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Preface  
 
 
This book was borne out of a mixture of excitement and frustration. Excitement because of our 
engagement with a developing field, ‘empirical bioethics’, which promises a great deal; and frustration 
because the emerging field threatens to be so multifarious and vague that making sense of it is a 
challenge for even the most seasoned researcher.   
  
The premise that underpins empirical bioethics, however, is simple, and this book is largely accepting 
of that premise: a bioethics that is dominated by theoretical philosophical approaches is ill-suited to 
the job of engaging with, and prescribing about, complex ethical dilemmas. Rather these dilemmas 
require solutions that can be applied and defended in practice, rather than in the pages of an 
academic journal.  A theoretical approach to bioethics provides a perspective that focusses on 
argument and theoretical consistency – but an approach to ethics that focuses wholly on argument 
and consistency risks ignoring the human element and sanitising what is, essentially, a very messy, 
social and human phenomenon.   Good applied ethics must, accordingly, be attendant to the realities 
of moral life as it is practised, not (merely) as it is theorised about, because good applied ethics must 
have real world purchase; that is, it must be resonant with moral actors in the world, not just those in 
the academy. 
 
There is certainly something compelling about the idea of real world purchase, but precisely what is 
meant by having ‘real world purchase’ remains moot.   For us, and for the purposes of this book, we 
understand it as research that seeks, through engaging with empirical research, to meet one or more 
of the following three conditions: 
 
The veridical condition 
 
The research process attempts to ensure that the ethical issue being researched is genuine and 
authentic; framed in terms of the way it is experienced and negotiated in practice by moral actors, 
rather than constructed in abstract by a moral theorist. 
 
The realist condition 
 
The research process attempts to ensure that the analysis is attendant to the circumstances in which 
moral actors find themselves, and pays due consideration to factors that may constrain or limit the 
actions or choices available to actors. 
 
The pragmatic condition 
 
The research process attempts to generate conclusions/solutions to normative problems that are 
sufficiently respectful to, and engage sufficiently seriously with, the concerns and issues of relevant 
stakeholders, such that it is capable of being accepted and implemented. 
 
There are myriad ways in which these conditions may be met - which may be more or less successful 
- and arguably not all of them will necessarily involve first-hand direct engagement with empirical 
research.  The strategy, however, that proponents of empirical bioethics have used has been to 
attempt to combine disciplines, or elements of disciplines, to produce methodologies for ethical inquiry 
that allow some kind of integration of normative and empirical research.  Precisely what form that 
‘integration’ takes can vary substantially and is down to the individual researcher to explicate, but 
broadly speaking we take it to mean a process in which the empirical and the normative are not seen 
as distinct and separate areas of inquiry (with the conclusions of one area merely ‘imported’ for use in 
the other area), but as mutually informing and, to some extent, symbiotic. 
 
This focus on integration is significant, because it demarcates our account of empirical bioethics from 
other research strategies that are commonly included under this term. We take it that there are a 
number of other ways in which empirical research can be put to work in bioethics that do not meet the 
three conditions articulated here. The empirical identification of ethical issues in practice, the empirical 
substantiation of practical moral arguments, and the empirical evaluation of the implementation of 
ethical arguments/interventions into practice are commonly included in ‘broader church’ typologies of 
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empirical ethics. These empirical research designs raise their own problems and uncertainties, though 
they all differ from empirical bioethics as we are framing it because they are orientated towards 
meeting empirical objectives; they do not set out (at least explicitly) with the aim of generating 
solutions or conclusions to normative questions. Whilst we do not focus on these research activities in 
this book, our silence on them is not to discount their importance; either as studies that are equally 
relevant to developing our understanding of ethics in practice, or as activities that are potentially 
complementary to the empirical ethics research practices that are the focus of this book. 
 
The enterprise of developing and articulating methodologies that explicate the process of integration 
in empirical bioethics research has been a major focus of the literature to date, and a recent 
systematic review of integrative empirical bioethics methodologies found 32 distinct approaches.  This 
certainly shows that the field is active and developing, but we would take this opportunity to sound a 
warning; a warning that we hope permeates this volume, but which may seem like a counter-intuitive 
way to preface a book that is ostensibly concerned with methodology.  
 
There is a real danger that such an overt focus on developing methodologies will lead the field to 
focus on process rather than practice; where a discrete piece of research is evaluated according to 
the extent that it follows the process set out in a prescribed methodology rather than evaluated on its 
own merits given its specific aims and objectives.  Following the prescriptions of a tried and tested 
methodology is by no means a bad thing, but our concern is that there is a risk of methodological 
proceduralism, in which unreflectively following the steps set out, and describing them effectively and 
articulately might, at best, replace serious reflection on methodological choices or, at worst, hide a 
multitude of sins. 
 
Accordingly we have sought, in this book, to bring together perspectives from researchers actively 
working in this field, who are both theorising about methodologies in empirical bioethics and 
conducting research that uses those methodologies.  We have encouraged all our contributors, 
particularly those articulating methodologies, to say something new, clarify their positions and deal 
with criticism that has been previously levelled at their approach.  Above all, every chapter in this 
book encourages the reader to think carefully about methodological choices, and consider the 
implications of epistemology and theoretical perspectives for their research.   
 
This book is, then, is broadly anti-proceduralist.   Our aim is to present a source book, not a text book: 
one that clearly articulates the key challenges in the field and provides accounts of methodologies 
that have been tried and tested, and in doing so provide the reader with material to take away, to 
reflect on, and to use to develop their own thinking.  It is designed to present examples of how to think 
through the various challenges that empirical bioethics research presents and to stimulate thought – 
not to provide answers. 
 
The book has been arranged into two broad sections, Section 1 comprising chapters about theoretical 
issues, and Section 2 comprising chapters outlining specific ways of doing empirical bioethics and 
other more practical concerns. This distinction is somewhat artificial and reflects differences in 
emphasis rather than anything more clear-cut. It is a product of the need to find a way to structure the 
book and is not a statement about the order in which questions ought to be approached, or which 
perspectives ought to be prioritised.  In fact, as editors of this volume, our position is that the 
theoretical and practical considerations outlined herein cannot be separated. This is very much part of 
the excitement and challenge of the field: to find ways of approaching substantive moral questions 
which matter to practical actors, whilst taking seriously both the demands for rigour that properly 
attach to different forms of academic research and the theoretical and philosophical debates that 
inform these demands. We hope this book will help other researchers engage with, and confront, this 
challenge. 
 
 
 
Jonathan Ives 
Alan Cribb  
Michael Dunn  
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Theoretical perspectives: An introduction 
 
Jonathan Ives 
Michael Dunn 
Alan Cribb 
 
 
  
Research, in general, is complex.  When we first come across it we may assume that it is a simple 
process, in which we make observations about the world and record our conclusions based on those 
observations.  We later learn that this kind of simple research can only answer certain kinds of 
questions.  As our questions become more complex, we learn that it is important to think about the 
lenses or theories through which we observe the world; that there are different approaches to 
observation and that observation alone may not be enough. For example, different kinds of 
experimental design are sometimes needed, where variables are controlled and hypotheses tested.  
We also learn that some kinds of questions cannot be answered by observing the world or carrying 
out experiments; some questions can only be answered by thinking them through and reasoning 
about them.  We might then learn that there is a fundamental disagreement about how we can come 
to know anything at all, with one school of thought asserting that knowledge can be acquired through 
observation of the world (empiricism) and the other asserting that knowledge can be acquired through 
reasoning (rationalism).  In the process, we will start to realise that the way we believe knowledge can 
be obtained, and the way we go about trying to acquire knowledge, is very greatly influenced by 
various assumptions and beliefs we hold about the world and the nature of knowledge. Assumptions 
and beliefs that we will all have, but of which we might not always be aware, make explicit, or be able 
to justify.  These assumptions and beliefs about the world and how we can obtain knowledge form an 
epistemology (or ‘theory of knowledge’); and when epistemology is used thoughtfully to inform and 
justify the use of a particular research method (or set of research methods), we have a research 
methodology – that is, a process for obtaining knowledge about the world, using various methods, 
which are made coherent by an underpinning philosophy that explains how we can move from a state 
of not knowing to knowing, and allows us to provide a justification for that state of knowing. 
 
Research, then, is complex, and empirical bioethics is a candidate for being one of the most 
theoretically complex forms.  This complexity is a result of its attempt to integrate two very different 
kinds of inquiry – normative and empirical – which have traditionally been seen as separate and, to 
some extent, incompatible. This, taken on its own does not, however, really explain very much.  Two 
things traditionally being viewed as separate and incompatible does not mean that their combination 
is necessarily complex or problematic (just ask any five year old who’s experimenting in the kitchen).  
The complexity of the attempt to combine normative and empirical research can, rather, be 
understood in terms of two distinct problems: one theoretical and one, for want of a better word, 
territorial.    
 
The first problem that arises out of trying to combine these two very different forms of research activity 
is that of harmonising the epistemologies (and associated theoretical frameworks) that undergird their 
research methods, and of developing and using methods in ways that are consistent with those 
epistemologies.  The second is that even if epistemological harmonisation is possible it will tend to 
result in the adoption of new or novel blended perspectives that do not fit neatly within disciplinary 
boundaries; thus requiring researchers to step outside of disciplinary silos into a new world of 
transdisciplinarity.  We look at each of these problems in turn, before outlining how this section of the 
book attempts to shed light on them. 
 
 
The problem of harmonising epistemologies and theoretical frameworks 
 
Any attempt to obtain moral knowledge – that is, to conduct research that aims to answer questions 
about what we ought to do, what we ought to think, or how we ought to act – is no different to any 
other attempt to obtain knowledge, insofar as even asking the question makes certain assumptions.  
When we ask a normative question – one that asks how we ought to act – we make at least three 
assumptions:   
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i) We assume that the question makes sense (i.e. that it is meaningful to ask such a 
question);  
ii) We make an assumption about what an answer might look like (so that we will know it 
when we see it); and 
iii) We make an assumption about the way such an answer can be justified (so that we know 
whether or not we ought to accept it).   
 
Different philosophical traditions and schools of thought will make different assumptions and 
assertions about all of these points, and so part of the process of conducting research to obtain 
knowledge about how we ought to act is being conscious of which school of philosophical thought 
(and specifically, which moral epistemology) one is aligned with. 
 
Similarly, any attempt to obtain empirical knowledge – that is to conduct research that aims to answer 
descriptive questions about what we actually do, what we actually think, or how we actually act – 
makes a series of assumptions about the social world and how we obtain understandings of it.  We 
make assumption about the underlying realities of the social world and whether or not it is possible to 
understand it independently of the research process; and we make assumptions about how we can, 
(and should) interpret and understand cultures and practices.  Different social scientific schools of 
thought will make different assumptions and assertions about all of these points, and so part of the 
process of doing research to obtain knowledge about how people do act/think/experience is being 
conscious of which empirical epistemology one is aligned with. 
 
As outlined in the preface, the unique quality of empirical bioethics, as we are defining it here, is that it 
aims to be integrative:  to combine normative and empirical research practices, and not simply to 
conduct separate empirical and normative studies in parallel.  As such it has to take seriously, and 
combine, both normative and empirical epistemologies; and a great deal of intellectual legwork is 
required in order to be able to tell a coherent theoretical story about how one can combine the 
empirical and the normative, and how one can obtain both empirically informed and useful normative 
conclusions that are appropriately justified. 
 
The most significant challenge of this kind that empirical bioethics faces, if the current and recent 
literature is anything to go by, is to explain how we can draw conclusions about the way the world 
should be (making ‘ought’ claims) in a way that has been meaningfully informed by observation and 
understanding about the way the world currently is.  The challenge, broadly conceived, can be 
narrated as follows: 
 
Ethics is fundamentally a normative enterprise, in the sense that it wants to be able to 
make statements about how people ought to act, regardless of how they actually do act.   
 
Recent critiques of bioethics, however, have challenged the traditional philosophical 
approach to doing bioethics research, claiming that philosophical bioethics is too abstract 
and too disconnected from people’s lived moral experiences to be capable of making 
‘ought’ claims about the world (Hedgecoe, 2004; Hoffmaster, 2001; De Vries et al, 2006; 
Borry et al, 2005; Ives 2008).  In order to be capable of making ‘ought’ claims that can be 
taken seriously, bioethics needs to pay attention to context and to what people actually 
do and think (and why); and the way to do this is to pay close attention to empirical 
(typically, social scientific) research.   
 
Philosophical Bioethics might respond, and claim that good applied ethics must, and has 
always, has paid attention to the empirical world and used empirical research (Herrera, 
2008), and so the challenge to philosophical bioethics is nothing but a straw man.   
 
But, says the critique, that is exactly the point.  Philosophical bioethics uses empirical 
research; the same way a queen uses a handmaiden (Haimes, 2002).  When it wants 
something, it asks for it, and then it sends it away.  Paying attention to the empirical 
world is more than simply using facts to support argument - what Ashcroft (2003) has 
called ‘completing the hypothetical imperative’, where a philosophical argument requires 
certain facts to be established, and so appeals to empirical research to establish the 
facts.  Paying attention to the empirical world means learning from it, and using the 
empirical to inform our thinking about which values are and should be important.  In other 
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words, the empirical ought not to be a handmaiden to the normative (philosophical) 
monarch, it should be a partner.  It should not simply be consulted when a philosophical 
argument requires a fact, but should be integrated into the process of working out what 
our values ought to be. 
 
This basic idea presents us with a problem, because much contemporary analytic philosophy 
contends that ethical and factual claims are fundamentally distinct; the former being normative and 
the latter being descriptive.  For many people, as McMillan & Hope note, “the normativity of ethics 
rules out the possibility of it’s being done in a factual or empirical way” (2008;14), and this is explained 
by appealing to various philosophical tropes, broadly expressed as follows: 
 
1) One cannot derive an ‘ought’ claim from an ‘is’ claim.  Any ‘is’ claim is simply descriptive of a 
contingent state of affairs; additional reasoning (in the form of a bridging value premise) is 
required in order to establish that what ‘is’ also ‘ought’ to be.  Given that, empirical bioethics is 
deeply problematic, because it requires us to make a leap from our understanding of what ‘is’ 
(described by empirical research) to making claims about what ought to be; and no move 
from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ can be justified. 
 
2) Ethics is concerned with ‘values’ and empirical research is concerned with ‘facts’.  Facts are 
independent of values; they are simply descriptive and value free.  Moral values, on the other 
hand, are not dependent on facts, and neither can they be reduced to facts.  Moore’s Open 
question argument attempts to show this, by pointing out that one can attempt to reduce a 
value to a fact (such as ‘morally good’ can be reduced to ‘pleasurable’), but one can always 
ask meaningfully ‘is pleasure good?’.  The fact that that question is meaningful, and can 
always be asked, shows us that values cannot be understood simply in terms of natural 
properties. 
 
A significant challenge, then, for proponents of empirical bioethics, is how to account for the 
relationship between empirical ‘is’ claims and normative ‘ought’ claims in a way that does not conflate 
facts and values and does not make an ‘ought’ directly derivative from an ‘is’.  As Ives and Draper 
(2009) have argued, “no sane defender of empirical bioethics is likely to suggest that we unreflectively 
use empirical data to determine what we morally ought to do” (pp254).  Rather, they contend, that: 
 
[t]he real challenge is to determine what role empirical data can play… and how it can be 
integrated into normative ethical reasoning in a way that respects the sound empirical 
point that facts and values are not distinct in practice, but that also does not fall foul of 
the is/ought problem as defined in philosophical terms (pp254). 
 
However, to consider this challenge as fundamental or insurmountable makes the mistake of 
assuming that all of ‘philosophy’ is united in the way that it understands the relationship between fact 
and value.  As McMillan (2016) notes, in his chapter from this volume, the empiricist epistemology 
that asserts the distinction between fact and value is not universally accepted, and: 
 
we have good reason for being cautious about basing objections to empirical ethics upon 
18th century British Empiricism, which is a radical and controversial epistemology. (pp)    
 
Whilst few might go so far as to support Hedgecoe’s (2004) (dismissive) claim that the is/ought 
problem or fact/value distinction are ‘figments of the philosophical imagination’, others might point to 
different philosophical traditions, and different ways of explaining the interaction between is/ought and 
between fact/value.  Once one takes a broader view, and considers what different philosophical 
traditions might have to offer, one can begin to see how and why the notion of integrating the 
empirical and normative cannot be dismissed out of hand.  For example; Haimes and Williams (2007) 
have proposed a methodology drawing on a notion of ethical particularism and Aristotelian phronesis, 
which supports an understanding of ethics as an activity that develops from context. Parker (2009) 
proposes ‘Teleological Expressivism’ -  a position that endorses a form of ethical naturalism and 
explains how empirical data can inform the making of normative judgements by explaining the role of 
emotion in practical rationality. Ives (2015) proposes ‘quasi-moral foundationalism’ – a position that 
draws on philosophical pragmatism and moderate pragmatic naturalism to describe fact/value 
entanglement, and justify an approach to empirical bioethics based on a particular understanding of 
the function of bioethics and the requirement to compromise.  In this volume, Landweer et al (2016) 
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draw on Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy to explain how the varied experiences and perspectives 
of stakeholders are integral to the development of normative solutions, through a process of dialogue 
and interpretation.  What is important in all of these approaches is that they have taken pains to 
acknowledge and engage with the problem of is/ought and fact/value, but have attempted to provide 
an internally coherent epistemology and theoretical framework to explain the relationship between the 
empirical and the normative - one that does not assume 18th century British Empiricism is 
authoritative on the issue. 
 
It is, however, important to consider that although much of the focus of the empirical bioethics 
literature has been on how to manage the is/ought problem in a way that allows us to make justifiable 
normative claims, there are others who are thoughtfully sceptical about this ambition. Some 
commentators, working in a broadly Weberian tradition (e.g. Hamersley, 2000), urge extreme caution 
in attempts to integrate empirical and normative forms of scholarship, on the grounds that attempting 
anything other than 'bracketing out' normative considerations is liable to undermine the possibility of 
empirical rigour.   Even so, Hammersley’s point about the need to aim for empirical research that is as 
‘value neutral’ as possible does not speak against the project of empirical bioethics, nor the project of 
developing empirically informed normative judgements.  As Gewirtz and Cribb (2006) note: 
 
[Hammersley] is against any assumption on the part of researchers that they are better 
qualified than those they are studying to make the everyday moral decisions that the 
people they are studying have to make. He is also opposed to the tendency for 
researchers to recommend courses of action that are impractical or that risk making 
matters worse rather than better. Above all, Hammersley is opposed to researchers 
prescribing courses of action as if they follow from their research findings rather than from 
their prior political or ethical beliefs. (pp145) 
 
These are concerns that many proponents of EB will share and, as attested to in this volume, attempt 
to address through their methodologies.  Hammersley, however, is also concerned that social 
researchers ought to make every effort to separate their own values from their search for facts, 
arguing that: 
 
[t]he closer we can approximate to [value-neutrality], the less the danger of our political 
or practical values biasing our results (Hammersley, 2000;33).   
 
Whilst the question of whether anything approaching value-neutral empirical research is possible is 
moot, it is certainly the case that some contributions to the EB literature seems to assume it can be 
done, and is unproblematic (e.g. Kon, 2009), whereas others are explicitly critical of this assumption 
(e.g. Dunn & Ives, 2009).  What is certain is that engaging in empirical bioethics requires one not only 
to consider the relationship between facts and values in the sense of how one make empirically 
informed normative judgements, but also the relationship between facts and values in the empirical 
research process itself. 
 
Another way of understanding this kind of concern is that in focussing all our attention on how to 
address the normative, we may become less attentive to the need to fully address the empirical, and 
ensure that our empirical data collection is rigorous.  Practitioners of empirical bioethics have certainly 
been accused of being insufficiently attentive to empirical rigour, with concerns that bioethics treats 
empirical data collection methods as a simplistic and philosophically unproblematic set of tools (Dunn 
& Ives, 2010), or simply that empirical bioethics has failed to import the standards of empirical 
research, both in conduct and critical appraisal (Hurst, 2010; Strech, 2010; Provoost, 2015), leading 
to poor quality work.  As Singh (2016) argues in her chapter in this volume, failure to be attentive to 
the quality of the empirical work undertaken risks the entire enterprise of empirical bioethics.  
 
 
The problem of harmonising disciplines 
 
When we introduced this problem above we described it as ‘territorial’ (for want of a better word), but 
this perhaps does the problem a dis-service.  Arguably, there is a territorial angle to the difficulties 
faced by working across disciplines, and the problems empirical bioethics has faced in this regard 
have been described by some as a territorial dispute, with disciplines vying for dominance over the 
(battle)field (for example: Molewijk & Frith, 2009; Ives, 2008).  Indeed, the analogy of the social 
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scientist as handmaiden to the philosophical monarch in bioethics, mentioned above (Haimes, 2002), 
is one that is fundamentally about disciplinary power and control over the normative and what counts 
as good normative justification. In using that analogy, one makes a point about where the power lies 
in bioethics, and might, for example, be suggesting that bioethics should not be dominated by 
philosophy and (Western analytic) philosophical perspectives on how normative claims can be made 
and justified.  Where the ‘power’ in bioethics lies is important, and arguably has implications for 
funding, publication, and ultimately the structure of research and teaching institutions (see also Frith & 
Draper’s chapter, this volume).  There is more to it, however, than disciplinary tub-thumping and 
argument over who exercises control over an academic field.  This can be managed; we can all play 
nicely together if we want to (and an excellent example of this can be found in Farsides & Williams’ 
account of their longstanding interdisciplinary collaborations, in this volume).   
 
The more substantive challenge around disciplinary harmonisation is finding sufficient common 
ground, and a sufficiently common language, to begin to build something that goes beyond traditional 
disciplinary boundaries and stands alone, not beholden to a dominant ‘parent’ discipline.  This 
requires us to go beyond merely harmonising theoretical perspectives so that we have a coherent 
epistemology; it requires us to understand and take seriously the challenges and demands of rigour 
that other disciplines bring to the table; and not dismiss an idea because ‘that’s not the way we do 
things’, but to genuinely suspend disciplinary assumptions – what DeWachter (1982) refers to as 
‘epoche’) – and this is no mean feat.  It requires a reflexive and creative approach, and a genuine 
thirst for new ways of discovery. 
 
 
Theoretical and territorial considerations 
 
In this section, we present chapters that explore some of these theoretical and territorial issues.  They 
give the novice reader grounding in some of the key issues and debates, but they also offer the more 
experienced researcher a positive account of, and argument for, how we might deal with them. 
 
In the first chapter, John McMillan explores the complex concept of ‘normativity’ through discussion of 
the fact-value distinction, which is so central to many of the debates in empirical bioethics, and offers 
insight into how taking a particular stance on the fact/value distinction can impact on how one might 
approach empirical bioethics research.  It also explores how different disciplinary perspectives might 
understand, and use, the concept of ‘normativity’ in different ways.  McMillan unpicks and delineates 
three distinctive meta-ethical issues: the fact/value distinction; the is/ought problem; and the 
naturalistic fallacy, and explores the implications of each for empirical bioethics. McMillan’s key task is 
to challenge the standard philosophical rebuke to empirical bioethics that facts and values are entirely 
distinct.  Rather, he argues, that: 
 
[t]he traditional empiricist version where fact and value are dichotomous is arguably 
untenable, and yet has shaped approaches to empirical bioethics…, and is sometimes 
used to argue that the whole project of empirical bioethics is untenable.   Further 
reflection upon the different kinds of value sheds light on how it is that different 
approaches to bioethics can be normative, but in different ways.  (pp??)  
 
The second chapter, from Mark Sheehan, details the ‘problem’ of moral relativism: what its impact is 
for empirical bioethics, and how empirical bioethics might attempt to manage it. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, given the centrality of this meta-ethical question to debates in empirical bioethics, this 
chapter links back to the discussion of fact/value in McMillan’s preceding chapter, and foregrounds 
many of the issues that are discussed in detail in proceeding chapters, including the notion of 
expertise, the status of robust empirical data, and questions about authority and legitimacy in making 
moral judgements.   Importantly, Sheehan takes the key issues in the philosophical debate around 
moral relativism, and transposes them into the debate about empirical bioethics methodology, 
illustrating forcefully their relevance and significance.  The chapter ends with an articulation of a 
‘moderate objectivist’ position, attributed to David Wiggins, which, argues Sheehan, is a meta-ethical 
position that: 
 
represents a very serious attempt to acknowledge the ethical significance of context, 
practice and perspective, but at the same time offers a robust account of the 
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methodology of ethical and conceptual argument which can claim authority in the face of 
the relativist’s scepticism. (pp??). 
 
This chapter, then, presents both an account of the challenge that moral relativism might pose to 
empirical bioethics, but also provides an accessible philosophical account of ethics that might provide 
a theoretical grounding for various forms of empirical bioethics methodology.  
 
Kyle Edwards & Zuzana Deans provide, in chapter three, an exploration of the issues of 
professionalism, expertise and authority, which are central to empirical bioethics, but rarely examined 
in relation to it. Edwards & Deans argue that one of the central driving forces behind empirical 
bioethics is the claim that it seeks to develop ‘a way of doing bioethics that gives it a legitimate place 
at the policy table’, premised on the notion that empirical bioethics allows us to conduct bioethics 
research that is better grounded in the real world than philosophical bioethics.  They approach the 
question, however, in reverse, by first exploring what legitimises the place of ethicist per se at the 
policy table, and exploring what authority, expertise and legitimacy they have.  Based on their answer 
to that question Edwards & Deans then consider how the way that we justify and legitimise the role of 
an ethicist in policy making must impact on the way that the ethicists themselves develops and 
represents their own ethical position.  There is, in essence, a drawing down of legitimacy, whereby 
the ethicist ought to be cognisant of choosing a methodology for developing and justifying a position 
on a normative issue that is compatible with the political justification for their presence and role in a 
public policy forum.  
 
Chapter four, by Ilina Singh, provides something of a bridge, which begins to blend important 
considerations about theoretical perspectives in empirical research with comments about disciplinary 
harmony and rigour.  The central message coming out of Singh’s chapter is that empirical bioethics 
needs to take seriously, and engage with, the substantial theoretical challenges involved in 
discovering empirical facts – what we might see as a rejection of the simplistic ‘tool kit’ approaches to 
empirical data gathering that some advocates of empirical bioethics seem to accept (see above).  
 
Singh’s chapter does many things.  It challenges the use of the term ‘empirical data’ to refer to an 
homogenous and interchangeable category, and encourages the empirical bioethics researcher to be 
more sophisticated in their understanding of what different kinds of data can offer and to think 
carefully about what kind of data is best suited to an integrative empirical bioethics analysis.   
 
It highlights the vital importance of being attentive to the framing of an empirical question within 
empirical bioethics research, emphasising that the way a question is framed has an impact on the 
empirical methods and methodology that can be used to answer it; the empirical method and 
methodology that are used then has an impact on what answer we get and how those answers are 
understood; and in turn the answers we get and the way they are understood have an impact on how 
they are and can be integrated with a normative analysis.   Similarly, if we begin with a theoretical 
perspective about ethics, this will impact on what empirical methodologies we are attracted to and 
use, which will in turn affect the kind of empirical data we collect.  The central argument is that 
empirical bioethics research must be viewed as an holistic enterprise – where inattention to the 
coherency of empirical and normative components creates significant problems. 
 
Finally, it draws our attention to the dangers of developing methodologies in empirical bioethics that 
replicate (or create) hierarchies of approaches, where different kinds of analysis are conducted by 
separate groups (or people) and the findings passed onto the next as a part of a production line.  This 
is a point that address the territorial issue more than the theoretical one, but it arises directly out of 
methodological reflection.  “The integrity of the empirical data”, argues Singh, “is lost when it functions 
as a means to an end” (pp??). 
 
The fifth chapter in this section sees Richard Huxtable articulating the relationship between bioethics 
and law, using an extended metaphor of ‘friends, foes and flatmates’.  In particular, Huxtable 
considers how law, as a fundamentally practical and empirically founded enterprise that “must have 
purchase in the real world”, has lessons for bioethics, particularly empirical bioethics, as it tries to 
develop into a field of research that has similar real world purchase.  More broadly, the chapter is an 
exploration, perhaps more accurately an exposition, of how conversations between disciplinary 
perspectives, which aim to genuinely understand and learn, can be productive and useful.  The 
conclusion Huxtable draws, that “[we] should… continue to configure the relationship between law 
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and bioethics, moving it on from its “haphazard” beginnings”  (pp??) rings true more generally.  
Empirical bioethics must continue to configure the relationships between all of the disciplines that 
contribute to it, so that it can move beyond a haphazard conglomeration of ideas competing for 
dominance, and into a more settled, happy, but almost certainly unconventional, marriage. 
 
The sixth and final chapter in this section, from Cribb & Owens, follows on from Huxtable’s specific 
examination of the relationship between law and bioethics, and considers more generally the value of 
diversity in empirical bioethics.  It does this by first setting up a stereotypical conflict between the 
‘Philosopher’ and the ‘Social Scientist’ that attests to the incommensurability of the two approaches.  
It then explores the heterogeneity of approaches within those disciplines themselves, and in doing so 
argues that the general criticisms that a philosopher may have of a social scientific approach applies 
to many philosophers as well, and vice versa.    The argument is that the points of contestation within 
empirical bioethics are not necessarily fought along disciplinary lines – to assume they are is to 
assume that disciplines have a homogeneity that they simply do not have and encourages a 
disciplinary tribalism of a very unhelpful kind.  Rather, what is more important is asking about the aims 
of the research – which Cribb and Owens characterise using the axes of engineering or 
enlightenment aims, and descriptive and normative aims.  They problematise the notion of one’s 
research aims being determined by one’s discipline, and the overriding point to take away from this is 
that embracing and recognising the diversity of aims and methods within disciplinary perspectives, as 
well was within bioethics, may be the key to effective transdisciplinary work in empirical bioethics. 
 
 
Final words 
 
This first section of the book ends with an entreaty to embrace diversity, but this appeal must be 
accompanied by a health warning.  As Cribb & Owens note, embracing diversity does not mean that 
‘anything goes’.  If there is a core message of this book, it is that all methodological decisions, 
underpinned as they must be with a sound and coherent theoretical framework, must be well 
reasoned and justified.  The entreaty to embrace diversity means that empirical bioethics needs to be 
open to different ways of thinking and be creative in its approach, but it must also be rigorous.   
We end with a quotation from a recent systematic review on methods in empirical bioethics, which 
sets the scene well for the chapters to come: 
 
For now, our view is that everyone working in this field must live with a great deal of 
uncertainty, and will have to work hard to explain what they are doing and why it ought to 
be taken seriously. If we are trying to do a new kind of ethics, using new kinds of 
methodologies, then we should be put under pressure to justify and articulate that new 
approach clearly. At this stage in the development of empirical bioethics, that means 
engaging explicitly and meaningfully with questions concerning the kinds of moral claim 
that empirical bioethicists want to be able to make, about normative justification and the 
methodological process, and about the coherence of these different components of their 
work. So long as this is done, the evident heterogeneity doesn’t matter, and should in 
fact be welcomed. (Davies et al, 2015;12). 
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Empirical Bioethics and the fact/value distinction 
 
John McMillan 
 
 
Introduction 
At first blush, there seems something compelling about the idea that there is a profound difference 
between matters of fact and values. Facts are the proper domain of science and seem to imply 
objectivity and being truth apt. Values would seem, on the other hand, to be inherently subjective, 
revisable and not truth apt.  The idea that ethics, which is a subject that deals primarily with questions 
of value, could be empirical grates on some because it sounds as if more epistemic weight is being 
given to ethics than it can bear. This is not to deny that we might find out something about what 
people in fact value via empirical methods; rather, more that it is a mistake to think that any kind of 
empirical investigation can further our understanding of what we should value or do.       
The philosophical underpinnings of that intuition, and how empirical approaches to ethics might 
respond to it, have been given significant attention over the last twenty years and there appears to be 
an acceptance, albeit grudging, among those who view bioethics via a philosophical lens, that there is 
a role for empirical approaches to ethics.   
Empirical ethics has become accepted to the extent that the American Journal of Bioethics, which has 
the highest impact factor of any ethics journal, has now started a sister journal publishing empirical 
ethics research; and there have been a number of articles, special issues and books published 
arguing for empirical ethics.  
Nonetheless, there are empirical approaches to ethics that are heavily influenced by the traditional 
philosophical fact/value distinction. Fulford’s (2004) ‘values based medicine’ is the most prominent 
example, where a sharp dichotomy between facts and values, and scepticism about the epistemic 
status of values, shape the theory. Unpacking where such views have gone astray involves revisiting 
the assumptions that underpin the fact value distinction. I will show, in this chapter, why we should not 
grant these assumptions and consider what the implications of this are for how we should view 
empirical bioethics.  
Thinking more carefully about the different kinds of value (or normativity) that make a sharp 
dichotomy between fact and value untenable can also explain how both sociological and philosophical 
approaches to bioethics are normative, but in distinct ways. ‘Sociological epistemic values’ are the 
epistemic norms of medical sociology and they encourage a critical perspective upon issues within 
bioethics. Such values explain not only how medical sociology is normative, but also why it is that 
empirical bioethics offers something new and distinct from classic medical sociology.    
 
The fact value distinction 
It is worth noting, as Mackie (1977) does, that philosophy has not always taken values to imply a lack 
of objectivity: for Plato the just and the beautiful were formal, objective and appropriately considered 
within the realm of ‘knowledge.’   Nonetheless, since Hume and the other British Empiricists, there 
has been a commonly held conviction that values are mere sentiment and need to put to one side 
when our aim is the pursuit of knowledge. While this is a scepticism that is true of values more 
generally, it is ethics where that challenge has had greatest bite. 
One of the most quoted passages in Hume, and the one that many will identify with the fact value 
distinction, is from the Treatise where he describes the logical problem of deriving a normative 
conclusion from purely factual premises.   
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that 
the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the 
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being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I 
am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I 
meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or 
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation… (Hume, 1956: 177-178) 
There are different ways of interpreting this passage.  Putnam (2002) and many others have taken it 
to imply a radical scepticism about the impossibility of ever grounding normative claims. But Hume 
can also be interpreted as merely making a logical point about the tendency to move quickly from a 
discussion of how things are, be that human nature or human affairs, to a claim about how things 
should be (Pigden, 1989). If that’s all that the fact/value distinction amounts to then this poses no 
great challenge to empirical approaches to ethics, all that needs to happen is that those who are 
engaged in empirical bioethics need to be mindful about the ethical premises that they’re using to 
derive a normative conclusion. There will be cases within bioethics where normative claims are drawn 
too hastily from an empirical study, and where a normative premise should have first been stated.  
For example, a qualitative study about neo-natal decision making might observe that parents value 
being fully informed about a changing prognosis and taking an active role in decision making about 
their very unwell child making (for an example of such a study see McHaffie et al, 2001). If the authors 
of such a study concluded from this alone that parents should always be informed and take an active 
role in decision-making they would be committing a logical fallacy of this kind. It does not follow from 
the fact that a group of people value something and have a preference about it that what they want is 
what should happen. Those interpreting such a study need to argue this out and add normative 
premises such as ‘parental autonomy is an important principle that implies we should give parents a 
greater right to decide’ in order to make the normative conclusion follow.   In such a case, that does 
not seem like anything more than a reminder to pay heed to the importance of checking that a deontic 
argument is valid. These are points that are worth bearing in mind for anyone seeking to combine 
empirical and normative investigation, and are explored by McMillan and Hope (2008) in ‘The 
possibility of empirical psychiatric ethics’. 
However, elsewhere in the Treatise it is clear that Hume is making a deeper point about the 
epistemology of value, and is developing a position that if true would create serious problems for 
scholarly inquiry into ethics and aesthetics. For Hume, all knowledge derives from the senses via 
sense impressions (for more on British Empiricism and how Hume fits within that tradition, see 
Mackie, 1980; Raphael, 1969).  Simple ideas, from which all knowledge is built, are faint copies of 
sense impressions. So, for example,my idea of ‘blueness’ is a faint copy of the sense impression that 
I have when I look at the sky on a cloudless day.  
Simple ideas can be associated with other ideas forming complex ideas, the stuff of which all 
knowledge is constructed. For example, I might form the idea of a ‘sphere’ from looking at a ball. That 
idea can be associated with my idea of ‘blueness’ and I am thereby able to perceive and have 
thoughts about a blue ball.  
So far so good for a grounding of factual knowledge in the testimony of the senses; but values are not 
so easily given an empiricist grounding. As Paul Griffiths (1997) has observed, the fact/value 
distinction is drawn very sharply by Hume because of his arguments about the impossibility of 
grounding the passions. In the following passage, Hume argues for a form of non-cognitivism about 
values, which in this context means that values are not truth apt and are mere sentiment.  
Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means 
insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. It is not 
contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching on my 
finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least 
uneasiness of an Indian, or person wholly unknown to me. (Hume, 1956:128) 
For Hume, passions should be understood in an expansive sense so as to include emotions, values, 
aesthetic and moral judgements: in effect anything that motivates us to act or is normative. He is clear 
that there are cases where a passion is premised upon a false belief and in such cases a passion 
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could be contrary to reason. For example, if I am moved by the beauty of a Van Gogh painting 
because of the tragedy that was unfolding in his life at that time, but when the painting is in fact a 
modern work painted in the same style, my passion might be viewed as contrary to reason because it 
is premised upon a false belief about the nature of the painting. Likewise, if I desire and eat ice cream 
because I wish to eat only foods that will enable me to lose weight, that desire is contrary to reason in 
the sense that it is a means that is insufficient to the end of losing weight.    
In the case of an ethical value, it too might be premised upon a false observation and thereby contrary 
to reason. For example, a passer-by might intervene if they see a woman distressed while being held 
by a man and say, ‘let her go, it’s wrong to treat someone like that.’ But, if the man and woman were 
in fact engaged in performance art and this was a piece of street theatre, then they might break role 
and explain that in fact no one was harmed and it was mere pretence. Hume’s point is that in both of 
these cases while there are factual errors that can lead the passions astray, the passions themselves 
cannot have a basis in matters of fact.      
Passions themselves, except for the cases of factual error described above, cannot admit of truth or 
falsity, principally because of Hume’s commitment to a particularly strict version of 18th century 
empiricism. For Hume, all knowledge derives from sense impressions and because we do not directly 
perceive the passions and they therefore cannot be built via the association of ideas, they cannot be 
matters or fact and therefore are not truth apt.  
It’s worth pausing to think about how radical Hume’s proposal is and what it would mean for areas 
such as ethics and aesthetics. Some have taken it to imply that moral claims fail to constitute claims 
at all and are merely expressions of emotion, see Ayer’s ‘Language, Truth and Logic’ (1946)  for an 
example. It is also worth thinking about the other possibilities for grounding the passions that are 
being denied. Rationalists about ethics believe that normativity can be grounded in the structure of 
our rationality, as opposed to judgements about how the world is. That view is one with a rich history 
and is the backbone of Kant’s theory, where normativity is derived from the nature of a good will. So, 
we have good reason for being cautious about basing objections to empirical ethics upon 18th century 
British Empiricism, which is a radical and controversial epistemology.  
There is a connection between Hume’s views about the passion’s lack of rationality and G E Moore’s 
claims about the naturalistic fallacy, but it is important to remember that they are distinct meta-ethical 
views.  In Moore’s own words, the naturalistic fallacy occurs:   
When a man confuses two natural objects with one another, defining the one by the 
other, if for instance, he confuses himself, who is one natural object, with “pleased” or 
with “pleasure” which are others, then there is no reason to call the fallacy naturalistic. 
But if he confuses “good,” which is not in the same sense a natural object, with any 
natural object whatever, then there is a reason for calling that a naturalistic fallacy; its 
being made with regard to “good” marks it as something quite specific, and this specific 
mistake deserves a name because it is so common. (Moore, 1903:s12) 
Although these views have something in common and perhaps also a lineage, Moore’s view is not 
Hume’s. Where Hume was concerned about the logical problem of constructing an ethical argument 
from purely factual premises and the impossibility of finding sense impressions that ground the 
passions, Moore is more concerned with attempts to reduce claims about the passions, or in his terms 
‘non-natural’ properties, to matters of fact or natural properties. Perhaps the most important example 
he discusses is attempting to define or reduce ‘goodness’ to ‘pleasure.’ According to Moore, defining 
the good in this way falls foul of the naturalistic fallacy and runs the risk of inviting an ‘open question’. 
Whenever a property such as ‘good’ is equated with pleasure it is always possible to sensibly pose 
the question ‘but is pleasure good?’ The idea is that there is more to non-natural properties than can 
ever be captured by it being defined in natural terms; they are essentially irreducible.     
Although Moore is, like Hume, an empiricist, they draw quite different epistemic implications from their 
similar view that ‘the passions’ or ‘non-natural’ properties are independent of the factual or natural.  At 
least, in the early Hume, the independence of the passions from the factual implies that morality and 
aesthetics, insofar as they are scholarly areas of inquiry, appear to be founded upon some kind of 
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mistake. Moore, on the other hand, seems more driven to protect the importance of viewing the good 
or the beautiful in their own terms. Rather than implying irrationality, the irreducibility of non-natural 
properties preserves their status as things to which we should aspire. Just as Plato thought that 
perceiving the ‘just’ or the ‘beautiful’ involved apprehending something formal and therefore truth apt, 
Moore seemed to think the irreducibility of the non-natural did not mean they could not be perceived 
in the world and be truth apt. His point is, rather, that we should not mistake those perceptions for 
others that are of a natural kind.      
The difference between Hume and Moore has some interesting applications for how we should 
conceptualize empirical ethics, but before turning to what might follow from a Moorean view, I will 
discuss the way in which Hume’s assumptions have shaped one influential approach to empirical 
ethics. 
 
Ten principles of values based medicine 
In ‘Ten principles of values based medicine’ (2004) Bill Fulford develops a method for discussing 
values in psychiatry that can be considered a form of empirical ethics. Values based medicine (VBM) 
is intended to act as the counterpoint to evidence based medicine (EBM). VBM is not, so the story 
goes, intended to supplant EBM; instead the idea is that because EBM involves the critical appraisal 
of evidence so as to reach rational determinations about matters of fact, it misses the importance of 
also having a way of making decisions about questions of value. So VBM is filling in part of the picture 
that is missed by EBM. We should consider VBM to be an example of empirical ethics because it has 
similar aims to EBM: to transform clinical practice by making decisions more structured and 
responsive to research informed evidence. VBM aims at providing a values base, similarly grounded 
in a method for generating claims about values, which can also be fed into clinical practice so as to 
ensure it is sensitive to values. The aims of both EBM and VBM are worthy, and mesh research 
activity with clinical practice. So VBM emphasises, as does EBM, the importance of particular kinds of 
research activity and should therefore be considered a form of empirical ethics.  A second reason why 
VBM qualifies as empirical ethics is because it is being used as a methodology for producing 
accounts of what patients value (Petrova et al, 2006; Fulford, 2011). 
In addition to supplementing EBM, it’s also clear that Fulford thinks VBM is an antidote to ways of 
approaching bioethics that he finds lacking. He says that VBM is ‘a skills based counterpart to the 
currently dominant quasi-legal form of clinical bioethics’ (2004:205). He explains this point as follows: 
Values based medicine, then, aims to resolve differences, not by consensus but by what 
I have called elsewhere “dissensus”… that is, by processes that support effective action 
through a balance of legitimately different value perspectives. It is worth looking at this 
notion of dissensus in a little more detail, since it is at the heart of the practice of VBM. 
Thus, in the quasi-legal model of bioethics, differences of values are resolved, in 
principle, by reference to a rule (embodied in a code or guideline and often supported by 
law), which has been settled in advance by consensus. Differences of interpretation may 
arise, of course, but these are settled, again in principle, by reference to a regulatory 
body with executive decision-making powers. (Fulford, 2004:216) 
In the footnote to this claim Fulford mentions the United Kingdom’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology and Authority (HFEA) by way of illustration, which does operate in a quasi-legal way, 
principally because it is a body given a mandate by an Act of Parliament. Even so, it seems unfair to 
the HFEA to criticise them for failing to acknowledge ‘dissensus’. In fact, the HFEA have been 
criticised for giving too much weight to the views of the public, for example in its report on sex 
selection (Harris, 2005). 
In any case there is a more substantial problem with Fulford’s view because he appears to be 
providing a solution to a straw man problem. It’s not obvious that anyone working in bioethics would 
describe their method as being one where disagreements about value are resolved by reference to a 
rule. What’s much more common, and is illustrated particularly ably by Jonathan Glover in his chapter 
on the scope and limits of moral argument in ‘Causing Death and Saving Lives’ (1977), is that values 
 19 
are tested for their scope, consistency and consequences in moral argument. It is hard to think of any 
example of a decent and published bioethical argument that reaches consensus between values via 
the adjudication of a pre-accepted rule.  
The reason why it is vitally important in bioethics to argue carefully about the scope, consistency and 
consequences of values is because, contra Fulford, not all values are legitimate. He claims that 
‘human values are not, merely, different but legitimately different’ (Fulford, 2004:215).  An assumption 
behind this belief, and perhaps another reason for distinguishing VBM from bioethics, is that the view 
that serious inquiry into the nature of values, and attempts to ground values, are fundamentally 
mistaken. This becomes apparent in the endnote attached to this claim where he describes in more 
depth what he means by ‘values’. He says 
That our values are not only different but legitimately different follows analytically from 
the logical separation of fact and value (or, more exactly, of description and evaluation) 
insisted on by ‘nondescriptivism’ in philosophical value theory. The eighteenth-century 
British Empiricist philosopher David Hume is generally credited with the first explicit 
account of the claim that no description of a state of affairs in the world can ever, in itself, 
add up to a value judgement of that state of affairs: ‘no ought from an is’ is how Hume’s 
“law” is often summarized. (Fulford, 2004:229)    
There’s a practical worry about viewing all values in the context of mental health (or in any context, for 
that matter) as legitimate. Forensic psychiatry often requires clinicians to help clients who have 
problems with violent or sexual offending. On many occasions those who abuse women and children 
will attempt to rationalise this via a different set of values. Some clients will attempt to justify what they 
have done via a set of values about the relative worth and role of women. There are clients who think 
that the moral prohibition on sexual relationships with young children is merely a social construct or 
reflects societally endorsed values and that their value set is one that is just as valid. A therapeutic 
challenge for forensic psychiatrists is to dis-abuse paedophiles from colluding about the validity of 
such values and attempting to justify their behaviour.  Fulford’s attempt to place all values on the 
same footing and to view them as not only different but ‘legitimately different’ is false because some 
values are not legitimate and there are practical therapeutic (and not only ethical) problems with 
viewing values in this way. However, there’s a more general issue for empirical ethics about how the 
fact/value distinction, if indeed any such distinction can be drawn, should influence our theory.  
 
Putnam on the ‘entanglement of fact and value’ 
A serious philosophical problem in shaping a theory about empirical ethics around the Humean 
version of the fact/value distinction is that there are strong arguments for thinking that no clear 
distinction can be drawn. In ‘The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy’ (2002), Hilary Putnam shows 
how philosophical debate about the synthetic/analytic dichotomy and the eventual abandonment of 
that distinction is a corollary for the fact/value distinction. The significance of the entanglement of fact 
and value for ethics has not been missed by those who have theorized about empirical ethics. 
Jonathan Ives (2014) has built on Eric Racine’s moderate pragmatic naturalism (2008) and argued 
that we don’t need to resolve the fact value problem in order to make progress with ethics or to 
formulate empirical ethics. Ives argues that when considering fact and value it is difficult to ‘make 
epistemic sense of either in isolation’ (Ives, 2014:303). That seems correct, but it is also important to 
be cognisant of different forms of value and their justification: doing this can enable us to have a more 
nuanced view of empirical ethics and how it is distinct from medical sociology.          
As I’ve already suggested, Hume deduced such a stark dichotomy because of his commitment to 18th 
century empiricism. In effect, Hume’s epistemology gave him what he took to be a true account of 
facts. Given the way that epistemic story worked, it was hard to see how values could be derived from 
it, so the fact/value distinction seemed self-evident to Hume because of what he took facts to be. 
A series of problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science led philosophers to see that it 
was impossible to give an account of knowledge, and of scientific knowledge, that did not include 
values.  
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‘…judgments of coherence, simplicity (which is itself a whole bunch of different values), 
not just one “parameter”), beauty, naturalness, and so on, are presupposed by physical 
science, likewise many today who refer to values as purely “subjective” and science as 
“objective” continue to shut their eyes to this same fact. Yet coherence and simplicity and 
the like are values.’ (Putnam, 2002:31) 
Putnam is careful to point out that he does not wish to equate epistemic values with moral or religious 
values. It is reasonable to suppose that these three kinds of value have different epistemic justification 
and will or will not be capable of being grounded in different kinds of ways. His point is that just 
because something doesn’t appear to be directly observable, in the way that my blue Humean ball is, 
it does not follow that it is not objective or incapable of being included within our realm of knowledge. 
The coherence and simplicity of Newtonian mechanics are features of those laws about physics and 
seem capable of the degree of objective description that is required by the natural sciences.  Moral 
values, on the other hand, need a different kind of grounding and we might be less confident about 
their objectivity so more needs to be said about different kinds of moral value. 
Meta-ethicists such as John McDowell, Philippa Foot and David Wiggins have discussed the apparent 
factual, or objective, nature of so called ‘thick ethical concepts.’ These are concepts that we would 
undoubtedly view as being evaluative, but where we do not appear be making some kind of error to 
view them as truth apt: 
If someone asks me what kind of person my child’s teacher is, and I say, ‘”he is very 
cruel,” I have both criticized him as a teacher and criticized him as a man. I do not have 
to add, ‘He is not a good teacher,” or, ‘He is not a good man.”… “Cruel” simply ignores 
the supposed fact/value dichotomy and cheerfully allows itself to be used sometimes for 
a normative purpose and sometimes as a descriptive term. (Putnam, 2002:34-35) 
The point here is that there are moral values that share many of the same features as the 
paradigmatically factual but we do not bat an eyelid about whether or not such claims are 
epistemically warranted. In the context of bioethics there are many thick ethical concepts that we use 
without needing to be concerned about whether we’re making some kind of epistemic mistake. For 
example, if we see a psychiatrist who is attempting to calm a psychotic patient say something that is 
untrue but will put that patient at ease, we might say that this psychiatrist had been both ‘untruthful’ 
and ‘paternalistic.’ Concepts such as these are the bedrock upon which bioethics and empirical ethics 
are built. They’re also concepts that appear to be factual and evaluative: there are factual features of 
that psychiatrist’s behaviour that will make these attributions true or false, yet at the same time these 
are evaluative and ethical concepts. It might be objected that thick ethical concepts are ambiguous in 
that when they’re being used in a factual sense they’re not clearly normative, and when they’re being 
used in a normative sense they’re not straightforwardly factual. There’s something to this worry, but 
because the fact/value distinction tends to be presented as a dichotomy then thick ethical concepts 
create a significant grey area between fact and value. Furthermore, even if someone is using 
‘coercion’ in a descriptive sense (i.e. that someone did something because of a threat), this is a sense 
that although not normative insofar as it entails that this should not occur, could not be considered 
morally neutral.1  
VBM is a version of empirical ethics that assumes a version of the fact/value distinction that we 
should not accept. In effect, for it to be plausible VBM requires a dichotomy between fact and value. 
No such dichotomy exists because there are many values that are objective (for example the 
epistemic values of natural science), and there are thick ethical concepts that can be considered 
factual.    
Putnam is correct that there are different kinds of value and that they require different kinds of 
justification. One defining feature of all values, and the reason why Hume included them within his 
category of ‘the passions’, is that they are motivating. For Hume, reason is empty and inert without 
motivating passion. While we should not agree with Hume’s epistemic picture, he’s correct that one 
defining feature of the passions (and values) is that they are normative; they give us a reason to act.  
                                                     
1 See Szmukler & Appelbaum (2008) for an example of how such concepts can be used. 
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When a scientist notes the coherence and simplicity of an explanation, she has reason for thinking 
that explanation good. When a music critic hears the dynamic range, precision and sensitivity to the 
composer’s intention of an orchestral performance, she might judge that performance to be excellent. 
The neighbour who intervenes in a domestic dispute where a child is about to be harmed has a moral 
reason grounded in the importance of preventing badness. In these three cases values play a role, so 
we could argue that there are ‘normative’ elements in all three cases. Yet, the kind of normativity is 
different in each of the examples, the first is a scientific or epistemic norm, the second an aesthetic 
norm, and the third moral. As I will show in the next section, there are different kinds of normativity 
that can be highlighted by empirical approaches to health care.    
   
Adam Hedgecoe’s challenge to empirical ethics 
Empirical ethics can take a number of forms and have a variety of aims. But for many, it is driven by a 
concern that bioethics can become too philosophical and insufficiently grounded in real world 
problems. Empirical ethics can help by building scholarly inquiry in bioethics upon the concepts, 
problems and challenges that health care professionals face (McMillan & Hope, 2008; McMillan, 
2012). A broad array of empirical methods have been proposed for doing this, but it would be fair to 
say that qualitative methods are used extensively, principally because they are an effective way of 
interacting with clinical reality.   
Adam Hedgecoe has given careful thought to the problematic nature of the fact/value distinction and 
is sensitive to what this implies about the futility of trying to demarcate the factual elements of inquiry 
in bioethics from the normative. What he has in mind is the fallacious idea that social scientists merely 
generate empirical data about health care which is then subjected to critical normative analysis by 
philosophically minded bioethicists (Hedgecoe, 2007). He, correctly in my view, objects to the claim 
that medical sociologist are not interested in normativity and points that out that they clearly are and 
that there is a rich literature in sociology which does exactly that.   
Medical Sociology provides thoroughly socially, culturally and politically embedded explanations for 
the values and actions of health care professionals. Thus if medical ethicists are interested in the lived 
experience of the social world of modern medicine, an obvious solution would be to read some more 
medical sociology, rather than look towards developing a new discipline (Hedgecoe, 2007). 
Almost everything Hedgecoe asserts here is correct: medical sociology is the place to look for 
nuanced socio-historical explanations for why health care professionals do what they do, and also for 
understanding the values that lie behind this. The suggestion that those working in bioethics should 
make themselves familiar with classic works in medical sociology and thereby become attuned to the 
socially critical lens of sociology is useful (Hedgecoe, 2004). An education in philosophy should equip 
bioethicists with knowledge about moral theories and concepts, as well as enhancing their ability to 
argue and think critically, however it is less likely to attune them to the broader social, historical and 
economic context of bioethics and its debates.  In order for bioethics to become more sophisticated 
and aware of the reasons why issues within bioethics become controversial and are deemed worthy 
of attention should follow Hedgecoe’s lead because there seems much that is right about this thought.  
Where Hedgecoe has made a mistake is his insistence that empirical ethics does not offer something 
new and distinctive to medical sociology. While it is true that sociology is normative, in the sense that 
it is interested in values and how they come into being, and is often motivated by a commitment to 
particular values (such as, for example, social justice) and the socio-historical structures that frustrate 
those values, it does tend to pay heed to different kinds of values from those that are at stake in a 
more philosophical argument about ethics. I am not asserting that we should consider the work of 
Hedgecoe or, for example, Fox & Swazey (1992) to lack the kind of normativity that is required for 
them to be placed within the canon of bioethics. Rather, I am saying that sociologists tend to argue in 
a different kind of way, and that they are interested in different kinds of normativity. Those who 
approach bioethics from a philosophically normative perspective, for example authors such as 
Jonathan Glover, Dan Brock, John Harris and Julian Savulescu work toward finding solutions to moral 
problems. Such authors will argue as cogently as they can for a moral position on a contested issue. 
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Of course, answers to contested moral issues tend to be provisional, revisable and are likely to 
remain arguable. While it’s true that sociologists are interested in values and correcting injustice, 
ordinarily they do not engage in this kind of argument. There will be exceptions to this and there are 
many sociologists, Hedgecoe himself being one good example, who have a philosophical background 
and will engage in that kind of analysis. But in such cases we could describe their argument as being 
‘more philosophical’ or ‘more analytic’ and perhaps ‘less sociological.’ None of these descriptions 
should be taken to imply anything about the relative worth of this kind of argument, nor whether it 
should be considered ‘bioethics’, but it is a different form of scholarly inquiry, which uses normativity 
in different ways. 
Strauss and Glaser’s classic sociological study involved fieldwork and interviews in which they 
observed the issues that arise during the process of dying in North American hospitals. From a more 
general interest, they refined their focus so that it studied the following questions:  
What are the recurrent kinds of interaction between the dying patient and hospital 
personnel? What kinds of tactics are used by the personnel who deal with the patient? 
Under what conditions of hospital organization do these kinds of interaction and these 
tactics occur, and how do they affect the patient, his family, the staff, and the hospital 
itself, all of whom are involved in the situations surrounded dying? In finding answers to 
these questions, we discovered that most variations could be accounted for by what 
each party to the dying situation was aware of about the patient’s fate. (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1965;8) 
Issues around the end of life, how we die and what our rights should be are foundational issues for 
bioethics, so although Glaser and Strauss predated the invention of bioethics, few would have any 
hesitation about viewing a study such as this as ‘bioethical’. Furthermore, the methods are very 
familiar and they approach this area in very much the same way that someone doing a project in 
‘empirical ethics’ might. So, Hedgecoe’s observation that there is much in common between medical 
sociology and empirical ethics, and his frustration that bioethicists do not draw more upon this 
tradition, is well founded. However, the difference is what motivated Glaser and Strauss to do this 
study and the explanations and analysis that follow. They’re very aware that what patients should 
know about their death is a moral issue and it clearly is something of importance to them. But in 
saying that, they offer rich contextual explanations for what happens. Their explanatory model is one 
that emphasises the importance that institutional norms, roles and other social structures have upon 
the ways in which people interact. What they don’t do is to analyse the ethical issues that are present 
in the interviews and observations and argue these out in an attempt to reach an ethical position on 
how dying should occur.        
Glaser and Strauss are certainly engaged in a normative exercise; they are trying to shed light on the 
nature of dying in hospitals partly with the hope that this might clarify, inform and perhaps even, 
empower. This is fairly typical for medical sociology in that it tends to have a critical and sceptical 
edge; it invites readers to view issues as being more complex, less straightforward and richer. This is 
a kind of normativity that could be considered an ‘epistemic’ value. Sociological epistemic values urge 
the reader to see a phenomenon in its social and political context. In effect this is a kind of perceptual 
norm: a plea to see the context that shapes, for example, organ donation or genetic counselling.    
Sociological epistemic values are different from norms about what is morally right or wrong. Clearly 
there’s a relationship between the two, in that making claims about right or wrong and being ignorant 
about the relevant socio-historical context is a recipe for saying false things about right or wrong. Very 
often the reason why a sociological analysis is warranted is because of a perception that an area is 
ethically complex or problematic and this kind of inquiry is a way forward. Nonetheless, there are 
distinct, equally important, forms of normativity in these two perspectives. Those who approach 
bioethics and empirical ethics from a philosophical perspective will tend to offer an analysis that 
involves robust argument with ethical norms, whereas a sociological epistemic values explain and 
analyse in a more structural and contextual way.     
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Conclusions 
The fact/value distinction is an important debate if we wish to think carefully about the theoretical 
backdrop of approaches to empirical bioethics. The traditional empiricist version where fact and value 
are dichotomous is arguably untenable, and yet has shaped approaches to empirical bioethics such 
as VBM, and is sometimes used to argue that the whole project of empirical bioethics is untenable.   
Further reflection upon the different kinds of value sheds light on how it is that different approaches to 
bioethics can be normative, but in different ways.   
Good empirical ethics is distinct from medical sociology in that it should fuse robust ethical argument 
with the groundedness and sensitivity to context that results from a well-constructed empirical 
investigation.  This volume contains descriptions of many such approaches.   While it is true that 
medical sociology is also normative, the normativity of robust ethical argument, which is arguably a 
requirement for empirical ethics in some forms, is different from the kinds of argument that typify 
medical sociology. 
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Metaethics, relativism and empirical bioethics 
 
Mark Sheehan  
 
 
Metaethics is the study of the nature of ethics. This very broadly speaking involves consideration of 
the nature and existence of moral truth, moral psychology and the nature of moral concepts such as 
‘obligation’ and ‘normativity’. Some of these concepts and their relationship to empirical bioethics 
have been considered in other chapters. This chapter will examine another of these and perhaps one 
of the key issues that empirical ethics and its methodologies often run up against: the question of 
ethical relativism.  
The initial attractiveness of ethical relativism can be seen by reflecting on apparent differences 
between people. People do things differently: they live their lives differently, they care about different 
things and most importantly they differ in opinion about what things count as right and wrong, 
permissible and impermissible. Most commonly, ethical relativists are impressed by these differences 
and think that there really is no right answer to ethics questions because the values that people hold 
depend on the culture in which they live or were raised. We might think of this as an ‘anti-imperialist’ 
kind of thought: Who are we to judge? Why think we know better what is right and wrong than 
someone else or some other culture? Why think that we can say of them that they have it wrong? 
These are concerns about authority, or ethical truth or ‘getting it right’ in ethical matters (Sheehan, 
2007). When we look around and reflect on the status of our own deeply held views, in contrast with 
those with whom we differ, it can seem that there is very little basis for separating our views from 
those with whom we disagree. These thoughts might have two effects on us. They might make us feel 
uneasy about our convictions in this area — why are we so committed to them when there is no 
obvious reason that they are better than anyone else’s? Second, we might, on these grounds, think 
that we should not judge those with whom we differ, after all, their values are as good as ours. 
Before unpacking these issues and their connection to empirical bioethics and its methodologies, 
some distinctions are useful. First, this chapter is concerned with metaethical relativism, which is a 
view about the nature of ethics and most often involves questions about truth and justification in 
ethics. The metaethical relativist thinks that there is no absolute truth in ethics; there are only different 
views about what is right and wrong. This kind of relativism is to be distinguished from descriptive 
ethical relativism: a view about the actual variation of moral views across societies and cultures. It 
holds that, as a matter of fact, there is widespread divergence in moral values and judgements 
between the peoples of the world both currently and across time (Blackburn, 2001; Levy, 2002). This 
distinction and my focus on metaethical relativism are important for what follows. There are important 
issues involving descriptive moral relativism and some of these are closely connected to questions 
here, but the central arguments about descriptive moral relativism are orthogonal to the aims of this 
chapter. The connections that we explore below are important because they allow us to be clearer 
about the role and place of ethical argument in empirical ethics. By being clear about the status of 
metaethical relativism we will better understand the normative claims of arguments and justifications 
in ethics and their relationship to empirical evidence. 
One final distinction: Opponents of relativism come in many shapes and sizes, but they all do think 
that value judgements are not relative. Someone opposing metaethical relativism will think that there 
are some ethical truths; that there are some values that one ought to hold regardless of who you are 
or where you live etc. They will think that some acts are right, and others are wrong, and that there is 
some account of how such rightness and wrongness might be determined. In what follows I will refer 
those who hold these views, and so are opponents of relativism, as objectivists. Following Wiggins 
(1995) a subject matter is objective if and only if there are questions about it that admit of answers 
that are simply and plainly true. 
This chapter is comprised of three sections. In the first section I set the context for the discussion of 
metaethical relativism. I distinguish between two kinds of questions, empirical and normative, which 
 26 
address normatively-invested concepts that are closely related to issues in bioethics and are central 
to issues in empirical bioethics. We will see that how we answer the normative questions makes a 
significant difference to how we understand the enterprise of empirical bioethics and the role that 
ethical argument and conceptual analysis plays in it. Metaethical relativism is seen to be a product of 
scepticism about providing a unique, authoritative answer to the normative questions and can have 
significant methodological consequences. In the second section we examine the status of metaethical 
relativism, looking at what can be said in its favour. The second section continues by examining the 
prospects for a moderate form of objectivism that is able to absorb some of the key intuitions of the 
relativist as well as offering a robust strategy for justification and progress towards ethical truths. The 
final section of the paper returns to develop some of the consequences of these arguments for 
empirical ethics and bioethics more generally. 
 
The relevance of (metaethical) relativism for empirical questions in bioethics 
Arguably one of the key issues in any account of empirical ethics and bioethics will be the way in 
which that account can handle the relationship between the empirical and the ethical (Sheehan and 
Dunn, 2013; Dunn et al, 2012). How can we understand empirical ethics as anything other than some 
empirical research followed by some ethical research or vice versa? The stubbornness of this 
separation is clearly borne out in the distinction between fact and value or ‘is’ and ‘ought’, which is 
discussed in depth by McMillan (2016) in this volume. 
One-way of articulating this issue is to cast them as distinctive questions or stances: the first is 
primarily directed at the way the world is and the second primarily directed at the way the world 
should be. These two questions quite quickly generate two approaches to what we might call 
‘normatively-invested’ concepts.  
Buchanan and Keohane provide us with an excellent example of this by distinguishing between 
normative and sociological legitimacy:  
“‘Legitimacy’ has both a normative and a sociological meaning. To say that an institution 
is legitimate in the normative sense is to assert that it has the right to rule—where ruling 
includes promulgating rules and attempting to secure compliance with them by attaching 
costs to noncompliance and/or benefits to compliance. An institution is legitimate in the 
sociological sense when it is widely believed to have the right to rule.” (2006:405)  
These meanings can be captured in the form of questions that express their empirical and normative 
basis: on the empirical (or sociological) side the question is ‘when is an institution taken to be 
legitimate?’ and on the normative side the question is ‘when ought an institution to be taken to be 
legitimate?’. 
‘Legitimacy’ is what I have called a normatively-invested concept: a concept that is clearly and 
obviously tied to questions of value and meaning. These concepts, we might say, are closely 
connected to ethics but can have a highly contextualised content. The way in which an institution 
might be considered legitimate will depend on the details of context as well as the nature of the 
institution itself. Other concepts of this sort might be ‘authority’, ‘expert’, ‘power’ and ‘value’. In each 
case we can, following the distinction above, construct questions that are empirical and normative 
(see table 1 below). 
Any account of empirical ethics or bioethics will either explicitly or implicitly have a place for these two 
sets of questions. Some may prioritise the empirical over the normative and others the reverse. Still 
others will make some attempt to show the way in which they can be combined or linked. In what 
follows below we explore the relationship between these sets of questions. 
 
Empirical (Sociological) questions Normative questions 
Who or what is taken to be legitimate in Who or what should be taken to be legitimate 
 27 
context A? in context A? 
Who actually has or is given authority? Who should have or be given authority? 
How does authority work in context B? How should authority work in context B? 
Who are taken to be experts in field C? Who should be taken to be experts in field C? 
How are power relations instantiated in 
context D? 
How should power relations be instantiated in 
context D? 
What do people value?  What should people value? 
Table 1 – Empirical and normative questions 
Empirical questions 
Many if not all social science methodologies are designed to produce robust empirical data about the 
social world (though this is itself far from a simple affair – see Singh’s (2016) chapter in this volume). 
Through social science and its methods we can learn in great detail about the institutions, structures 
and relationships in society. Often these relationships involve normativity of various shapes and sizes; 
so, through social scientific analyses, we can clearly see how claims to authority, expertise, legitimacy 
or power (and so on) are made in a range of different contexts and how these claims come to be 
accepted in these. 
We can learn, for example, how claims of expertise are made and accepted in a range of different 
contexts (Angell et al, 2008). Part of what we learn here is how groups of individuals (scientists, 
doctors, lobby groups, ethicists, etc.) make claims to be experts in a particular domain and the ways 
in which people more generally (the media, the public, patients, research participants) come to accept 
or endorse these claims. What we learn is something about the politics of claims of expertise: how 
groups or individuals, by making certain claims manage to appropriate the role of ‘expert’. This work 
builds an account of what is to be taken to be an expert and the relationship between being an expert 
and claims to expertise (for a discussion of what ‘expertise’ might mean in bioethics, see Edwards 
and Deans (2016) in this volume).  
We can learn for example how research ethics committees (RECs) enact their position and role of 
authority through the context of their decision that they make and, in particular, the way in which they 
make those decisions. Through this kind of analysis we can clearly see the processes of authority 
being played out and reaffirmed. When these processes are challenged or contested we are also 
given a glimpse of the way in which the various relevant stakeholders understand that authority. This 
research builds an understanding of the authority that RECs are taken to have and the ways in which 
the politics of this authority is negotiated. This work does not, without further normative premises or 
assumptions, tell us who ought to be taken as experts: it does not alone address the normative 
question. 
Perhaps most generally we might say that much of the social science that is closest to empirical 
ethics and bioethics consists of empirical studies examining, and developing understanding of, social 
and cultural practices and norms. In each of these cases however there is a crucial distinction to be 
drawn between the ability of this work to answer empirical questions and its ability to answer the 
closely related normative question. We can ask who or what is taken to be legitimate in a given 
context but we can also ask who or what should be taken to be legitimate in that context. 
Normative questions 
Elsewhere I have argued that bioethics should be understood as a field that endeavours to answer 
practical ‘ought’ questions – these are normative questions of the kind above but with special 
reference to a particular practical context (Sheehan & Dunn, 2013). On this view bioethics is a 
normative enterprise: answering a practical ‘ought’ question requires making a recommendation or 
being prescriptive — it requires making a claim about what ought to be done. The adequacy of such 
claims will be, importantly, dependent on the extent to which the claim is explicitly justified or argued 
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for, as well as their engagement with other arguments and justifications. These practical ought 
questions, I suggest, are the primary questions of the field. Secondary questions are those that need 
to be answered in order to provide a satisfactory answer to the primary practical ‘ought’ question. It is 
important on this account that there is an explicit link between the primary question and each of the 
secondary questions. There are two substantive conditions to be met in order for a candidate 
secondary question to be appropriately linked to a primary, practical ‘ought’ question:  
(i) there should be an explicit link showing how an answer to the secondary question will 
help to answer the primary question; and, 
(ii) this link should engage with other strategies for answering the question by providing 
arguments in favour of the proposed strategy or against opposing strategies.  
On this account, empirical questions in bioethics are put to work in answering the practical ‘ought’ 
question.  Purely normative or conceptual questions (in ethical theory) are similarly secondary to the 
primary practical ‘ought’ question. It is easy to see how being clear about the empirical context can 
make a difference to what should happen. So long as we have a set of normative standards or 
argumentative strategies (a strategy for answering the normative question), we look to be in a position 
to arrive at an answer, given the appropriate empirical details. 
Relativism becomes an issue when we think that the normative questions cannot be answered either 
in principle or pragmatically. That is, we might think that there is no single definitive answer to 
questions like ‘who should have authority’, ‘who should be taken to be legitimate’ or ‘what people 
should value’. We might think that, in principle, the answers to such questions are essentially relative. 
An example is useful (taken from Sheehan, 2008).  What is the role that attitudes of the general public 
should play in settling ethically difficult policy questions?  It certainly does look as though we should 
involve the public in some way in formulating these policies, but it would be helpful to have a sense of 
justification for this intuition. The metaethical relativist, who thinks that there is no reason to think that 
one person’s opinion, when it comes to ethics, is better or more correct than any other’s, might 
conclude that policy making is simply a matter of politics. Surveying the attitudes of the public is one 
kind of pragmatic move in this political context: ‘we have to get things done and the only way to do 
this is to try to get everyone on board’. This kind of pragmatism looks very much like metaethical 
relativism. 
In economics ‘value’ is often understood to be the weight or importance that people place on a certain 
thing, X. Value is expressed in, and captured by, people’s preferences (Louviere et al, 2000). One 
way in which we determine the value of X is by testing how much people would pay for it or by ranking 
X alongside other relevant things. We can then use these individual level values to decide what 
policies we should adopt across society by aggregating the individual values in various ways. This is 
one way in which we might see the attitudes of the public playing a role in policy formation: by 
defining what is taken to be valued and how much. 
There are two important implicit normative assumptions here. The first is that ‘value’ looks to be 
equated with ‘preferences’. This view of value on its own is clearly a relativist (indeed subjectivist) 
one. Understanding value to be captured or reflected in what individuals prefer would seem to flatten 
nuances that we ordinarily take to be important in distinguishing what we ‘merely’ prefer from those 
things that we care most about, captured in the idea of our  ‘values’. The second normative 
assumption is the ‘democratic’ bridging premise that takes us from the aggregate data to a view about 
what should be done (Garrard & Wilkinson, 2005).  Exactly what shape this takes can vary ranging 
from a strong democratic commitment which verges on an ethical principle, to a pragmatic approach 
which is resigned to politics without independent authority.2 
Of course this adopted relativism and the corresponding bridging principle might be strategic 
methodological assumptions or metaethical commitments. In the former case, it might be the most 
convenient, most accessible or perhaps most reliable way to access empirical data on value. The 
‘democratic’ bridging principle, however, provides an additional source of value and stands in need of 
                                                     
2 See Kim’s (2016) chapter in this volume for an account of how strong democratic commitments can be worked into a 
methodology. 
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its own justification. If this is just what we happen to think, then we are back to a relativistic position. If 
it is the right or the best principle (or just the one that we ought to adopt), then it is embroiled in non-
relativist claims. 
 
The distinction between relativistic and non-relativistic positions in ethics 
What is at stake in the debate between the metaethical relativist and the objectivist? As we have seen 
above, if the relativist’s view is correct, or at least if the objectivist’s view is untenable, we have reason 
to be sceptical about making progress on the normative questions discussed above, and which are at 
the heart of bioethics and empirical ethics. Since metaethical relativism involves a claim about the 
nature of moral truth and justification, it is directly implicated in the claims outlined in the first section 
of this chapter. That is, the metaethical relativist directly claims that there is no answer to be given to 
the ‘should; question of legitimacy: our answers to questions about who should be taken to be 
legitimate will necessarily be answers which express our values and these do not, and cannot, have 
any special status. It looks as though we can only rely on the empirical methodological strategies from 
social science in combination with careful attention to, and disclosure of, implicit normative 
assumptions within them.  
In this section, then, we focus on the metaethical relativist’s position and its relationship to other 
‘nearby’ positions. In particular we will look, in a bit more detail, at the kinds of claims that might take 
us towards a metaethical relativist position. The section then moves to give an account of a moderate 
objectivism, which represents an attempt to soften the objectivist position in order to accommodate 
some of the lessons of the preceding discussions. 
As we saw at the outset, the metaethical relativist thinks that there is no absolute truth in ethics; there 
are only different views about what is right and wrong. More substantively the metaethical relativist 
often has a story to tell about how we come to think that there are things that are ‘really’ right or 
wrong. For the relativists we have been considering (i.e. cultural relativists) this story suggests that 
what we think is right and wrong is importantly connected to, or determined by, the culture to which 
we belong or in which we were raised. Other kinds of metaethical relativists also think that there is no 
absolute truth in ethics, but might differ in their account of how we come to have the ethical views that 
we do. So, subjectivists typically would count as relativists; they hold that there is no (absolute) truth 
in ethics because these judgements are not the kind of things that are capable of being true or false 
(Blackburn, 1998). In this case, ethics is not relative to culture but to each individual subject (though 
of course an individual is likely to be influenced by their culture amongst other things). 
Metaethical Relativism  
As we saw above, descriptive ethical relativism is an empirical thesis about the variation in ethical 
systems across societies and cultures. A cursory glance at the variety of moral systems is enough to 
suggest that there is indeed significant variation.  This matters here because if this variation is robust, 
we might have reason to be sceptical about truth in ethics, and so be provided with grounds for 
metaethical relativism. 
Some apparent differences in ethical judgement can be explained by a closer examination of the 
context of the judgement. Sometimes they are not an instance of different values; rather, the 
situations in which the others find themselves have led to systematically different judgements.  For 
example, water-related ethical norms in a desert context will be different to water related norms in a 
temperate climate. Not all divergence, however, can be explained like this. Sometimes cultures differ 
in their beliefs about the working of the world. If we believed in reincarnation as animals, we might, 
because of the same values we currently have about respect for the dead, have much more 
significant restrictions on how we treat animals. These explanations should not however lead us to 
think that all variation can be handled in this way: there remain a number of clear cases where the 
values are just different (Levy, 2002; Midegly, 1981).  
In all of this we have been speaking of cultural variation as though cultures were fixed, but clearly 
cultures and cultural values are fluid and amorphous. The problem for the relativist, of course, is that if 
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‘culture’ and ‘cultural values’ are too vague or changeable, we will lose the sense of what it means for 
some ethical judgment to be ‘true in that culture’ or for the judgements that any individual makes to 
reflect the culture’s values (Levy, 2002). However, for our purposes here our relativist need not be 
committed to a cultural basis of ethics. At bottom, what matters here is the way that metaethical 
relativsm undermines the idea of absolute truth and justification in ethics. ‘True for me’, ‘true for us’ 
and ‘true in that culture’ each undermine just plain ‘true’. 
David Wong (1984; 1993) has developed an account of relativism that is more moderate than those 
considered so far. He argues that the relativist’s position is typically characterised too harshly 
because it is assumed that 
one’s moral confidence, one’s commitment to act on one’s values, is somehow 
dependent on maintaining the belief that one’s morality is the only true or the most 
justified one. (Wong, 1993:449)  
This assumption suggests a tight connection between the metaethical claim concerning the truth or 
justifiability of moral claims and our confidence in the normative judgements we are prepared to 
endorse. The significance of this observation is that it softens the extent to which the metaethical 
relativist needs to definitively hold that there are no sources of authority or truth. Wong’s point is that 
the conviction to act as we know to be right can, but need not, derive from a conviction about the truth 
of those judgements. The depiction of the relativist as someone who is unsure and uncommitted, 
because their values have no absolute grounding in truth, looks too harsh. In this respect, metaethical 
relativism may be a pragmatic or agnostic strategy. 
Even with this moderation, the core of metaethical relativism remains.  It is tempting to think that the 
variety of ethical positions instantiated in time and space give us reason to think that there is no 
absolute ethical truth; no authoritative standards of right and wrong — if there were, we might expect 
some convergence. The considerations above, however, suggest that this inference might be a 
difficult one to make work. More importantly, the gap between the empirical set of questions and the 
normative ones remains: empirical details about variation in ethics do not show that there are no right 
answers. Demonstrating differences does not mean that there are no real standards. There may be 
something that people should think, even if they do not. 
Objectivism and moderate objectivism 
On the opposite side of the fence, objectivists typically believe that there are moral truths, and that 
these truths give them the appropriate authority (or justification) to be confident of judgements in 
accord with their favoured account of these truths. Part of what is at issue here connects with our 
initial way of capturing the ethical relativist’s impulse — what gives us the special status or privileged 
position to judge the values and practices of others; who are we to judge? One way to understand 
much of the history of moral philosophy is as an attempt to come up with a satisfactory answer to this 
question (Sheehan, 2007). In each case the quest is to find the standpoint from which to judge. 
Understood in this way, these objectivist attempts are responses to the relativist’s position — if we 
can come up with a satisfactory answer to the ‘who are we to judge?’ question, then we seem to be in 
a better (or at least more justified) position in cases of conflict. The important point here is that the 
relativist cannot object to the objectivist by repeating the ‘who are we to judge?’ claim. Criticisms of 
these approaches, instead, need to be of the theories themselves as adequate accounts of ethics 
and, in particular, undermine the ability of the theory to achieve the required ‘authority.’  
David Wiggins has developed what we might call a moderate objectivist position that is ‘softened’ by 
the concerns raised by the relativist and which acknowledges the importance of variation and context. 
Given the interests of empirical ethics and the observations above, it is worth exploring this position. 
There are two main strands to Wiggins’ position that are relevant here:  
(i) the way in which the position is softened towards some of the relativist’s points and;  
(ii) the way in which the position is to be understood as objectivist.  
We will deal with each of these in order. 
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Perhaps the key point of softening in Wiggins’ approach involves the idea of authority (Sheehan, 
2007).  As we have seen, one way of understanding the challenge of relativism is by pointing to the 
way in which it undermines the authority of our own ethical convictions. In order to secure this 
authority, the objectivist seems required to demonstrate that ethical judgements are just like paradigm 
cases of judgements of fact. It looks as though what is required to regain the authority of our 
convictions is the ability to convince everyone.  Faced with stark cultural disagreement between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ about what ought to be done, the only thing that seems good enough are reasons that will 
convince ‘them’.  
Wiggins argues that this expectation is an unreasonable one (Wiggins, 1993).  Instead, he suggests 
three options: incommensurability, perseverance and underdetermination. First it may be that ‘us’ and 
‘them’ come from such different ‘forms of life’ (civilizations or cultures) that “any semblance of 
agreement on the question what one ought to do or what is good is only a semblance” (Wiggins, 
1990:75).  Here, the respective understanding on either side is so different that there is not enough 
common ground, or common language, on which to build any progress.  
Second, there may be a genuine question that we share and where our disagreement is non-trivial. 
Here Wiggins urges perseverance. The thought is that by uncovering the ‘deep’ differences of 
perspective, both conceptual and responsive, one or both sides can come to see or understand the 
other’s standpoint. This seems reasonably common — one finds oneself (suddenly) seeing or feeling 
what it is like from the ‘other side’. The idea here is that perseverance would or could achieve 
agreement or a resolution of the dispute. Whether such a strategy works or not is more a matter of the 
individuals concerned and the circumstances of their involvement. In the enterprise of trying to 
understand one another, egos, temperament, claims of authority and attitudes of superiority can get in 
the way.3 
Finally, there may be situations where, although there is a real question about what ought to be done, 
it is not clear that any of the parties are in a position to decide and to be justified — “there is no 
manifest possibility of any winning set of considerations ever being mustered” (Wiggins, 1990:77). 
On this picture of ethical disagreement only the second option offers any prospect of resolution. The 
only authority that the objectivist can claim, then, is as a result of the process of perseverance, and 
this only after hindrances like egos and temperament have been put aside. It is in this context, on this 
account, that the possibility of truth in ethics arises. For Wiggins this happens when we arrive at the 
point where ‘there is nothing else to think.’ A particular claim, ‘X is wrong,’ is true when, after bringing 
to bear our full argumentative, conceptual and emotional resources, we realise that there is nothing 
else to think but that X is wrong.4   
Wiggins (1990) uses the example of slavery to illustrate. Here there is a wealth of considerations that 
can be produced to show that slavery is unjust and insupportable, and these considerations are such 
as to show that there is nothing else to think but that slavery is unjust and insupportable. Raimond 
Gaita discusses this issue in a way that well illustrates the point. He writes: 
“The slave owner denies that the slave has his kind (the slave owner’s kind) of 
individuality: the kind of individuality that shows itself in our revulsion in being numbered 
rather than being called by name; the kind of individuality that gives human beings the 
power to haunt those who have wronged them, in remorse. If the slave owner could be 
haunted by the slave girl he raped, then her days as a slave would be numbered.” (Gaita, 
2004:156-7) 
What this passage, and the rest of Gaita’s discussion, brings out is how the concepts of ‘individuality’, 
‘human being’ and ‘person’ themselves are invested with an emotional and responsive power that 
cannot be disentangled from them. These kinds of emotions and responses are caught up with the 
                                                     
3 These ideas are interestingly compared with those presented by Landeweer et al (2016) in this volume 
4 Ives (2014) provides an interesting contrast to this position. He sees something like this point as the point at which inquiry 
must (temporarily) cease, justified by an appeal to pragmatism.  The bioethics research endeavour is, on his account, 
characterised as a process of ‘noble failure’ and a scepticism about whether we can ever know if we have reached the point of 
truth. In the face of this scepticism, we are returned to a metaethical relativist position. 
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idea of taking someone seriously as an individual. They illustrate the full force, not of what it is to treat 
someone as a human being, but of conceiving of them as ‘other to my one’. This kind of investigation 
of, as we might say, the psychology of the slave owners, shows how their understanding of those who 
were their slaves failed to approach their conception of those who were ‘fully human’. It trades on an 
understanding of the full range of our evaluative and emotional resources and seeks to show how 
these resources cohere. In the face of this understanding and in the face of this diagnosis of the slave 
owner, we are to see that there is nothing else to think; the slave owner is simply, and truly, wrong. 
Importantly, what is shown by these kinds of considerations is not that there is nothing else for us to 
think, but that there is nothing else to think, simpliciter. The thought is that the arguments (and the 
whole wealth of considerations) are mounted from the level of a perspective that is not particular, that 
aims at an abstraction from the ‘for us’ to one involving simply one person to another. What is shown 
by these arguments is that the price of not thinking that slavery is unjust and insupportable is that one 
opts out of the point of view that is common between people. This common point of view is not 
culturally or socially specific, even though particular ways of expressing it might be. 
As I have described it here, Wiggins’ position first adjusts the aims of the objectivist enterprise by 
allowing that there are significant limits to the kind of success that can be hoped for. In cases where 
perseverance is called for, we can come to some ethical truths when the wealth of considerations in 
our ethical repertoire leads us to the view that there is nothing else to think. This moderate objectivist 
position represents a very serious attempt to acknowledge the ethical significance of context, practice 
and perspective, but at the same time offers a robust account of the methodology of ethical and 
conceptual argument which can claim authority in the face of the relativist’s scepticism. 
 
The consequences of these distinctions for empirical ethics and bioethics 
This chapter has been concerned with the relationship between empirical ethics and bioethics and the 
particular metaethical position of ethical relativism. We have seen that if the relativist’s view is correct, 
or at least the objectivist’s view is untenable, we have reason to be sceptical about making progress 
on the normative questions that lie at the heart of bioethics and empirical ethics.  
This is why the challenge of relativism matters. If empirical ethics or bioethics purport to do ethics, to 
provide us with some answers to explicitly normative questions, they must engage in claims about 
what should be done, how we should think about things or what the right processes are. In short, 
answering normative questions requires providing normative answers. However, as soon as these 
kinds of answers are given they are then subject to the relativist’s sceptical question on authority: 
what gives your answer authority? 
The previous section of this chapter concluded with Wiggins’ broad account of a moderate objectivist 
position. This position I suggest can provide an account of the enterprise of ethical and conceptual 
argument that aims at the kind of authority that answers the relativist’s challenge. In what follows I 
draw the elements of this account together to say something about a methodology that can meet the 
relativist’s sceptical challenge. 
Broadly speaking, ethical or conceptual arguments provide the tools for a claim to be justified. The 
extent to which a claim counts as a satisfactory answer to a normative question is to be judged in the 
light of standards of reasoning that apply to arguments generally. These standards are derived from 
the appeal that such arguments make to reasons that apply to all agents independently of context and 
as possessors of the ability to reason. That is, arguments function by making an appeal to general 
features of agents: 
So the reasons anyone should accept that q follows from ‘If p then q’ and p are reasons 
that apply to him or her in virtue of his or her logical or reasoning capacities generally — 
those features that he or she holds in common with all beings capable of logic and 
reason (Dunn et al, 2012:469).  
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When we engage in ethical or conceptual argument of the kind that is relevant here, we are 
constructing a series of premises or considerations that make reference to these general or 
abstracted features of agents, and which combine in standard ways to imply a concluding claim. 
These ethical or conceptual arguments, our justificatory tools, are embedded in the context of 
dialogue and perseverance suggested by Wiggins. When perseverance fails or the context is 
underdetermined or incommensurable, it is likely to be because of the complex interaction between 
the individuals involved, the circumstances of their involvement and the context of the argument. So 
there will be some people for whom our arguments and considerations have no ‘grip’, and there will 
be some who refuse to try to see or refuse to engage. Importantly there will be some who are 
embedded in their, or their culture’s, way of viewing the world – they will be unable or unwilling to try 
to conceive of people or contexts from the point of view that is common between people. We will of 
course need to be on our guard that we are not too comfortable or too ‘in’ so that our claims to ethical 
truth end up being claims of truth ‘for us’. In part, the openness and critical stance that is implicated in 
Wiggins’ perseverance situation is helpful. 
It is important to see how any of these failures or breakdowns in the dialogue about what ought to be 
done feed back into the standards of argument and analysis, and show that the arguments are not up 
to scratch. This point is often missed. Insofar as an argument (or claim, or set of reasons) that I 
present is limited by, or entrenched within, my own view or my own perspective (and so fails to make 
the kinds of abstractions at which it aims), it fails as an ethical or conceptual argument which can 
make the kinds of claims we are considering. Pointing out that the argument (rather than the arguer) 
is in a certain important way constrained by presupposing features of a certain class or race or 
historical period, or that it relies on empirical or conceptual mistakes, is again to point out a failure to 
meet the required standard.  
These arguments and considerations, as I have observed above, are mounted from the level of a 
perspective that is not particular, which aims at an abstraction from the ‘for us’ to one involving simply 
one person to any other. The process of abstraction from the particular context and the particular 
individual is important here. If the premises of an argument appeal to a feature of a situation that 
narrowly applies, it looks as though the acceptability of that argument will be similarly narrow. As a 
strategy, abstraction looks to be a useful one: if I want my claims to apply as broadly as possible, I 
should ensure that they rely on features that are as broad as possible. 
Neither Gaita nor Wiggins seek to depersonalise or decontextualize this reasoning or dialogical 
process in the way that some forms of abstraction might; they both rely on very political and 
embedded accounts of the way ethical dialogues take place. Wiggins speaks of coming to see or feel 
what it is like from the other side. He also clearly implies that the individual foibles (ego, temperament 
and the like) of those in dialogue need to be managed. Gaita makes a good deal of the emotional and 
responsive power that is caught up in taking someone seriously as an individual. The abstraction that 
is implicated in these accounts, and endorsed here, is not one that is removed or isolated from the 
context and the human condition but is, crucially, recognised in it. 
This account of ethical and conceptual argument that takes place in ethics and bioethics is intended 
to represent a methodology or an approach to answering questions of a certain (normative) kind. It is 
a strategy for getting clear on the concepts that are in play in the particular context, and for working 
through the nature and structure of the reasons and justifications that are possible (or available) for 
agents and their actions in those contexts. As such it represents a form of practically and contextually 
oriented abstraction and argument that is embedded in the human exchanges and behaviours that 
are the essential focus of normative claims. The techniques and standards that come with this 
approach are not mysterious or new: the standards of reasoning, formal and informal logic and 
argument are well known; and while it is easy to find disagreement in places, these disagreements 
almost always trade on agreement elsewhere.  
Part of the interest for empirical ethics and bioethics in Wiggins’ moderate objectivism is the way that 
it challenges the sceptical claim itself. The relativist cannot see how ethical and conceptual arguments 
(or any strategy for that matter) can have the kind of authority that bare physical facts might be taken 
to have, or could be capable of persuading all-comers of their truth. Wiggins’ suggestion is that we 
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need not aspire to anything quite so grandiose: we can aspire to truth and, he thinks, sometimes 
achieve it without thinking that we will find it everywhere. 
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There is growing consensus that empirical ethics is the appropriate method for reaching answers to 
practical moral questions, with the debate centering on details of correct methodology. In the research 
context, there has been much discussion of how to bring together the various disciplines and actors 
that contribute to empirical ethics. Specifically, scholarly work to date looks at how to reconcile the 
empirical ‘is’ of the social sciences with the normative ‘ought’ of philosophy, and how lived experience 
should shape our understandings of moral principles.5 One of the central goals of such work is to 
produce arguments for public policy that are effective and justified in virtue of being grounded in the 
practical context in question.  
One way to understand the ‘rise’ of empirical bioethics is as a response to concerns about legitimacy 
and expertise in relation to public policy, with much of the empirical bioethics literature striving to 
develop a way of doing bioethics that gives it a legitimate place at the policy table.  One analogy 
worth making is with the Patient and Public Involvement (PPI) movement in health care research 
more generally, which “is underpinned by the notion that people who are affected by research should 
have a right to have a say in what, and how, research is undertaken.” (Ives et al, 2012:181) This 
movement suggests that, in health care research, the professional expertise of the researchers alone 
is not sufficient to make research relevant, useful or legitimate.  What is needed is input from ‘lay’ 
persons, who can contribute to the research process the relevant and vital expertise that comes from 
being a service user. Similarly, accounts of empirical bioethics can be seen as a challenge to the 
traditional, and arguably illegitimate, power dynamic in bioethics research, in which the professional 
bioethicist thinks “hard in a special way” (Hedgecoe, 2004:138) using her finely tuned capacity for 
rational thought, and pronounces on the correct course of action. The methodological accounts 
showcased in this volume are, at least in part, based upon an implicit critique of philosophical ethics 
understood in this way. 
Before making claims about what the ethicist ought to bring to the policy table, we need first to be 
sure her place there is legitimate. In this chapter, we assess the legitimacy of appointing ethicists to 
policy committees, first making an argument for how their role can be justified, and then suggesting 
how empirical ethics research can enhance this role. We consider whether the ethicist’s place on the 
committee is justified by any expertise she may have to offer, and then go on to articulate a 
framework of political philosophical positions that justify her role in policymaking. While the ethicist is 
not given special authority over other members (e.g. power to veto), suggesting that she is not seen 
as morally authoritative, she and other committee members do exercise significant political authority 
in determining binding regulations on behalf of the state. We take it as a crucial and unmet challenge 
to this institutional set-up to explain why we should entrust such decision-making to the ethicist in 
particular and such an appointed committee more generally. We show how, from the perspective of 
many of these political philosophical positions, familiarity with and use of empirical ethics research 
may usefully strengthen the justifications for the ethicist’s influence on policymaking.  
This explication of the proper role of the professional ethicist – understood as the influence that the 
ethicist should exert on the creation and substance of policy – depends largely on what type of 
                                                     
5 See MacMillan’s (2016) and Sheehan’s (2016) chapters in this volume. 
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authority the ethicist possesses. As previous scholars tend to derive the type of authority ethicists can 
and ought to lay claim to from the type of expertise they possess, we begin by reviewing arguments 
about ethics expertise. However, we argue that even resolving this entrenched disagreement on the 
ethicist’s expertise cannot settle the question of what authority they should exercise in the 
policymaking context. 
Instead, we observe that the ethicist serving as a public appointee to a policy committee wields de 
facto political authority. That is, policy committees that act as an arm of the state produce binding 
regulations for other citizens. In doing so, the committee is responsible for deciding whether to 
coercively restrict or require certain behaviour by individuals. The determination of the role of the 
ethicist in the context of a policy committee, then, depends primarily on an account of legitimate 
political authority, rather than on an account of the expertise of the ethicist. Although we lack the 
space to articulate such an account here, we outline the consequences of various potential accounts 
of legitimacy for the role of the ethicist.  
Finally, we consider how empirical ethics may enhance these justifications for the role of the ethicist. 
Again, carving out a special place for empirical ethics requires first the endorsement of a particular 
account of political legitimacy in regulatory decision-making. Yet we illustrate how, on some such 
accounts, empirical ethics may indeed enhance the justification for the ethicist’s influence on 
policymaking. 
Three brief clarifications of context and terms are useful. First, by empirical ethics we crucially do not 
refer to normative conclusions drawn solely on the basis of public opinion polling or simple surveying 
of what practitioners or patients are doing in practice, although most of the policymaking bodies that 
we discuss herein consider such empirical evidence (often through PPI). Rather, we refer to the 
development, deployment, and testing of normative arguments close to practice, which may be done 
in a variety of ways to a variety of ends. This account of empirical ethics focuses on the ways in which 
systematic study of the practical context in which our ethical arguments are meant to function 
contributes to the overarching objective of bringing our lived realities in line with justified, moral 
practice.  
Second, by ‘professional ethicist’ we refer to an individual ethicist who is employed or voluntarily 
serves on a committee to bring ethical considerations to bear upon practical situations beyond the 
considerations voiced by other committee members. We consider an ethicist to be a scholar of the 
normative demands of morality, identified by peers (typically university academics) as specialists in 
this field. The disciplinary backgrounds of these individuals vary considerably and include, for 
example, moral philosophers, theologians, lawyers and social scientists. 
Finally, we focus our inquiry on ethicists that sit on deliberative bodies responsible for setting 
regulations on a specific policy matter for a particular political society, such as the UK’s Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and various committees of the UK’s National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). Beyond such statutory bodies, we also consider advisory 
bodies and short-term commissions that are convened by the government but whose 
recommendations are subject to approval or rejection by separate, executive decision-makers. For 
brevity, we will use the term ‘policy committee’ to include all of the above. We provide justification for 
considering executive and advisory bodies in tandem in section two below.  
 
What Expertise Does the Ethicist Possess?  
Previous attempts to carve out the role of the ethicist generally focus on whether an ethics expert can 
exist, and what exactly she would be an expert in. While most agree that in order to claim expertise, 
the ethicist must bring some skill or information above and beyond what the layman offers to the 
conversation, there is much disagreement on what exactly this expertise consists in. This robust 
disagreement on the ethicist’s expertise is largely rooted in an entrenched debate about whether 
ethicists have privileged access to moral truth or know better what ought to be done. In other words, 
despite there being fairly widespread agreement about the observable skills or abilities of a good 
ethicist, there is heavy disagreement on whether these skills allow the ethicist better access to moral 
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truth and thus whether she has some special claim to moral authority in virtue of this expertise in what 
ought to be done.6 
The implication is that if ethicists do have expert knowledge or skills such that they are better able to 
access moral truth, there may be occasions in which laymen ought to defer to their judgment. For 
instance, Peter Singer, in his defence of moral philosophers as moral experts, argues that 
philosophers should be better able than others to reach “the right decision, or at least a soundly 
based one,” (Singer, 1972:116) suggesting his conviction that we can come to know what is the 
objectively right thing to do through skilled and careful philosophical argument. 
Lisa Rasmussen, on the other hand, distinguishes between two types of expertise that track the 
disagreement on access to moral truth: hard ‘moral expertise’ akin to Singer’s definition and a softer 
‘ethics expertise,’ where she uses the terms ‘moral’ and ‘ethics’ merely as a heuristic. She defines 
moral expertise as “the ability to resolve dispute on a moral issue by rendering a decisive opinion” 
(Rasmussen, 2011:651).  It is the status or position of the moral expert that gives her this ability. She 
notes that followers might accept the Pope as a moral expert due to their belief in his special access 
to moral truth through his connection to God’s will, but rejects the possibility of moral expertise for 
ethicists. In contrast, she defends and describes ethics expertise as the ability to give non-binding 
“recommendations grounded in a pervasive ethos or practice within a particular context” (Rasmussen, 
2011:650), such that an ethics expert could aid others in understanding, for example, the arguments 
and principles supporting or opposing a particular position, the rationale behind the law and 
regulations relating to it, and the relevant academic debate. 
Scot Yoder suggests that expertise hinges on one’s ability to provide justification for a claim, 
regardless of whether this justification results in a claim that is known to be true: “[E]thics expertise is 
not based on the truth of one’s judgments but on one’s ability to provide a coherent justification for 
them” (Yoder, 1998:13).  In other words, the ethicist’s expertise lies in providing arguments that 
adhere to recognised standards of justification. This is compatible with Rasmussen’s account, which 
allows for an expertise in providing guidance to practitioners on the basis of well-established, context-
specific norms, while denying that such guidance will or needs to track objective moral truth. 
The implicit assumption motivating this debate on the nature of ethics expertise seems to be as 
follows: if we can resolve the type of expertise that ethicists can lay claim to, then we can determine 
the validity and scope of their authority and role in public life. However, we suggest that this 
assumption is mistaken: accounts of the ethicist’s expertise will consistently fall short of justifying the 
authority and role of the ethicist in policymaking. Indeed, ethicists on policy committees are not 
assigned authoritative status as an ethicist (though they may be an authority on ethics).7 Certainly, the 
answers to the expertise question may be somewhat determinative of the authority question. 
One who believes that ethicists do not possess any of the accounts of expertise described above is 
unlikely to assert the authority of ethicists as ethicists; there is no reason to think that an ethicist, by 
virtue of her profession, can or should make authoritative judgments if ethicists have neither privileged 
access to moral truth nor a softer version of expertise in navigating moral issues. Assuming the 
ethicist does have this second type of expertise (ethics expertise), this goes some way to justifying 
her involvement in the policy committee on the basis of expertise in place of, for example, an elected 
representative or a layperson. Importantly, few deny the very substantial skill set that ethicists may 
possess. Indeed, while disagreeing quite resolutely on whether ethicists can possess hard expertise 
in what ought to be done, former accounts seem fairly well in agreement on the skills, characteristics, 
and descriptive expertise in moral theory that a good ethicist will possess. Singer (1972) suggests that 
philosophers will be better able to find, understand, and isolate relevant empirical evidence, be more 
familiar with moral concepts and the logic of moral argument, be more aware of bias, and have more 
time to think about moral issues than the average person. Rasmussen’s (2011) account of the 
ethicist’s expertise echoes Singer’s points, though she adds that ethicists will also be better able to 
                                                     
6 Of course, this debate presupposes the possibility of moral truth – see Sheehan (2016) in this volume. 
7 The distinction between in authority and an authority is as follows: the status of a person in authority (e.g. the Pope) is 
sufficient for others to defer their judgement to him; the ethics expert does not have this status, but instead has special 
knowledge or skill in a given area – she is an authority on the matter - such that the non-expert has reason to accept and act on 
the basis of the expert’s advice. See Rasmussen (2011) 
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offer creative solutions. Finally, David Archard – even while directly rebutting Singer’s argument – 
suggests a similar skill set, where philosophers are more skilled in the “systematization, clarification, 
disambiguation and – where necessary – modification of common-sense morality.” (Archard, 
2011:125) We will return to the ways in which this expertise may be utilised in the final section, where 
we suggest that empirical ethics may enhance the role that the ethicist can play. 
Even with a positive account of ethics expertise, further explanation is needed to justify the ethicist’s 
membership on a policy committee that exercises authority to mandate or prohibit action by others. It 
would be a mistake to think there is a direct connection between expertise and political authority. 
David Estlund refers to the unsubstantiated jump from expertise to authority as the “expert/boss 
fallacy” (Estlund, 2008:3): just because someone may know better what ought to be done does not 
necessarily mean she should be ‘the boss’ in regulating the choices and behavior of non-experts. To 
claim that those who know better ought to rule requires a justification that goes beyond the 
establishment and elucidation of the individual’s expertise: it requires an account of legitimate political 
authority.8  
 
Deriving the Role of the Ethicist from an Account of Legitimate Political Authority 
As we have shown, expertise goes some way to justifying the ethicist’s role in a policy committee; she 
can, for example, offer expert guidance on the moral principles underlying particular issues, and can 
offer assessment of the most relevant arguments. However, this is not sufficient to justify the decision-
making powers assigned to ethicists (as well as all other members) on policy committees. In this 
section we do not attempt to derive the authority of the ethicist from her expertise, but instead begin 
by examining the de facto authority that the policy committee is given. Then we illustrate how an 
account of the legitimate exercise of that authority will entail a particular role for the ethicist. 
To understand the nature of this de facto political authority, it is useful to consider in more depth the 
policymaking context in which ethicists are generally placed, such as the UK’s HFEA and NICE’s 
Highly Specialised Technologies Evaluation Committee. These bodies, sitting at various degrees of 
arm’s length from ministers in the UK, feature central deliberative committees that are responsible for 
determining regulations in a specific area. They also often determine the sanctions that will be in 
place for individuals or institutions that violate these regulations. For example: the HFEA can revoke 
the license of an in vitro fertilisation (IVF) clinic if it fails to meet regulations and legal requirements; 
the Care Quality Commission and Monitor (two health services regulators) can impose financial 
penalties on service providers that fail to meet quality, safety, and cost efficiency requirements; the 
Medicine and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) can prosecute drug and device 
manufacturers who breach regulations.  
Standing advisory bodies as well as temporary commissions chartered by Parliament or departments 
to address a specific policy question also fall under the purview of these arguments. Although their 
advice is subject to acceptance or rejection by a separate, executive decision-maker, each is still 
convened as an arm of the state to reach policy conclusions that, if accepted, would require or 
prohibit certain behavior by individuals and institutions across the country. As such, their deliberative 
task in reaching a recommendation is quite similar to that of bodies with final decision-making and 
enforcement powers. As we are interested in the justified influence of ethicists on the policymaking 
process, these advisory bodies are analogous for our purposes to executive bodies like the HFEA to 
the extent that their advice is enacted.  
The members of these deliberative bodies are usually appointed by politicians. For institutions that 
must grapple with policy around science, technology, and medicine (for example the HFEA, NICE, 
and the MHRA), appointees are largely scientific experts and practitioners. However, in the past few 
decades it has become more common for at least one ethicist to be appointed to such a body. 
Depending on the way in which the committee functions, this means the ethicist will either have a vote 
or be included in the consensus-seeking decision of the committee on matters of policy. In this 
                                                     
8 For example, Plato’s argument that Philosophers ought to rule in The Republic. 
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capacity, then, ethicists serve directly as decision-makers, jointly responsible with other members for 
constructing regulations backed by the coercive power of the state.  
What implications does this political authority have for the role of the ethicist on the policy committee? 
This hinges on the account of normative legitimacy endorsed for the exercise of this political authority, 
where we follow Estlund in defining legitimacy as “the moral permissibility of the state’s issuing and 
enforcing its commands.” (Estlund, 2008:2) If we can formulate this account, we can judge whether 
policy decisions are more or less normatively legitimate, and specifically whether and how the ethicist 
can enhance this legitimacy.  
An argument for a particular account of the legitimate exercise of political authority is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. We instead suggest the consequences for the role of the ethicist that follow 
from a few plausible accounts within the UK context, although we expect such accounts to apply in 
other liberal democratic societies. One popular alternative to the current status quo of appointed 
deliberative committees like the HFEA is to hive such policymaking back into Parliament. This option’s 
justification lies in classic arguments for representative democracy, where the enforcement of 
coercive regulations on a population is legitimate when those regulations are set by representatives 
elected by that selfsame population. On this account, the ethicist would have an advisory role, 
although her influence could vary dramatically. Philosopher Mary Warnock, for instance, played a 
powerful role in chairing the Committee of Inquiry that recommended and convinced Parliament to 
pass the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990 (Wilson, 2011). However, such influence 
would be checked by traditional democratic pressure: Members of Parliament (MPs) would be unlikely 
to pass legislation recommended by an ethicist or committee if their constituencies overwhelmingly 
opposed such policy. In the United States, for instance, President Bill Clinton rejected the carefully 
constructed recommendation of his National Bioethics Advisory Commission to fund stem cell 
research for life-threatening or seriously debilitating conditions due to political pressure (Robertson, 
1999). It is worth noting that influence could instead come from less democratic sources, such as 
party political pressure. 
Such an account of parliamentary decision-making may be countered from a few different 
perspectives, each of which suggests its own account of legitimate political authority. First, there is 
the view that many bioethical issues, such as organ donation, assisted reproduction, genetic testing, 
and drug regulation, have low electoral salience; citizens, the argument goes, are unlikely to consider 
such issues when voting for representatives, and as such there is little reason to think that the views 
of MPs will track the values of the people they represent. If we do in fact think that coercive policy 
decisions are legitimate to the extent that they reflect the democratic will, this line of argument may 
recommend a public referendum on morally controversial issues that have low electoral salience. For 
instance, residents of Washington state voted to legalize physician-assisted suicide during their 2008 
general election (Steinbrook, 2008).  In such a case, ethicists would have a very limited role, only 
influencing policy to the extent that any other political issue campaign is able to reach individual 
voters through, for instance, media interviews and campaign materials.  
Parliamentary decision-making might still seem preferable to this direct democracy approach if we 
think that legislation should not always directly reflect the preferences – particularly unconsidered 
preferences – of the people. MPs, in virtue of their profession, have more time to think about these 
issues and reach a considered opinion, perhaps even the opinion that their constituents would hold if 
they too had time to consider the issues. Or one might think that parliamentary decision-making would 
strike a proper balance between enlightened debate on an issue and consideration of the democratic 
will, due to pressures to be reelected that will keep the preferences of the general public in view. 
These two responses to the direct democracy account suggest that legitimate political authority 
depends, at least to some extent, on the substantive quality of decisions. In other words, the 
procedural, democratic origin of policy is necessary but not sufficient for its legitimacy; the decisions 
themselves must be well reasoned.9  
A second response to the parliamentary option, with different conclusions, begins by noting that we 
do not always think that the decisions of individuals should be subject to the will of the democratic 
                                                     
9 See Scot Kim’s (2016) chapter, in this volume, for an account of how this idea can be incorporated into a methodology. 
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majority. We think that there are occasionally situations in which the liberties of the minority should be 
protected against the ‘tyranny of the majority.’ On this view, bioethical issues – to the extent that they 
fall into personal and generally private territory, like reproduction or the treatment and use of our 
bodies – may be the type of issues that we ought to protect from majority rule. This may require a 
body that is politically impartial, unlike Parliament, to consider and rule on such issues. This is one 
reason underpinning the current system of appointing members to deliberative regulatory committees 
that sit at arm’s length from elected representatives.10 
There are a variety of ways to structure such a deliberative committee, each offering a different role 
for the ethicist. First, we may think that policy on technically complex issues, like genetic engineering 
or human tissue storage, is best made by those with relevant scientific or technical expertise. Indeed, 
when building a bridge, we most likely want a group of engineers to have authority to make major 
technical decisions, rather than an ethicist or an MP. This technocratic approach would afford no role 
to the ethicist. However, for issues with a salient ethical component on which there is substantial 
moral disagreement, this technocratic approach should be rejected because of the expert-boss 
distinction discussed in the previous section: it is at least not apparent, and seemingly dubious, that 
expertise in the technological or scientific aspects of an emerging biotechnology should give one 
special authority to determine whether and why other citizens should be restricted from accessing it. 
The recognition of this distinctive component of substantial moral disagreement has prompted a rich 
literature on a second, broad set of options for structuring deliberative committees. Responding 
largely to John Rawls’ concept of public reason, a set of political philosophers has attempted to 
articulate how the state ought to formulate collectively binding rules in the face of fundamental moral 
disagreement. Each of these formulations, then, represents a slightly different account of legitimate 
political authority. Proponents of public reason, though, are united by the conviction that coercive 
rules must be justifiable by ideas or arguments that are on some level acceptable to all those who 
would be bound by those rules. For our inquiry into the role of the ethicist, one of the most important 
disagreements amongst public reason scholars is the extent to which the content of public reason is 
determined by actual deliberation as opposed to philosophical analysis. Rawls, on the one hand, 
idealizes the rationality of the ‘reasonable persons’ to whom rules must be justifiable and specifies a 
set of values that all would endorse, thus narrowing the substantive content of public reason (Rawls, 
1996). Indeed, the content of public reason is fairly well determined by philosophical analysis 
following from these specifications, with little needing or able to rest on actual deliberative 
proceedings (Quong, 2013). In contrast, other scholars argue that the content of public reason cannot 
be determined prior to actual deliberation. Most famously, Jürgen Habermas’ discourse theory and its 
application to the deliberative democratic context suggest a strong proceduralist conception of 
legitimacy (Habermas, 1990). On his account, philosophical analysis can only help to structure the 
features of a deliberative process in creating an ideal discursive space that is free and inclusive; the 
decisions that flow from this deliberation are legitimate to the extent that the process is appropriately 
structured. As such, the legitimacy of rules cannot be judged on the basis of predetermined 
substantive standards for the content of public reason.  
This suggests two crucially different roles for the ethicist. On the Rawlsian account, the ethicist would 
play a substantial role in specifying and applying the content of public reason; on an extreme 
interpretation, an ethicist simply reflecting by herself on the characteristics of ‘reasonable persons’ 
would be able to determine legitimate policy decisions, rendering a committee deliberation redundant. 
On the Habermasian account, the ethicist could serve as an architect, structuring the deliberative 
proceedings, but only the actual process of reasoning amongst free and equal deliberators could 
produce legitimate decisions. Accounts of Empirical Bioethics methodology to date have tended to 
adopt either the Rawlsian or Habermasian approach outlined above to legitimise their normative 
conclusions. The Habermasian account seems most visible in accounts of empirical bioethics that 
Davies et al (2015) call ‘dialogical’ including, for example, the hermeneutic (Landeweer et al, 2016) 
and deliberative democratic (Kim, 2016) approaches; whereas the Rawlsian account is visible in what 
                                                     
10 Requiring ‘political impartiality’ is one of three reasons that can justify the use of ALBs in the UK. See ‘Public Bodies Reform’, 
at  https://www.gov.uk/public-bodies-reform . 
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Davies et al call ‘consultative’ approaches including, for example, Reflective Equilibrium (Theil & 
Delden, 2016), Symbiotic Bioethics (Frith, 2010), and Reflexive Bioethics (Ives, 2014).  
This section has endeavored to lay out the various potential roles of the ethicist that follow from 
different accounts of normatively legitimate political authority. As suggested in the previous section, 
an account of the ethicist’s expertise cannot sufficiently justify her political authority, understood as 
her influence in determining regulations that will be backed by the coercive power of the state. 
Instead, an account of legitimate political authority for the types of collective decisions at stake must 
first be endorsed, out of which will fall a justified role for the ethicist. Importantly, this is true of the 
authority of the deliberative committee as a whole and that of the other individual members. This 
analysis has focused on the ethicist in particular in order to understand why the ethicist, as an ethicist 
or in virtue of her expertise in making moral arguments, might be brought to the table to enhance the 
legitimacy of policy decisions, rather than a lay member of the public, an elected representative, or a 
doctor.  
 
The Role of Empirical Ethics in Public Policymaking: From justification to practice 
Even after the endorsement of a particular account of legitimate political authority and a specific 
justification for the ethicist’s involvement that follows from this account, there is still an unresolved 
question of how the ethicist should best utilise her expertise in that role. As noted in section one, 
scholars are largely in agreement about the skills or abilities that a good ethicist possesses. These 
are, in brief, making and analysing logical arguments, knowledge of moral theory, sensitivity to the 
range of ethical considerations that an issue may raise, awareness of bias, and understanding and 
use of relevant empirical information. This final skill in particular seems to require further specification 
for the policy context: when is empirical information relevant and how should it be used? Here we 
consider the use of empirical ethics research as one way of understanding the relevance and 
usefulness of empirical information for policymaking (as opposed to, for example, anecdotal accounts 
or contributions through PPI).    
By empirical ethics, as noted at the outset, we refer to the systematic study of the force of reasons in 
practice, with the goal of producing well-justified normative arguments that are both shaped by and 
will shape the practical context in which they are meant to function. We acknowledge, however, that 
there are several justifications and methodological accounts that seek to meet this goal in the most 
defensible way. What, concretely, does this mean for policymaking? The answer to this question 
depends in large part on the underpinning argument for legitimate political authority that provides the 
justification for the role of the ethicist and others involved in the decision-making process. For 
example, authority that demands direct democratic involvement in decision-making will require an 
ethics methodology that draws on that same democratic mandate for legitimacy; such as the 
deliberative democracy approach outlined by Scott Kim (2016) in this volume.  Political authority that 
requires decision-makers to navigate in a deliberative fashion between competing experiences and 
attitudes that reflect different moral positions implies that those empirical ethics approaches that 
identify the ethicist as a moral steward between competing ethical values and perspectives is likely to 
be most clearly justified. The dialogical approach offered by Landeweer et al (2016) in this volume 
represents one such position, established on the same assumption that those stakeholders who stand 
in relation to an ethical question have relevant and important expertise that should contribute to 
ethical decision-making. Here, the role of the ethicist is to work collaboratively, in an interpretative 
fashion, to find a shared solution. 
Within each of these approaches, the empirical ethicist can ensure both that the heritage of the 
arguments she draws upon, or any novel work she undertakes herself as a committee member, are 
firmly aligned with the underpinning political justification for the process of decision-making itself. 
Whilst this is helpful in clarifying why empirical ethics connects closely to the process of making 
policy, it remains uncertain precisely what else the empirical ethicist can do, in a more practical 
sense, to assist in the decision-making process. 
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One feasible way of clarifying the practical value of empirical ethics in the policy-making process is 
espoused within those justifications of empirical ethics that articulate the value of empirical ethics in 
terms of the challenges of making sound ethical arguments that have effects in the world. Dunn et al. 
suggest that we ought to understand the role of empirical ethics as the process of making practical 
normative arguments “that are both convincing…and will actually convince.” (Dunn et al, 2012:473) 
This claim corresponds respectively to making arguments that are philosophically sound and 
appropriately grounded in the relevant context, such that these arguments will have force in practice. 
Understanding empirical ethics in this way can assist in the practical activity of cultivating arguments 
with sound ethical foundations to shape policy decisions in ways that are most likely to have purchase 
in the world. Given that policy-making is rightly seen as having failed if the policy produced has no 
rational normative foundation, or if it has no practical effect in the world, this articulation of attending 
to justification in a very practical way within empirical ethics is of crucial importance to the activities of 
the ethicist working to formulate policy. 
It appears, therefore, that empirical ethics offers a way of bringing empirical evidence to bear on 
policy such that the policy produced attends to the relevant moral justifications at stake in that context. 
Furthermore, to be properly executed, this approach requires an individual familiar with empirical 
ethics, and who is comfortable interpreting and applying empirical ethics research (that is, someone 
who understands the methods of collecting and analysing empirical data and relating it to 
philosophical moral concepts in such a way to critique and synthesize sound practical ethical 
arguments). The professional ethicist is well placed to fulfill this role, even if she herself does not 
produce empirical ethics research, although experience or training in the methodologies would be 
valuable.   
 
Conclusions 
Empirical ethics has received a great deal of attention as a method in bioethics, but it has yet to make 
a strong impact in policy-making beyond the academic world. This is despite its central purpose of 
bringing together a rich understanding of the lived experience with the insight and rigorous scrutiny 
that philosophy has to offer, a union that seems prima facie fitting for public policy. 
Before addressing whether and how the ethicist should incorporate empirical ethics into the expertise 
she brings to the policy table, we needed first to understand the normative justifications underpinning 
her influence on policy more broadly. We have endeavoured to show that justification for the ethicist’s 
role on a policy committee relies first on an account of legitimate political authority, and that this 
account will advance different kinds of empirical ethics approaches. This depends on the form of the 
political authority claim and recognises that these claims to political authority are likely to be sensitive 
(for a range of reasons) to the concerns of, or evidence about, people in the world outside the 
decision-making setting in which the ethicist is situated. Second, the role she plays in this position is 
enhanced by her expertise in articulating practical moral reasoning in ways that are advanced by 
those working in empirical ethics. This requires her to produce an argument for policy that is 
philosophically sound and that is able to actually convince policy-makers, stakeholders, and citizens 
in general to act accordingly. 
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Evidence, Epistemology and Empirical Bioethics 
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Introduction 
In recent years, bioethical discussions about the utility and value of empirical research have become 
increasingly sophisticated and diverse. Many of these discussions begin with a critique of traditional 
philosophical distinctions such as is/ought and fact/value as a way of defending and illustrating the 
value, or in some cases the necessity, of empirical approaches in bioethics (Solomon, 2005; 
Lawrence & Curlin, 2011; Dawson, 2013). As Leget et al (2009) have shown, these approaches are 
by no means uniform; one might say that approaches exist along two continuous intersecting axes - 
the disciplinary and the epistemological. On the disciplinary axis, sociology and analytic philosophy 
make up each of the ends; on the epistemological axis, descriptive and normative make up each of 
the ends.  As a consequence of these axes, empirical ethics ranges from the use of empirical data to 
inform normative analysis, to descriptive sociology (about ethical or moral concerns; or about 
bioethics itself), to efforts to properly integrate the normative and the empirical.  
In the midst of this complexity about the purpose and utility of empirical data (and some confusion 
about what empirical ethics “actually” is), there is nevertheless a growing sense that broadly 
speaking, an understanding of social context should be part of bioethical analyses. How such 
understanding should be achieved can be viewed as a methodological concern. In his 2012 
Presidential Address at the World Congress of Bioethics, Angus Dawson went so far as to claim that 
“the use of empirical social scientific methods is fundamental to good ethics” (Dawson, 2013). This 
bold claim stops short of where this chapter begins: while  “the use of” social science methods may be 
necessary to good ethics, it is not sufficient. The good use of empirical social scientific methods will 
prove fundamental to good ethics.  
Acknowledgement of the value of empirical investigations in ethics is an important step away from a 
unitary analytic paradigm, but much work remains to be done to train a generation of empirical 
ethicists to be sophisticated, reflexive and rigorous methodologists. Lack of understanding of the 
integration of research questions, data collection and analytic methods results in a good deal of bad 
empirical research among social scientists, and these problems have accompanied the translation of 
empirical approaches into ethics (Dunn et al, 2008; Hurst, 2009; Strong et al, 2010).  In the absence 
of proper training, there is a danger that ‘tool-kit’ approaches that require minimal training and 
understanding will be favoured over the more difficult route (Dunn & Ives, 2009). This chapter 
introduces the concept of epistemology and its relationship to empirical data collection, and illustrates 
the impact that methods of data collection have on the process of generating knowledge though 
empirical encounters. The chapter has a twofold aim: First, to challenge and critique approaches to 
empirical bioethics that view data collection as a process that can be practised in isolation and used 
to inform theorising in a linear fashion.11 Second, to offer a transparent and concrete discussion that 
will inform and encourage readers in developing their own empirical ethics research design. To this 
end, many points are illustrated through examples of, and reflections on, an empirical ethics research 
study conducted between 2008-2012. 
 
The ‘empirical’ in empirical ethics 
What does ‘empirical’ mean in empirical ethics? For Dawson, as for many researchers in this area, 
‘empirical’ refers to social context, and ‘empirical ethics’ refers to studies in or about ethics that take 
social context into account. ‘Social context’, as understood here, can refer to institutional, relational, 
                                                     
11 Kon (2009) provides an exemplar of such a linear, “hierarchical” approach to empirical ethics.  
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cultural, social, spatial or virtual dimensions of human and animal life. Empirical ethics, therefore, has 
a broad and diverse remit, a fact that generates both opportunity and confusion. 
DeVries (2004) has proposed a continuum that describes empirical research in bioethics, which 
includes descriptive ethics; the consequences of moral decision-making; the consequences of moral 
advice-giving; and the context of bioethics. This typology provides a helpful way to consider some of 
the kinds of ethical questions an empirical approach can answer. Its focus on context in empirical 
ethics, as a pre and post-hoc ground for evaluations of ethical policy and ethical claims, is highly 
relevant. For example, in the category ‘the consequences of moral advice-giving,’ projects may take 
the following form: X advice-giving practice/policy espouses Y virtues/ideals, and has Z expected 
consequences. But what is X actually doing in practice? In such a formulation, the question itself 
substantiates the need for empirical research and simultaneously provides a clear guide to research 
design –the empirical work needs to capture events, practices, attitudes and so on in a given setting, 
for a given population of patients, and evaluate the findings in relation to the stated ideals and 
intentions.   
As valuable as this typology is, it neglects explication of some key concerns embedded in an 
empirical ethics approach.  For example, an implicit or explicit interest in the relationship of context 
and power should, and often does, inform research questions in empirical ethics. While this 
relationship is implicit in DeVries’s typology, it would be useful to highlight it as a core dimension of 
the sorts of questions that generate ethical questions that require an empirical approach.  
Similarly, it would be useful to highlight more features of ‘descriptive ethics’. This category is not only, 
or even largely, about “public attitudes” to burning ethical questions (DeVries, 2004); it is also about 
what is sometimes called ‘ethics on the ground’, or ‘local ethics’, that is, an interest in the ways in 
which moral dilemmas and ethical commitments take shape through embodied processes and 
practices of lived experiences in local contexts.  Here, the label ‘descriptive ethics’ runs the danger of 
reinforcing unhelpful distinctions between this kind of work and ‘normative’ questions, where 
description is seen as subjective, interpretive and relativistic, and normative is seen as robust, 
objective and impact-full (see also Musschenga, 2005). Such problematic distinctions can be 
exacerbated in the context of under-specified empirical ethics research questions and research 
design.  
 
‘Data’ in empirical ethics 
The broad remit of empirical ethics potentiates the full range of social science ‘data,’ from interviews 
to texts to vignettes to participant observation. Each type of data has a rich tradition of collection and 
analysis, and its collection is usually underpinned by a particular theoretical orientation or commitment 
(the relationship of theory to data collection is discussed further down). On one level, it appears 
obvious what constitutes ‘data’ in empirical ethics, even though the majority of empirical ethics studies 
to date do not exploit the full range of methodological possibilities. Yet there is an emerging diversity 
of interpretation around the ‘empirical’ in empirical ethics. One example of this diversity is the 
introduction of survey methodology as an empirical ethics approach. Here, the data is arguably rather 
far removed from the social context, even though it constitutes a representation of ‘the social’ in the 
form of attitudes, beliefs, biases and so forth. In general, the accusation brought against surveys is 
that they sacrifice a thick understanding of ‘the social’ for data that is ‘big’ and generalisable. This sort 
of data is unlikely to enrich ethical analysis or understanding in a deep way; however, it is able to 
respond to general questions about how the public view the ethics of certain practices or processes, 
and their moral attitudes and beliefs. In DeVries’s typology, surveys could certainly provide empirical 
ethics data on public attitudes.  
A more complicated data question arises in the context of experimental neuroethics (overlapping 
areas include experimental philosophy, social neuroscience and moral psychology). In this area, mind 
and brain are the primary empirical ‘sites’ under investigation, and the empirical data collected is brain 
data in the form of, for example, brain scans or what might be considered ‘near-brain data’, such as 
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psychological data (e.g. Terbeck et al, 2013; Cope et al, 2010).  One might say that the key interest in 
these kinds of studies is: ‘How does the brain do ethics and morality’?  
Is research that operationalises the brain as an empirical site for data collection part of an empirical 
ethics approach? The important overlap between this kind of research and other empirical ethics 
research is that it is clearly data-driven. The departure from common formulations of empirical 
research is that it does not generally incorporate social science methods or concepts, and it does not 
take ‘the real world’ as its primary research context. At the same time, real world settings are 
important sites in which this kind of empirical ethics research finds both its questions and its 
applications.  For example, research investigating the neural and/or genetic bases of aggression and 
criminality has implications in criminal courts and in educational settings. In these contexts, biological 
and brain data are being used to explain moral wrongdoing, and to predict who might be at higher risk 
of future morally deviant behavior (Singh et al, 2014). Similarly, empirical data about unconscious bias 
and decision-making are shaping arguments about human capacity for free will and moral 
responsibility. 
(https://www.academia.edu/405647/Consciousness_Implicit_Attitudes_and_Moral_Responsibility). 
It is an open question whether the biological sites and systems should be, or can be, viewed as 
empirical sites on par with social sites. The importance of social contexts, power relations, 
embodiment and so forth that empirical ethics has acknowledged and promoted, is generally not 
acknowledged when notions of ‘the empirical’ in empirical ethics is confined to biological realms and 
systems. If the point of empirical ethics was to assert the importance of social context in ethics, then 
this branch of empirical ethics potentially puts that effort at some risk by reducing ethics and morality 
to the brain. 
 
Posing Questions and Collecting Data 
Having considered what constitutes ‘data’ in empirical ethics, it is now important to consider data 
collection and its implications for good empirical ethics research.  ‘What methods should I use to 
collect my data?’ Qualitative researchers frequently hear this question from students. However, data 
collection methods should not be chosen for convenience or popularity or other instrumental reasons; 
they should be chosen because they are considered the best possible way to achieve good answers 
to a particular set of research questions. But many disciplines have deeply embedded assumptions 
about the ‘right’ methods to use, such that methodology is more a function of convention than of 
explicit decision-making. These conventions have important benefits: they confer in-group status and 
increase the likelihood of acceptance in disciplinary publications.12 But one consequence of 
conventional methodological thinking within disciplines is that not only the same kinds of methods, but 
also the same sorts of questions, frequently turn up over and over again.  
Methodological consistency offers an important advantage in that it enables comparisons across 
studies, allowing analysis of trends and change over time, as well as awareness of how fine-grained 
changes in study design affect outcomes. And indeed, methodological consistency may exist in some 
or many cases because those methods are, in fact, the best way to answer a particular set of 
research questions. At the same time, in an inherently interdisciplinary field like empirical ethics, it is 
imperative to train researchers to understand the basic rationale for research methods, and the 
implications for knowledge production of methodological choices.  
Methodological choices necessarily create epistemological constraints; that is, they narrow what can 
be seen, how it is seen, and therefore what can be known. Methods are like lenses on a microscope; 
they provide sight and focus on a target phenomenon; they enable adjustments to the level of detail 
that can be viewed; and without sufficient care, they can blur or distort views and interpretation. For 
this reason, data collection is never a neutral affair, and the researcher needs to understand the ways 
of knowing and seeing that a methodology confers on the empirical realm. Moreover, ways of knowing 
and seeing in a research context are frequently (and should be) part of a theoretical framework, which 
                                                     
12 See Frith’s and Draper’s (2016) chapter, in this volume, for further discussion around the challenges of publishing with 
methodologies that do not fit within a disciplinary canon. 
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shapes the research questions and the processes of answering them. Ideally, this theoretical 
framework, its epistemological commitments and their relationship to methodological choices should 
also be made explicit in research. For example, if I adhere to the theory that human morality is a 
function of innate capacities, and that immoral acts likely arise because of biological pathology, then 
my research into immoral acts will focus on the biological realm, and my methods will be chosen 
accordingly. This does not mean necessarily that I am uninterested in the social dimensions of 
immorality, but because I believe the primary causes of immorality to be biological, and I believe 
understanding of causes to be the best way to address the social problem of immorality, I focus my 
microscope exclusively on (probably a very small and tightly conceived) biological system. This 
interrelationship between theory, epistemology and data collection methods may seem obvious in this 
example, but it is all too rarely considered in empirical bioethics research. 
These complexities in the context of an empirical bioethics approach are best illustrated concretely; 
the following section presents a case study of empirical bioethics research, outlining the research 
questions and methodological choices, and discussing their implications.  
 
Research with Children on Ethical Dimensions of Stimulant Drug Medications: The VOICES 
study (Voices on Identity, Childhood, Ethics & Stimulants) 
 
Background to the Study 
Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder is a highly contested disorder, because of its diagnostic 
ambiguity, the fact that it is often treated with stimulant drugs, such as Ritalin and Adderall, and 
because it raises complex questions about what constitutes ‘normal’ childhood behavior. The disorder 
is usually diagnosed in middle childhood, and in most countries approximately 75 – 80% of children 
diagnosed are boys. The rate of ADHD diagnoses is rising in many countries, alongside a rise in 
consumption of stimulant drugs. A controversial estimate of global prevalence of ADHD suggests that 
5% of school-age children world-wide meet criteria for a clinical diagnosis; however, there is variation 
across geographic areas. (Polanczyk et al, 2007). Although the US is still the largest consumer of 
methylphenidate, a key ingredient in the drug used to treat ADHD, increases in ADHD medication 
expenditures in OECD countries (other than the US) exceed the rate of increase in the US over the 
past decade (Singh et al, 2013).  
Ethical controversies over ADHD diagnosis and stimulant drug treatments range from concerns about 
medicalization of childhood to concerns about the threats that stimulant drugs pose to development of 
an authentic self, personal responsibility, and moral agency in children (Conrad, 1976; Mayes et al, 
2008; Singh, 2012). An active and frequently polemic debate over these issues has played out in the 
media, blogs, journal articles and books over the past decade and more, but in all this time, there had 
been no systematic enquiry into children’s own views of, and experiences with, ADHD diagnosis and 
stimulant drug treatments. 
The VOICES study was born out of a simple question: Was there evidence to support claims about 
the moral and ethical harms of stimulant drug treatments?  The project’s research questions focused 
on authenticity, personal responsibility and moral agency because these were concerns that had been 
most frequently raised in the bioethics literature.  Alongside these specific concerns, the study aimed 
to generate a broad understanding of the moral lives of children with ADHD, particularly in the context 
of the imposition of behavioural norms and school expectations, and the experiences of stigma. 
Again, the focus on these concerns was derived from the academic literature, this time primarily from 
the sociological literature, which has a rich history of analysis and reflection about the ‘moral career’ 
of psychiatric patients and stigma and labelling (Goffman, 1963).  
In the absence of empirical evidence, we considered the concepts and theoretical claims we found in 
the academic literature to be hypotheses rather than realities; the study would test the hypotheses 
and generate empirical understanding of ethical implications and moral concerns surrounding 
stimulant drug treatments, as perceived, reported and experienced by children. This approach, 
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essentially to investigate the ‘lived’ or ‘on the ground’ ethics accompanying a medical intervention, is a 
key dimension of empirical ethics. Hypothesis testing (this non-experimental version) is not a 
necessary or even a typical feature of a ‘lived ethics’ study; the VOICES study could have deployed a 
more open-ended perspective in its formulation of research questions, allowing the relevant ethical 
concerns to emerge from initial data collection, as in a grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) 
approach. However, in this case, pilot research had been conducted (Singh, 2007, 2010), and this 
research, in conjunction with extensive reading of the literature, allowed for the formulation of more 
specific research questions. 
The Sample 
VOICES proceeded from the premise that research with children was the best way to examine the 
potential ethical and moral harms (and benefits) of stimulant drug treatments – children were, after all, 
the patients. The fact that children with ADHD had never been included in research of this kind before 
was not because their inclusion had been carefully considered and then rejected. Their exclusion was 
a function of an epistemological problem that has its roots in social science conceptualisations of 
children and childhood, and in the biological reductionism of contemporary psychiatry. Post-
structuralist conceptions of children and psychiatry tended to view children as victims of techniques of 
‘biopower’ or as ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault, 1994); psychiatric accounts of children with ADHD tended 
to put the brain before the person, viewing children’s behavior as a function of a biological problem of 
self-control (Barkley, 1986). It is ironic (given the extensive disagreements between these two 
perspectives) that neither account opened a space – an epistemic surface – in which children’s 
experiential knowledge appeared valuable or important. The contention that data collection with 
children was the best way to answer our research questions therefore not only unsettled the way 
ethics was normally done; it also disrupted knowledge-production in other disciplines.  
It was always clear that the VOICES study would collect data from children, but who these children 
should be was not clear. Sampling outside the context of a population-based study (in which sampling 
is generally random) requires a good deal of thought. In clinical and medical ethics studies, for 
example, participants are often patients and/or patients’ family members, and access and research 
ethics considerations require planning and discussion. While researchers will often seize the 
opportunity to work with a ‘convenience sample,’ it is important to be aware of, and explicit about, the 
limitations of such samples. This is particularly true in cases where the researcher is also a member 
of the clinical group working with the patients who have agreed to participate in the study. In addition 
to the staple research ethics concerns, there is also the reality of the power relationship between a 
researcher and patients. This relationship needs to be addressed and acknowledged throughout the 
research process, particularly as part of the researcher’s reflexive insights into how the relationship 
shapes the encounter with research participants and, consequently, how it shapes knowledge 
production that occurs through that encounter (Singh, 2010). This kind of reflexivity about sampling 
and the researcher-participant relationship is essential to good research practice no matter the type of 
participant recruited into the study, but special attention should be paid to participants who could be 
more vulnerable for one reason or another.    
In any kind of sample, inclusion criteria are ideally decided in relation to the research questions and 
the research literature. In the case of the VOICES study, the academic literature on ADHD and 
stimulant drugs gave rise to theoretical interests in the role of gender, culture and socio-economic 
status in children’s experiences and perceptions; and these interests were reflected in the research 
questions. Our sampling therefore needed to allow analyses of these variables to take place, at least 
in a preliminary way. The biggest challenge was how to interpret ‘culture’, which we did very crudely 
at first by including a sample of US children and a sample of UK children in the study. We actively 
recruited girls into the study, and recruited from socio-economically diverse areas.  
A strong steer from reviewers of the funding proposal for the study meant that we also created sub-
groups of participants to account for different medication status, and we included an undiagnosed 
‘comparison’ group. Very little thought was given at the outset as to whether these sub-groups (which 
suggested that comparisons across groups would be possible and desirable) made sense in the 
context of the study questions, interests and approach. In hindsight it is clear that we, and our 
reviewers, fell into positivist sampling conventions, perhaps because of all the unknowns in the study, 
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and because the stakes around the findings were high given the controversy around the topic. 
Analytically, some of the sub-groups and variables we included ended up yielding important insights; 
for example children with fewer socio-economic resources were more vulnerable to ethical harms 
related to ADHD diagnosis and stimulant drug treatments than children with more resources. But any 
such insights were necessarily qualified by the fact that our research design did not allow for the 
discernment of generalisable differences between groups, and it is possible that the focus on some of 
these variables distracted us, at least in the initial analysis of the data, from more relevant and 
appropriate insights.  
Data Collection 
In considering our sample and our methods we had to keep in mind the capacities of our child 
participants and the fact that we would be asking them to engage with concepts and experiences that 
are difficult even for adults to understand and express. From the pilot research we had learned that 
children engage most authentically when they feel they are driving the action with the researcher, so 
we needed ‘child-led’ methods as much as possible. We also had a pragmatic eye on the audiences 
that we hoped would be interested in the study findings eventually; in our case this audience was 
psychiatrists and other medical professionals; bioethicists; and social scientists. These audiences had 
no common methodological frame of reference; in fact, they had different understandings of ‘empirical 
evidence’ as outlined above. The challenge here was to conduct a study that combined strong 
intellectual anchors with methodological creativity, in order to allow the findings to speak across 
disciplines.   
Ultimately we settled on a mixed methods approach that was oriented around a 60-90 minute 
interview with a child. The interview itself was divided into different sections, each of which probed 
one main topic in which we were interested (e.g. authenticity, responsibility, etc.) and several sub-
topics. Different sections employed different methods, such that in the course of the interview children 
were asked to engage in a variety of activities, including verbal responses to questions, drawing, 
sentence completions, sorting tasks, a vignette, and a standardized self-perception questionnaire. 
This approach allowed us not only to probe the same topic using different techniques during the 
interview, it also opened up a range of analytic strategies that involved quantitative and qualitative 
methods in a complementary way.  
If the interview protocol was rather structured, it is because it over-compensated somewhat in trying 
to address a recurring criticism we confronted about the entire VOICES study enterprise: children 
could not possibly report on their moral lives or on ethical concerns in a valid and reliable way. 
Another version of this criticism suggested that children would only parrot back what their parents or 
doctors or teachers had told them. Validity and reliability are concepts that come out of the world of 
statistical research and reflect that world’s concerns with the standardization of measurement 
(validity: are you measuring what you think you’re measuring) and generalizability of findings 
(reliability: if I did this study again in a different sample, using your measures, would I come up with 
similar findings). Common ways of addressing issues of reliability and validity in empirical research 
with children is to use only standardized, validated instruments; to conduct research on children only 
with adult participants; to conduct research with adults and children and then to compare the findings. 
These approaches all severely narrow what can be known about the child, and tend to reproduce 
knowledge rather than allowing new knowledge to enter the frame. Standardized measures, with their 
a priori categories, values and scales, offer little innovation in a new research area.  
The intention here is not to erect another argument for the riches of qualitative methods over the 
relative impoverishment of quantitative methods. Instead, it is to reflect on the process of 
methodological choices in empirical ethics against the backdrop of measurement conventions. We 
were aware of the problematics of reliability and validity in research with children, but we felt that the 
ways in which those problematics were commonly addressed would not allow us to take full 
advantage of the epistemic surface that had opened up – in other words, those approaches were not 
the best way to answer our research questions, even though they would allow us to deal with the 
anticipated criticism of the very idea of conducting research with children in the area of ethics and 
moral life. 
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The burden of ‘reliability and validity’ is greatest in areas that are new to empirical research – such as 
ethics – in part because there is no methodologically consistent body of work on which to base 
research questions and methodological choices. As we note above, this sort of consistency also has 
significant drawbacks; moreover, it is unclear if empirical ethics as a fundamentally interdisciplinary 
endeavor, ought to aim for methodological consistency. But skepticism about the relevance of 
reliability and validity for empirical ethics (unless empirical ethics research is using a quantitative 
approach in which these concepts are intrinsically relevant), does not preclude a commitment to the 
underlying principle of quality indicators in research, and to the importance of research that allows 
systematic comparisons to be made across contexts. Observing the growth in empirical ethics over 
the past decade, it is clear that there has not been sufficient discussion of, or attention to quality 
indicators. This is not the place to engage in a discussion of what quality indicators for empirical 
ethics research ought to be; however, as proposals for quality criteria emerge (Mertz et al, 2014) it will 
be important to give these focused attention and scrutiny, and, as consensus emerges, to translate 
these into training for empirical ethics researchers. 
 
Novel methods and interdisciplinarity in empirical ethics 
The solution of a more structured protocol allowed us more control over the kinds of data we collected 
from children; we also asked parents to fill out standardized measures and a structured questionnaire. 
However, this solution also gave us less time and space for a wide-angle perspective on the moral 
lives of children taking medications for ADHD. As time went on in our study, we came to understand 
more and more how much the ecological systems (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) in which children are 
embedded mattered to their embodied experiences and perceptions of stimulant drug treatments. 
Although it was not part of our initial methodological plan, we began to investigate these ecologies by 
making notes about children’s local areas, and by incorporating questions in our interview protocol on 
school environments and local history, including neighborhood, families and friends, opportunities for 
play outdoors, and so forth. We knew that these were important concerns because where our protocol 
invited children to introduce themes and ideas, these were issues they raised repeatedly.  
Retrospectively, it is clear that our focus on a specific set of questions that emerged from the 
bioethics and sociological literature, and our choice of methodological tools, could easily have allowed 
us to miss the significance of this local ecology. Our methods did not require us to walk around 
children’s neighbourhoods, to visit their schools, to talk to their friends. We were fortunate in that we 
had sufficient flexibility and resources to start engaging this complementary lens on our research 
questions early in the research process, but a proper multi-sited ethnography would provide much 
richer and more systematic data than we could obtain in the course of the VOICES study.  
Ethnography has not been used much as an approach in empirical ethics, but this is likely to change 
with developments in the new field of ‘moral anthropology’ (Mattingly, 2012; Laidlaw, 2014). This area 
overlaps substantively with the subset of empirical ethics studies that seek to understand ‘lived’ or 
‘local’ ethics and values, viewing the processes and practices of moral life as giving rise to ethical 
commitments (Parker, 2007). In addition to bringing a robust method to empirical ethics, anthropology 
also offers a rich tradition of reflexivity in research, through which researchers learn to consider issues 
of power and participation throughout the research process, but particularly in sampling, data 
collection and data analysis.    
A main point here is that empirical ethics offers an opportunity for creative and productive integration 
of qualitative and quantitative methods. This is not to suggest that any combination of approaches is 
productive or possible in empirical ethics. There are probably are some incompatible approaches. 
Moreover, in an interdisciplinary field, it seems important to try to prevent hierarchies of approaches 
from emerging, in the way that these currently exist in places in the context of the 
qualitative/quantitative divide. In the life sciences and in medicine, for example, qualitative research is 
frequently valued only as a pilot phase of a project, or as part of a side project, e.g. in public 
engagement, or in ‘ethics.’ In other words, qualitative research is not viewed as essential to the 
investigation of the core phenomenon. A similar concern is emerging in a subset of empirical ethics, in 
which empirical data is collected by one kind of researcher in order to supply a dataset for a 
 52 
normative analysis that will be performed by another kind of researcher. This kind of empirical data 
may well be more relevant to addressing real world problems than fictional ethical cases such as the 
trolley problem. The problem is, again, that the integrity of the empirical data is lost when it functions 
as a means to an end. As we have seen in this chapter, empirical data does not represent a ‘view 
from nowhere’ – the data itself is diffused with an epistemology that has been carefully considered 
and crafted by researchers who produced the data. This is the case whether the data is brain scans 
or interviews. How will or should this story be retained as part of a normative analysis? Empirical 
ethics needs to grapple with this question, as part of a broader acknowledgment of the complexities of 
data collection and analysis in ethics.  
 
Roads Not Taken 
In just about any research project, a different methodological toolkit will allow different kinds of 
understandings and different kinds and levels of knowledge about a phenomenon to come to the fore. 
This is why research questions and methods should not only refer tightly to each other, they should 
also be held together within a theoretical framework that proposes a vision of how knowledge 
generated in the current study will relate to existing knowledge, and how it furthers understanding of a 
given phenomenon. Empirical ethics researchers must have sufficient reflexive awareness to 
anticipate how different approaches open up and close down what can be known about a 
phenomenon. 
It is instructive, therefore, to consider how the VOICES project might have achieved different data had 
the theoretical framework been different. As pointed out earlier, the idea of interviewing children was 
itself a result of a framework that views children not as submissive and docile objects of social 
practices and forces (as in a strong social constructivist view), but as developing agents and citizens, 
capable of formulating and articulating views on themselves and their moral worlds. We understood 
these articulations to be socially informed and developmentally nuanced, and we did not assume that 
young people (or anyone, for that matter) were able to reflect a social reality ‘out there’ that was 
unaffected by their perspective, status, history and so forth. The ecological paradigm allowed us to 
embed this theoretical understanding in our research with children. Thus our approach retained an 
important aspect of the social constructivist critique of scientific objectivism, while rejecting a 
constructivist formulation of the child as victim. On the basis of our theoretical framework, we were 
obliged to conduct an ecological analysis of our interviews with children, and this dimension of our 
research proved particularly rich and provocative (see Singh, 2011). 
Another approach the VOICES study could have taken is one that foregrounded the justice and 
equality concerns in ADHD diagnosis and treatment, drawing on a feminist bioethics perspective (see 
Leach Scully’s (2016) chapter in this volume). This approach might have encouraged a focus on the 
gender dimensions of ADHD, including the bias against boys in ADHD diagnosis; gendered 
assumptions inherent in ‘normal’ child development; inattentive type ADHD as ‘ADHD for girls’. More 
broadly, a justice and equity perspective might have investigated constructions of ‘normal’ and 
‘disordered’ behaviours and persons in ADHD, or different rates of ADHD diagnosis and drug 
treatment among children, based on gender, race/ethnicity, socio-economic status and geographic 
location.  
We were not unaware of these concerns in the VOICES study, of course, but our research design did 
not allow for their scrutiny as primary questions. We did try to over-sample girls in the study, in order 
to give voice to an under-represented group; and when we had the opportunity to recruit more US 
ethnic minority children into the sample, we did so. Had our research design prioritised gender and 
justice concerns, we would have recruited more children in these under-represented groups; perhaps 
our recruitment would have focused on these groups entirely. Our questions would likely have 
changed substantively from a focus on authenticity, moral agency and responsibility, to questions 
concerning the construction of difference and self-representation, power relations in diagnosis and 
treatment decisions, and access to services; and we would probably have been more focused in our 
efforts to understand the impacts of labeling and stigma in ADHD.  It is likely that in addition to 
interviewing children, we would have undertaken epidemiological analyses of diagnosis and treatment 
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rates, to ascertain potential population-level biases, and sites of risk and resilience in ADHD. In order 
to better understand the local dynamics of power, diagnosis and treatment, we may have included a 
set of professionals in our interview study – perhaps medical professionals or teachers. 
As a result of a shift in the foundational theoretical framework, the VOICES study would have had a 
substantively different research design and therefore a different set of outcomes. It is useful to 
consider the implications of theoretical foundations early on in an empirical ethics study in order to 
understand how a framework could shape research questions, methodological tools and outcomes.  
 
The way forward  
Empirical ethics represents a hard-fought argument about the importance of data in ethical analysis, 
but this should not induce uncritical, unreflexive pursuit of that data. From a methodological 
perspective, empirical ethics is a skill that must be taught, learned and practiced, in order to achieve 
requisite levels of rigor and transparency. While conceptual analysis and rigor around empirical ethics 
have certainly flourished in the past decade, the applied dimension of empirical ethics is still 
remarkably under-specified, and lacks agreed quality indicators, resulting in poor research design and 
in analytically impoverished, inconsistent, and unreliable research outcomes. Programmes in 
bioethics, medical ethics and related areas need to give more thought to the development and 
delivery of such training. It is not an exaggeration to say that without these and other programmatic 
pursuits of quality in empirical ethics, the entire enterprise may fall down for lack of rigour and value.  
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Friends, Foes, Flatmates: On the Relationship between 
Law and (Empirical) Bioethics 
 
Richard Huxtable 
 
 
A Tale of Two Flatmates 
Lei-Kung, from China, shares an apartment with his younger flatmate Bronislawa, who is Polish. Each 
has their own room, into which their flatmate can venture. They drafted the rules of the flat together, 
dividing responsibility for shared areas, like the kitchen. Lei-Kung is primarily responsible for the rota 
and basic maintenance, while Bronislawa regularly cleans. The apartment occupies an urban 
complex, whose residents toil together on common areas, such as the stairwells; Lei-Kung and 
Bronislawa typically work alongside their neighbours Sachan, Theo, Pascal, and Hakym and his 
family. Communication is complicated by the many languages they speak, and disagreements do 
arise. Bronislawa nevertheless throws frequent parties for the block. Once close to Theo, 
Bronislawa’s best friend nowadays is Pascal, who tries to get on with everyone, although his 
relationship with Sachan is sometimes strained.  
Occasionally the relationship between Lei-Kung and Bronislawa is also tested. Lei-Kung likes to keep 
busy doing things; Bronislawa does too, although she is also something of a dreamer. Lei-Kung 
sometimes exclaims that Bronislawa is “摽 (biào)” – a word not easily translated for Bronislawa, but 
which essentially means that she restricts his movement by hanging off his arm while he walks. 
Bronislawa, meanwhile, judges Lei-Kung to be “kombinować” – also difficult to translate, this suggests 
that Bronislawa dislikes Lei-Kung’s contrived solutions to problems arising in the flat.  
Each does, however, speak some of the other’s language, and Lei-Kung and Bronislawa usually get 
along amicably, appreciating their flatmate’s contributions to communal life. Perhaps their relationship 
will develop: from flatmates, who are occasionally foes but often friends, to, one day, spouses.  
This tale of two flatmates may seem an unlikely starting place, but metaphors abound in the literature 
that explores the relationship between bioethics and law: they ‘share much of the same turf’ (Sullivan 
& Reynolds, 1998); they may be related by blood, either as ‘close but estranged cousins’ (Foster, 
2009), or as twin siblings (van der Burg, 2010); perhaps they are related by marriage (Wolf, 2004); or, 
maybe, as Miola suggests, they are “flatmates rather than bedfellows” (Miola, 2006:25). In our tale, 
Bronislawa, whose name means Divine Protector, represents bioethics, while Lei-Kung, which means 
God of Retribution, represents law. These are our protagonists, but we will also encounter Sachan 
(sociable), who represents the social sciences, Theo (godly), who personifies theology, Pascal, who 
stands for philosophy, and Hakym (doctor) and his family (i.e. the various health sciences and allied 
professions).  
My aim here is to contemplate the relationship between bioethics and law and, in particular, to 
consider what law can – and cannot – contribute to bioethics. This will involve some empirical 
reflection, although conceptual and normative questions will also feature, including how we should 
understand each domain and thus how we should view the relationship. I suggest that law’s (positive) 
contributions can be captured by five P’s, which relate to law’s purpose, processes, products, 
practices and phrasing. Despite these areas of contribution and convergence, there is also 
divergence and distraction, summarised in five A’s, which concern articulation, angst, action, 
aspiration and audience. Of course, in order to see both the good and the ill in the relationship 
between law and bioethics, we need first to define each of these domains.  
 
Bioethics as a Discipline of Disciplines 
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To locate “bioethics”, let us remove the “bio” prefix and first consider “ethics”, or moral philosophy.13 
This discipline encompasses four (somewhat overlapping) sub-disciplines: normative ethics, which 
constructs and criticises normative theories of what we should do or who we should be; applied 
ethics, which relates such theories to specific fields; meta-ethics, which reflects on the concepts at 
stake; and descriptive ethics, which analyses actual moral beliefs and practices (van der Burg, 2010; 
Dawson & Wilkinson, 2009; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2006). 
Unsurprisingly, bioethics, which developed from medical ethics in the 1960s,14 accommodates all of 
this work, albeit with a focus on the biosciences.15 Reich (1995) defines bioethics as: 
“the systematic study of the moral dimensions – including moral vision, decisions, 
conduct, and policies – of the life sciences and health care, employing a variety of ethical 
methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting” (ppxxi)  
As the final clause suggests, bioethics – like the party-hosting Bronislawa – provides a meeting place. 
Indeed, bioethics is distinctively inter-, multi- or even trans-disciplinary, inviting in a variety of 
disciplines (amongst them philosophy, anthropology, sociology, psychology and theology16), each of 
which has its own language but which must – at least in bioethics’ gatherings – communicate with its 
neighbours (Callahan, 1973; Silber, 1982). 
Although its contributing disciplines (like medicine) are also heterogeneous (Silber, 1982), bioethics 
appears a particularly broad church. So is bioethics itself a discipline? Foucault (1977) suggested 
that: 
“The disciplines characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute along a scale, around a 
norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another and, if necessary, disqualify and 
invalidate” (pp223).  
One of bioethics’ pioneers, Dan Callahan, noted in 1973 that disciplines involve the acquisition of 
professional expertise, through specific training and apprenticeships, in which particular 
methodologies, approaches and commitments are learnt (Callahan, 1973). But, he added, disciplines 
can also exhibit arrogance, insulation, neurosis and narrow(minded)ness. Four decades on, some say 
that bioethics still lacks the necessary unity to be a discipline (Priaulx, 2013). Yet, bioethics does have 
many of the features - good and bad – to which Foucault and Callahan referred, including education 
programmes, learned journals, and professional appointments and organisations.17 Despite all this, it 
is intriguing (or is it telling?) that many of bioethics’ practitioners decline to label themselves 
“bioethicists”.18  
Discipline or not, we might nevertheless ponder what is distinctive about this bioethics beast. Here we 
re-encounter Bronislawa, and specifically her ties to Theo and Pascal. While once bioethics seemed 
particularly associated with theology (Freeman, 2008), nowadays it is philosophy which asserts its 
dominance. According to Brownsword, “as a critical discipline, bioethics tries to sort out the moral 
wheat from the non-moral chaff” (2008:15). In short, bioethics is ethics, which is moral philosophy, 
albeit visiting the realm of the biosciences.  
Recalling Callahan’s concerns, some of the other contributing disciplines – notably the social sciences 
– have been critical of bioethics’ apparent emphasis on normative, applied and meta-ethics, at the 
expense of descriptive ethics (Hedgcoe, 2004).  As this volume attests, the tide is turning, and 
perhaps necessarily so, since bioethics must engage with the real world (Stirrat, 2003).  Moral 
philosophy helps identify “the elements of a moral position” but, Brownsword (2008) continues:  
                                                     
13 I will use ethics and morals interchangeably.  
14 Histories of medical ethics include, for example, Jonsen (1998) and Freeman (2008). The precise origins of bioethics are, however, contested.  
See,Rothstein (2009)  
15 Silber (1982) sees bioethics as a special case of universal ethics, rather than a special professional ethics, a point deliberately reflected in the 
naming of the Centre for Ethics in Medicine, in which I work: G.M. Stirrat, personal communication.  
16 Although explicitly selective, Silber’s (1982) list (notably?) omits law. 
17 Notably, Brownsword (2008) describes bioethics as a discipline. 
18 Bioethics’ inter-disciplinarity can cause problems e.g. in the UK Research Excellence Framework, which assesses the quality of academic 
work, on which basis Universities are awarded funding. Lacking their own panel, “bioethicists” return to their original disciplinary homes, hopeful 
that their work is not too tainted by inter-discplinarity.  
 57 
bioethics is much more proximately concerned with developing working guidance for 
those who wish to do the right thing but who are unclear what they should actually do in 
particular cases – such, for example, seems to be the inspiration for much of the interest 
in clinical ethics committees. (pp16-17) 
Bioethics, then, has not only a theoretical but also a practical remit (Sullivan & Reynolds, 1998).  
Miola (2006) indicates that bioethics does its diverse work in three sectors.19 At the formal level there 
are authoritative, directive professional bodies, such as the UK General Medical Council (GMC), 
which regulates doctors. The semi-formal sector is less authoritative but nonetheless influential, 
comprising organisations like the UK’s Royal Colleges and the British Medical Association (BMA). 
Here we might also include clinical ethics committees and national bioethics committees (like those in 
the USA, Belgium and Singapore). Miola’s unofficial sector, meanwhile, comprises the discourses 
flowing from the academy, as well as from pressure groups. Miola feels that the lower levels of the 
hierarchy should influence the upper tiers, although we might wonder why and, indeed, whether the 
lowest tier should be further differentiated.20 It might also be notable that Miola, a legal academic, 
posits an organisation like the GMC – which has the force of law – at the pinnacle. How, then, might 
its decrees differ from those issued by law? Indeed, where and how does law fit into this whole 
picture?  
Like bioethics, law is notoriously difficult to define (Sullivan & Reynolds, 1998). Lon Fuller, however, 
helpfully defines the concept of law as “the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance 
of rules”. (Fuller, 1969:96) This is useful because it appears not to beg any questions about the 
(conceptual) relationship between law and ethics. Jurists have, of course, long queried whether law is, 
in principle, a moral enterprise. The legal idealists (or natural lawyers), with whom Fuller sided, 
perceive a necessary connection between law and ethics; legal positivists, exemplified by Hart (e.g. 
1965), take the opposite view. 
Alongside the conceptual relationship between law and ethics, there is also the empirical relationship 
to consider. Is law, in practice, a moral enterprise? Some legal officials think so:  
“It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every 
legal duty is founded on a moral obligation”.21  
Yet, given our specific interest in law’s relationship with bioethics, we should ask: is law, in bio-
practice, a moral enterprise?  
Some would suggest that the (made) laws governing bio-practices are indeed indebted to bioethics.22 
“Bioethics helped to conceptualize problems, elucidate essential values, and influence the 
development of legal doctrines and processes”, suggests Rothstein (2008:3).23 As such, meta-ethical 
bioethics can clarify common legal concepts, like the “reasonable man (sic)”, “intention” and “public 
morals” (van der Berg, 2010:2,9,23). Bioethically relevant data might also be adduced,24 while 
bioethics’ normative and applied work can provide prescriptions about, say, respect for autonomy,25 
and the value of human life.26  
These different contributions will appear in different legal locations. Common law systems, for 
example, refer to written rules and to judges’ rulings. So, in English law, not only will we hear 
bioethics’ voice(s) in the commissions and reports that precede Acts of Parliament,27 but we will also 
                                                     
19 Although he considers medical ethics, his point seems equally applicable to (the wider) bioethics.  
20 Although each possesses a useful moral compass, pressure groups and academic scholars seem distinct. Presumably, for example, 
scholarship involves a particular expertise, although some resist the idea: see Huxtable (2012). 
21 Instan (1893) 1 QB 450, 453, per Coleridge LCJ.  
22 Particularly, perhaps, in medicine (Freeman, 2008).  Indeed, the dilemmas that birthed bioethics also spurred the development of medical (or 
health care) law: see e.g. Rothstein (2009). These similar trajectories and themes (e.g. medical lawyers, like “bioethicists”, are occasionally asked 
what sort of lawyer they really are) merit further investigation.  
23 See also Callahan (1973). 
24 E.g. Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1, para. 27.  
25 Although maybe law got there first: Annas, 1991).  
26 E.g. “The Philosophers’ Brief”, supporting the right to physician-assisted suicide, which was submitted by Dworkin and colleagues to the US 
Supreme Court in Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793 (1997).  
27 E.g. The Retained Organ Commission (vice-chaired by Alastair V. Campbell) and the Nuffield Council on Bioethics contributed to the passing of 
the Human Tissue Act 2004, while Mary Warnock’s commission led to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. For a US perspective, 
see Rothstein (2009).  
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encounter judicial references to the bioethical work occurring in the formal,28 semi-formal,29 and 
unofficial sectors of the discipline.30 In other common law systems, like the US, ‘bioethicists’ have 
even acted as expert witnesses in court proceedings (Sullivan & Reynolds, 1998). Such jurisdictions 
differ from civil law systems, in which the general principles enshrined in a written code provide the 
primary source of law. Even in these systems, the rules can tackle bioethical matters: for example, in 
2005, French law clarified the rules governing end-of-life care.31  
As such, bioethics may be a discipline but it evidently encompasses a variety of endeavours, ranging 
from theorising in the abstract to collecting empirical data. In all of its endeavours, however, bioethics’ 
seeks to engage with practice i.e. it seeks to work with, and speak to, the “real world”. Law also 
performs a variety of tasks, but it too is concerned with actual practice: it seeks to issue rules that 
guide people in this real world. This common orientation begins to suggest that the two are related. 
On some accounts, (bio)ethics and law share a conceptual relationship, but even those who dispute 
this relationship would accept that bioethics can and does contribute to law in practice. But does 
bioethics itself gain or lose from its relationship with law? Let us start with the apparent positive 
contributions.  
 
Contribution and Convergence 
 
Law’s first constructive contribution to bioethics resides in its fundamental purpose: to guide human 
behaviour. Law, as the older partner (or flatmate), might have much to teach bioethics here, and 
bioethics should be receptive, as it too strives not merely to theorise about, but also to influence 
human activity. As Van der Burg (2010) says:  
“Both law and morality are hermeneutic, normative, and argumentative systems or 
practices, their purpose being to guide human action... Moreover, both are social in 
character: they purport to regulate behaviour in order to make our society and our lives 
better” (pp18).32  
Lei-Kung and Bronislawa worked together to ensure successful communal living. On Van der Burg’s 
account, the purported differences between law and bioethics should not be inflated. Different jurists 
have emphasised different features of the legal enterprise, including its assumed sovereignty and its 
capacity to impose sanctions (Riddall, 1999; van der Burg, 2010). Yet, some sectors of bioethics – not 
least Miola’s formal sector – need not be so different: the non-compliant doctor, for example, might be 
struck from the medical register. In its normative guise, meanwhile, bioethics might be deemed 
distinctive for its issuance of authoritative prescriptions, which are to be considered universalisable 
and for the good of all (Beauchamp, 1991). But law similarly seeks to be authoritative, prescriptive, 
general in its application (at least within jurisdictional boundaries, unless explicit exceptions are 
carved out), and a force for ensuring the good of society at large (van der Berg, 2010). In short, as 
each pursues the goal of guiding human co-existence, law and bioethics might not be so distinct.  
Insofar as they share a goal, bioethics and law can also appeal to similar standards for judging the 
success or failure of the endeavour. Here law makes a second helpful contribution, as law is 
characteristically concerned with process (Lei-Kung, you will recall, took charge of devising the rota). 
As such, the standards of assessment – or the methodologies employed – in each discipline might 
share similarities and, again, as the older partner, law might have a great deal of experience on which 
bioethics can fruitfully draw.  
Jurists have long pondered what it is that makes (made) law law, or, put differently, what makes for 
good law, if not (necessarily) in a moral sense, then in the sense of achieving law’s goal. Fuller was 
                                                     
28 E.g. GMC guidance on confidentiality was cited in W v Egdell [1990] 2 WLR 471.  
29 E.g. Guidance from the British Medical Association and a Royal College were respectively cited in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 
316 and An NHS Trust v H [2013] 1 FLR 1471.   
30 E.g. Ronald Dworkin’s (bioethical and biolegal) work is cited in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316 and Chester v Afshar [2004] 
UKHL 41.  
31 Law no. 2005-370.  
32 See also Maclean (2008) 
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joined in this quest by theorists interested in the ‘rule of law’ and ‘legal rationality’ (Huxtable, 2012). 
Fuller’s (1969) ‘internal morality of law’ accordingly included such norms as clarity, consistency and 
coherence between the law-as-stated and the law-as-applied, without which law could not hope to 
guide its subjects. Similar questions arise about what we might call the ‘internal morality of bioethics’. 
Those interested in the standards associated with (good) bioethics – a bioethics that achieves its goal 
– have identified markedly similar norms, again including consistency, clarity and coherence (for 
example: Regan, 2004; Dawson & Wilkinson, 2009; and related inquiries into the internal morality of 
medicine: Veatch and Miller, 2001). 
Certainly, in both disciplines, critical questions are asked about the ultimate ends of the particular 
endeavour. Some jurists have insisted that law entails a particular set of moral commitments 
(Brownsword, 1991), while some bioethicists urge adherence to a given normative theory (Arras, 
2013; van der Berg, 2010).  But many of the aforementioned norms (clarity, consistency and the like) 
are merely formal, instrumental or procedural – and it is here that law seems particularly well-
equipped to educate bioethics. Law is experienced in issuing judgments on particular situations, by 
reference to guiding principles and to the situation itself. Law tackles the case and the doctrine, the 
latter becoming the principle in bioethics’ language. In both disciplines bottom-up and top-down 
approaches feature. There are, of course, differences within each discipline: a civil law system might 
favour a top-down (doctrine-led) approach, rather than the more mixed approach we might encounter 
in a common law system; in bioethics, meanwhile, casuists might work from the bottom-up, while 
those beholden to particular principles might prefer to work down to the case in question. But, 
whichever extreme is preferred (and there will be middle-ground positions33), law will have important 
insights to offer.  
To illustrate these observations, consider the common ground between common lawyers and 
bioethical casuists: each takes an approach that is “inductive and particularist, and, it would appear to 
be, dismissive of principles” (Freeman, 2008;7). Yet, this is not the whole story, as Annas, 
commenting on the US, hints when he says that  
law’s primary contribution to bioethics is procedural. Lawyers are expert at procedure. 
The common law itself is based on deciding individual cases and using these cases as 
the basis of creating law. Bioethics has adopted this technique (Annas, 1991, quoted in 
Jonsen, 1998:343).   
Annas here appears to be describing the way in which particular rulings ‘create law’ by generating 
rules and, indeed, wider legal doctrines.34 As such, the principle-generating bioethicist could also find 
helpful precedents in the story of the common law.  
Precedent is, of course, crucial in the common law. Yet, although the approach is potentially 
conservative in its adherence to decided cases - and thus the past (Freeman, 2008) - changing times 
can mean changes in the law.35 Officials working in a common law system will therefore tack between 
the case arising and the overarching doctrine or principle. This two-way process appears increasingly 
popular in bioethics too, not least with those who adopt Rawls’ (1972) ‘reflective equilibrium’.36 The 
method involves working back-and-forth among our considered judgments about particular cases, the 
principles or rules that we believe govern them, and theoretical considerations, making adjustments 
along the way, with the aim of achieving coherence between them. Used by Rawls in his analysis of 
justice, bioethics’ embrace of reflective equilibrium is evident in, for example, its deployment in 
Beauchamp and Childress’ (2013) principlist approach. Furthermore, and of particular relevance here, 
reflective equilibrium has been promoted as a methodological approach to conducting empirical 
bioethics research, by which theory and data might be combined (Theil & Delden, 2016; DeVries and 
Leeuwen, 2010). As the common law has long used such a method, albeit not by name, here too we 
might expect law to make a valuable contribution to bioethics, not least to the aforementioned debates 
about methodology in bioethics, which with this volume is concerned. Indeed, the ideas might usefully 
                                                     
33 See further the discussion of reflective equilibrium, below.  
34 Of course, legal doctrines might also develop from other legal sources, such as Acts of Parliament: see e.g. van der Burg (2010).   
35 E.g. “Social customs change, and the law ought to, and does in fact, have regard to such changes when they are of major importance”, Gillick v 
West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] AC 112, 171, per Lord Fraser.  
36 See also van der Burg (2010).  
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transfer in both directions. Empirical research in law (such as socio-legal studies) is (like bioethics) 
backed by training programmes, journals and organisations, but remains relatively new and it lacks an 
agreed meaning or scope; perhaps, then, the insights offered in empirical bioethics research might in 
turn contribute to the evolution of empirical legal research (Genn & Partington, 2006; Watkins & 
Burton, 2013).37  
Returning to law’s contribution to bioethics, and specifically to law’s proceduralist bent, we should 
note that procedure also features elsewhere in bioethics’ business, so there will be other ways in 
which law might fruitfully contribute. Those in the unofficial sector who advocate a proceduralist 
bioethics – promoting, for example, ‘accountability for reasonableness’ (Daniels & Sabin, 1997), or 
‘principled compromise’ (Huxtable, 2012) – could benefit from law’s experiences,38 as might some of 
those working in bioethics’ semi-formal sector, such as on clinical ethics committees (McLean, 2008). 
In short, as a forum in which process is king, law might helpfully guide its younger cohabitee.  
But law can also contribute in substance, not merely in form. Put simply, law’s products provide work 
for every sector of bioethics, from the academy to the committee. Law’s edicts will often say 
something on which bioethics will also have an opinion (or, more likely, opinions plural). So, for 
example, many – maybe all – medico-legal rulings will include or invite ethical evaluation (no matter 
what some judges say).39 The unofficial, academic sector will accordingly take to the journals to 
reflect on legal developments at home and away, while occupants of the other sectors might have 
cause to revise the guidance they issue.40 This interplay between bioethics and law seems strikingly 
apparent when the end(ing) of life is in view (Sullivan & Reynolds, 1998; Coggon, 2010). The US case 
of Karen Ann Quinlan,41 in the 1970s, appears a pivotal moment in the development of both 
disciplines (Huxtable, 2007). Here, for the first time, a court contemplated terminating the life-
supporting treatment being provided to an incapacitated patient. Citing a proposal from an academic 
lawyer (Teel, 1975), the judges even explicitly created (semi-formal) work for bioethics, by advocating 
the creation of clinical ethics committees. Whether it is adjudicating on matters of life or death, law 
evidently provides many of the raw materials for constructing bioethics.42   
Yet, to change metaphors, law does more than serve up the morsels for moral mastication: law also 
checks that bioethics’ recipes are palatable. Law thus provides a testing ground for the practice of 
bioethics. Law is inherently empirical in orientation: its edicts must have purchase in the real world. 
Many bioethical issues have indeed been tested in legal claims: “law is experienced with analysing 
and solving social problems” (Freeman, 2008;6). Law sometimes does bioethics and, in doing so, it is 
normatively open (van der Burg, 2010); it is “ready to take on ethics if that is what gets served up to it 
for the making of decisions” (Callahan, 1996;34). Law can, therefore, test out bioethics’ concepts (for 
example, beneficence becomes ‘best interests’ in the lawyer’s lexicon), as well as its (action-directed) 
normative theories, like deontology and rule-utilitarianism. Law is, after all, replete with rules and 
devoted to duties, so the bioethicist may see in law different ways in which a particular normative 
commitment could (not) or should (not) be worked through.  
Whether law gets things right (in some sense) should not detract from the fact that law has to put its 
morals where its mouth is: law cannot merely theorise, it must also decide (Rothstein, 2009; Sperling, 
2008).  For some, this makes law the senior partner to bioethics (Foster, 2009). As McLean (2007) 
says: 
irrespective of the ethical views of decision-makers – legal or medical – there are rules 
under which they must operate [which] are superior (in practical terms) to the outcome 
predicted by adherents to one ethical school of thought or another (pp196) 
The law is (quite rightly) under unrelenting scrutiny for the ways in which it strives “day by day to solve 
the real problems of real people” (Birks, 2000:2-3).  Bioethics might provide such scrutiny but, in its 
                                                     
37 I know of socio-legal scholars who already incorporate the methodological insights offered by empirical bioethics, and such cross-fertilisation 
seems promising.  
38 Although some argue that bioethics should not become too proceduralist and law-like (Sperling 2008).  
39 Re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2000] 4 All ER 961, 969, per Ward LJ.  
40 E.g. the first instance decision (reversed on appeal) in R (on the application of Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] 2 WLR 431. 
41 In re Quinlan (1976) NJ 355 A 2d 647.  
42 Indeed, in the case of clinical ethics committees, it arguably provided a building for bioethics to occupy.  
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unofficial sector at least, it is rarely subjected to the same inspection.43 Law therefore has the benefit, 
and undoubted burden, of doing ethics work in the real world and, in doing so, it has surely learnt 
lessons that bioethics should heed. Law’s empirical orientation therefore warrants repetition. Law will 
sometimes appear to get things ethically ‘wrong’, according to some theory or other. But perhaps law 
can teach the ethical theorists something too, about the sorts of practical resolutions to which 
particular moral problems are most – or least – amenable.  This notion speaks clearly to the 
enterprise that is empirical bioethics, which is prefaced, for many, on the idea of working to provide 
practically oriented normative solutions that work in context. 
And, finally, law’s lessons need not be incomprehensible to bioethics: law’s phrasing can be heard. 
Lei-Kung and Bronislawa were able to communicate and so too are law and bioethics – indeed, they 
share a common language, of rules, principles, and rights (Freeman, 2008; Sperling, 2008; Miola, 
2006). The commonality is perhaps unsurprising, given the prevalence of academic lawyers in the 
unofficial sector of bioethics (Rothstein, 2009; Sperling, 2008). Given all this, bioethics can – and 
arguably should – hear law’s voice (Huxtable & Ost, 2015).  
 
Divergence and Distraction 
Whilst law therefore can and does offer much to bioethics, the news is not all good. Law also differs 
from bioethics in ways that mean each can distract, and detract from, the other. First, returning to the 
previous point, problems of articulation do arise. Law’s styles and conventions – at least within a strict 
legal arena – certainly differ from those adopted in bioethics’ sectors: lawyers address one another in 
formal, indirect and cautious (as opposed to clear) terms, and they will conventionally defer to 
authority (van der Burg, 2010; Sullivan & Reynolds, 1998). Although bioethics invites a degree of 
deference,44 its practitioners seemingly prefer the pursuit of clarity and defensibility and, whilst their 
opinions remain revisable in principle, their exchanges can be very direct indeed.45  
Here too there are problems not only of style but also of substance. Lei-Kung and Bronislawa each 
faced the difficulty of translating particular words for their flatmate. In law and bioethics, we find that 
even common words have uncommon, technical meanings (van der Burg, 2010):46 for example, 
pluralistic legal accounts of respect for autonomy do not necessarily correspond with the equally 
pluralistic accounts writ in bioethics’ corpus (e.g. Foster, 2009). Whenever a discipline re-frames an 
issue in its terms, it risks stripping the presenting problem of “the complex facticity with which it 
actually presented” (Callahan, 1973:69).  Law might be particularly susceptible to this reductionist 
charge: a complex, fractious issue like assisted dying is swept into a brute legal category and 
emerges unrecognisable to bioethics (and even the protagonists) as the original dilemma.47 The 
resulting problems of translation return us to law’s purpose: as Schneider (1994) puts it: 
we should remember that the law’s calling is to regulate social life, however awkwardly, 
and its language reflects that purpose (pp22).  
We saw earlier that bioethics can share this purpose, but Schneider hints here that bioethics might 
also be doing and saying more than this; if so, then there may be limits to “the extent to which the 
language of the law may safely be imported into bioethical discourse and to which bioethical ideas 
may be effectively translated into law” (Scheider, 1994:22; see also Freeman, 2008; Sperling, 2008; 
Foster, 2009). 
Secondly, and related to law’s prose and purpose, law is adversarial, particularly where judicial 
proceedings are concerned. Like legal cases, bioethical dilemmas “revolve around a nexus of 
competing or conflicting claims” (Sullivan & Reynolds, 1998:610). Law seeks a winner:  
                                                     
43 Note, however, the furore sparked by Giubilini and Minerva (2013), with their paper ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’  
44 Not only in the formal sector, but also in the unofficial, academic sector (for example, students should show due regard – if not unquestioning 
respect – for standard texts).  
45 E.g. between Harris and Finnis in Keown (1997). 
46 A discipline might require some technical tools, although it is notable that in each there have been calls to purge unnecessary jargon: e.g. Butt 
(2001); Callahan (1973); Cowley (2005). 
47 E.g. the English rulings culminating in R (on the application of Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 FLR 268.  
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“so much of what is taught in law school is about winning: winning the case, winning the 
arguments, or winning the point” (Sullivan & Reynolds, 1998:620).48  
Yet, bioethics’ problems “are not black and white, but are often composed of multiple shades of grey” 
(Mellor & Barclay, 2011:619),49 in which there might be two competing rights, as opposed to a right 
and a wrong (Sperling, 2008).  
Certainly, law’s decisions are not always monochromatic: it sometimes manages to split the difference 
between disputing parties or principles (Huxtable, 2012). Yet, law still decides – it acts – and this 
points to a third area of divergence. Law is, as Fuller suggested, action-orientated: law might 
therefore seek to kill the conflict (van der Burg, 2010), while philosophical bioethics could opt for over-
kill, further complicating matters (Callahan, 1973). Schneider hinted that bioethics encompasses more 
than the rules and action that fixate law; when we pan out, we can indeed see more of bioethics’ 
diverse landscape, on which the emotions, character, and the virtues also feature. Whether law can 
adequately talk to or about such matters is, of course, an enduring question (e.g. Slote, 1995; Solum, 
2003).  
Law’s adequacy is further questioned when we consider its aspirations. You will recall that Bronislawa 
disliked Lei-Kung’s contrivances, while Lei-Kung felt that Bronislawa, the dreamer, got in his way. 
Law’s rules perform many functions, amongst them setting standards and drawing lines between the 
permissible and impermissible. The fourth problem for bioethics is that law might draw the line in the 
wrong place, since it insists on only minimal standards, regarding what must be done, while 
(bio)ethics aspires to what should be done (e.g. Sullivan & Reynolds, 1998; Rothstein, 2009; 
Freeman, 2008; Sperling, 2008; Maclean, 2008). The bioethics journals contain many examples but 
the English courts’ long-standing reluctance to require (fully) ‘informed’ consent suffices (Maclean, 
2008). Even the judges appear uneasy about the moral ramifications of some of their rulings, no 
matter how apparently sound they are in law.50  
Perhaps, then, law needs a bioethical bolt-on. “Good ethics committees begin where the law ends” 
suggests Annas (1991:21), providing just one example of how the disciplines might rightly remain 
separate, with bioethics (literally) providing added value to the law.51 But, as we have seen, law does 
advance or adopt particular moral positions. So what sort of (bio)ethics should we expect to see in 
law? Bioethics’ broadly composed congregation subjects law to a cacophony of critique: consider, for 
example, the diverse bioethical positions taken on laws governing assisted dying, embryo research 
and organ transplantation. Law will, inevitably, talk past some of these complainants (Sperling, 2008). 
So, recalling a famous exchange between Hart (1963) and Devlin (1959), should law express a 
positive morality, which commands popular support, or should it reflect a more critical morality, such 
as we might associate with bioethics? (van der Burg, 2010)  We saw earlier how law seems to borrow 
from each sphere, occasionally citing public opinion, and elsewhere referring to the different sectors 
of bioethics (Miola, 2006 & 2007). Unfortunately, such selections are just that: selective and 
inconsistent, with law seemingly lacking any robust or transparent methodology for making its moral 
choices.  
Maybe a messy morass of morals is appropriate, if law is only concerned with setting the minimal 
standards for communal living - which, as we saw, it might achieve by capturing a compromise 
between values, plural (Huxtable, 2012). But not every bioethicist will agree, perhaps understandably 
so, once we appreciate that law and bioethics can have very different audiences. Law seems often to 
be targeted at the transgressor, not the utopian. These transgressors will reside in a given jurisdiction, 
under the dominion of particular laws. The jurisdiction may be wide,52 but an essential point is that law 
is thereby relative to a particular place and, indeed, time. Time can even be a problem for law: it might 
sometimes get there first, but law will often lag behind developments in science and even in morals 
                                                     
48 Law’s warrior mentality has even led one judge to depict consent not in the bioethical terms of autonomy, but as conferring a “flak jacket” that 
protects the health professional: Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1992] 3 WLR 758.  
49 Given such differences, bioethicists might need to proceed cautiously whenever they are called to be expert witnesses in a legal battle: see 
Sullivan and Reynolds (1998).  
50 E.g. Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 2 WLR 316, 387, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.  
51 Montgomery (2006) fears the growing “de-moralisation” of English medico-legal rulings  
52 Even cross-jurisdictional e.g. in international law, federal law in the USA and the laws of the European Union and European Convention on 
Human Rights.  
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(Rothstein, 2009; Sullivan & Reynolds, 1998). Bioethics can be relativistic53, and even myopic 
(Campbell, 2000), but it will also, on occasion, aspire to universality; law, meanwhile, remains 
tethered to a territory, issuing its edicts to its subjects, under the watchful, questioning and sometimes 
uncomprehending gaze of bioethics.  
 
(Happy) Endings? 
In conclusion, I have suggested that there are numerous contributions that law can make, and has 
made, to bioethics, which I have described as five P’s, which encompass law’s purpose, processes, 
products, practices and phrasing. There is, therefore, much that law has to offer bioethics, particularly 
insofar as law is inherently empirically-oriented and therefore offers a real world testing ground for 
particular types of solutions to particular moral problems. Like Bronislawa and Lei-Kung, law and 
bioethics do manage to communicate with one another more than some might believe (Foster, 2009). 
This is unsurprising given their close co-existence. Indeed, just as it can be difficult to define law in a 
way that does not beg moral questions, so too it can be hard to define bioethics without some 
reference to law. If the differences between law and bioethics are only gradual and contextual, as Van 
der Burg (2010) indicates, then there may be much that each can learn from the other. 
Equally, however, I have argued that the relationship is marred by five A’s, which concern law’s 
articulation, angst, action-orientation, (lack of) aspiration and audience. Some of the problems 
between these flatmates might be attributed to a lack of understanding of what each is and does: 
bioethics might over-emphasise law’s authoritarian or argumentative sides, while law might fail to see 
that bioethics involves both consensus and controversy (van der Burg, 2010; Miola, 2006). Different 
authors offer different prescriptions for the various ills that afflict the couple, ranging from separation 
to the acquisition of new roles (Sperling, 2008; Brownsword, 2008; Wolf, 2004). For my part, I suspect 
that better appreciation of what each brings to their shared areas of interest provides a good place to 
start. Neither, it seems, can entirely replace the other (Sperling, 2008); like our flatmates, each can 
benefit the other and, indeed, the wider communities they inhabit and serve, not least by spotting 
something that the other might miss. Whether or not bioethics itself is ‘a full discipline’, the opportunity 
remains – in Callahan’s words – for ‘creativity and constant re-definition’ (Callahan, 1973). We should, 
therefore, continue to configure the relationship between law and bioethics, moving it on from its 
‘haphazard’ beginnings (Miola, 2006). Sometimes friends, sometime foes, they may yet become 
spouses.  
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Embracing Diversity in Empirical Bioethics 
 
Alan Cribb 
John Owens 
 
 
 
In this chapter we make a positive case for a diversity of approaches to bioethics in general and 
empirical bioethics in particular. We suggest that there is much to be gained from embracing 
pluralism, and a certain degree of open-mindedness, in relation to the methodology of bioethics. In 
broad terms we are arguing for methodological toleration founded on individual and collective 
reflexivity about aims and methods: bioethics is a broad area, and the diversity of aims which sit 
within the extensive field of bioethical scholarship call for a variety of methods to be employed. 
Moreover, we suggest, reflexivity about aims and methods supports the development of new forms of 
bioethical scholarship. We, of course, accept that there are limits to defensible toleration, but our 
worry is that conflicts about the nature and scope of bioethics can kick in well before those limits, and 
are sometimes needless, damaging to the field and insufficiently reflexive about the reasons for 
methodological differences. 
 
Interdisciplinary conflict in bioethics 
Our focus derives its importance from the nature of bioethics as contested territory. For some time 
bioethics has been a site for conflict between scholars approaching it from different disciplinary 
traditions, with disputes between sociologically and philosophically oriented scholars having been 
particularly heated. We will begin by illustrating these contests by drawing upon some rather 
stereotypical conceptions of sociology and philosophy. In reality, as we will go on to suggest, the 
boundaries are less clear-cut and there is considerable heterogenenity within disciplines. 
In brief, ‘sociological bioethicists’ have accused ‘philosophical bioethicists’ of working at too great a 
remove from the complex, and historically and culturally constituted, contexts of action to be able to 
make a practical contribution to ethics. There is now a well-established critique of purely philosophical 
approaches to bioethics from medical sociologists and others (Bosk 1999; Fox & Swazey, 1984; 
Hedgecoe, 2004; Hoffmaster, 1992; Ives and Dunn, 2010), which argues that the over-idealised and 
theoretical nature of philosophical ethics undermines the validity of its claims and reduces its 
relevance to practice. The motivation for such a critique arises, in part, from the long tradition within 
social scientific research of engaging with social contexts and for detailed attention to actual 
circumstances and behaviours. Against this light, a propensity for producing ideal theory and abstract 
universal principles, and the tendency within mainstream philosophical bioethics of preferring 
conceptual analysis and theoretical reasoning over empirically informed description and 
understanding has been seen by some as a significant weakness.  
In reply, many philosophers have failed to see the potential relevance of applied social scientific 
research to ethics. Philosophical bioethicists tend to be sceptical about much of the work done in the 
name of sociological bioethics, viewing such scholarship as work about ethics rather than work in 
ethics. No doubt this has partly been shaped by the longstanding distinction often made between 
‘normative’ questions and ’empirical’ questions, which has gone a long way to producing the cultural 
and methodological divides between philosophy and the social sciences.54 And more fundamentally, 
as Borry et al (2006) put it, “the meta-ethical distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ created a ‘natural’ 
border between the disciplines” (pp54). Within the field of bioethics, this divide has proven remarkably 
difficult to overcome. 
                                                     
54 See also MacMillan’s (2016) chapter in this volume. 
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As a consequence of th’eir disciplinary heritage, philosophers working in the field of bioethics have 
often seemed reluctant to ‘get their hands dirty’ with empirical methods, seeing ethics as essentially 
an abstract and theoretical enterprise primarily concerned with normative reasoning rather than 
descriptive or explanatory reasoning. Indeed, some go so far as suggesting that, at a fundamental 
level at least, normative principles must exist independently of any factual claims about the world (e.g. 
Cohen, 2003). More routinely, philosophical approaches to bioethics often tend to treat empirical data 
as a raw ‘descriptive material’, which can be used to feed the proper business of normative and 
conceptual analysis.  
One reason for the abstract and detached nature of philosophical ethics may be the lingering 
assumption, on the part of some at least, that the proper role of ethics is to produce universal ethical 
ascriptions, rather than those which apply to particular contexts (albeit there are other philosophical 
bioethicists who explicitly identify with ‘particularist’ ethical theories.) This tendency towards abstract 
generalism can be coupled with a concern that resorting to sociological and/or anthropological 
accounts of ethics which rest upon descriptions of moral beliefs, values, practices and arrangements 
brings with it some form of cultural or moral relativism where “there exists no way of criticising or 
analyzing these values, nor for arguing for what is morally right” (Clouser, 1973:788).55 
These differences between disciplinary traditions can take a variety of forms, some more serious than 
others. For instance, it might be that philosophers and social scientists are merely talking at cross-
purposes to one another. Here the feeling might be that the work of the other camp may be valuable 
in its own right, but happens to be irrelevant to one’s own purposes and therefore not really worth 
engaging with. A social scientist may think it important that philosophers analyse the nature of well-
being, but be relatively uninterested in the outcome of the inquiry in the abstract terms in which it is 
presented. Alternatively, a philosopher may appreciate the value of a social scientist investigating the 
perceptions of the various stakeholders about what count as ‘surplus’ embryos in the context of 
fertility treatment whilst regarding this research as irrelevant to their investigation into the moral status 
of embryos.  
A more serious case of divergence can arise if parties become inclined to the view that the other is 
simply missing the point. Sociologists may feel that abstract and general accounts of the right or the 
good in bioethics, which are not grounded in concrete circumstances and problems, fail to engage 
with the central purposes of bioethical scholarship. For example, a social scientist may take issue with 
a philosopher who fails to say how the ideal model of distributive justice they have outlined may be 
practically applied to any specific question of resource allocation. Philosophers, by contrast, may feel 
that descriptions or explanations of social phenomena, however well grounded or rich, just do not 
address the central question of what ought to be done. For instance, while a philosopher may be 
happy to admit the importance of recognising instances of oppression where they occur within 
medical practice, she may be aggrieved if the researcher responsible fails to consider whether or not 
some such oppressive practices can be justified.  
Another serious type of cross-disciplinary conflict might be caused by the feeling that some work in 
bioethics can positively alienate audiences and undermine the potential of bioethics as a disciplinary 
field.  For instance, one can well imagine a social scientist researching programmes for improving 
organ donation rates feeling exasperated by John Harris’s famous Survival Lottery (1975), or the 
policy-maker responsible for negotiating the legal status of abortion clinics being frustrated by Giubilini 
and Minerva’s (2012) argument for post-birth abortion.  
To those interested in addressing practical questions within specific contexts, the sort of abstract 
reasoning and thought experiments found within the philosophical bioethics literature might be seen 
as lacking moral and political seriousness and as potentially damaging to those seeking practical 
solutions to bioethical issues. Such feelings of frustration can be substantially mitigated by 
researchers articulating the aims of their research (Oswald, 2013; Ives & Dunn, 2010). Clarification of 
purposes is an important step towards managing potential conflict within the field.  
                                                     
55 See also Sheehan’s (2016) chapter in this volume. 
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It is against this backdrop of disciplinary conflict that the emergence of empirical bioethics makes 
sense – it emerges from the ambition to transcend disciplinary divisions by contributing to normative 
discussions about what ought to happen in a way that is informed by, and sensitive to, ‘real world’ 
contexts, perspectives and considerations. This conflictual backdrop also enables us to summarise 
our main argument: sociological and philosophical approaches to bioethics can have different aims 
and employ different methods and both can make a positive and legitimate contribution to bioethical 
scholarship. This is not an especially new or challenging argument, but we suggest that it is one that 
is worth rehearsing from time to time. If a sociologist criticises a philosopher for not doing x, or a 
philosopher criticises a sociologist for not doing y, one perfectly sensible response is for the accused 
party to simply say they were not aiming to do x (or y). The philosophical bioethicist can say, for 
example, “In this piece of work I was not trying to make a practical contribution to ethics; I was making 
a theoretical contribution”. Likewise the sociologist can say, “In this work I am not making claims 
about what ought to happen, I am doing something different – e.g. I am trying to understand why 
certain norms become prominent under certain institutional conditions”. Having different aims is a 
perfectly good reason for doing different things and for adopting different methods. When something 
like this is the case – when scholars are operating in parallel on different kinds of projects – it is 
necessary to understand any tension between them accordingly. Any conflict is not a disagreement 
about the best way of doing the same thing (x or y, because only one party is attempting x or y 
respectively). It may, for example, simply be a conflict over resources - perhaps they are competing 
for a single ethics grant or post - or it may, more substantively, be a disagreement about the relative 
worthwhileness of different kinds of project. These forms of competition or disagreement may be 
important but they are not disagreements about ethics methodology.  
We would argue that the account of diversity and disagreement between disciplines that we have just 
offered also applies to more fine-grained forms of conflict in bioethics and empirical bioethics. That is, 
in order to determine whether an apparent disagreement between approaches is an actual 
disagreement, and, more specifically, what it is a disagreement about, we first have to ask about the 
precise aims of different approaches. Much of the time scholars will simply be aiming to do different 
kinds of things and this will help explain, and in many cases will justify, methodological diversity (see 
Davies et al, 2015). There will also be instances where rival scholars are not operating completely in 
parallel but are engaged in overlapping projects and are making competing claims about 
methodology. Here it makes sense to apply effort to the contestation and resulting debates. But we 
should definitely not rush to assume that any divergence of approach falls into that category. Even 
where there is direct contestation about the defensibility of different methodologies for similar aims 
then diversity of practice can still have a role in advancing debates in the field because such disputes 
are unlikely all to be settled a priori i.e. without a degree of ‘trial and error’. In short, diversity is often a 
good thing because it reflects the breadth of the different aims that can be pursued in bioethics 
scholarship and because it enables methodological exploration and imagination. Indeed, empirical 
bioethics appears to be a product of imagination and tolerance within the bioethics community and its 
success demonstrates the potential advantages delivered by recognising and embracing diversity. In 
the next section we examine the inherently heterogeneous and multi-faceted nature of ethics and how 
this lends itself to pluralism. 
 
The diversity of aims and methods within ethics 
The question, ‘how ought we to live?’, which is close to the heart of ethics, indicates a dual concern 
with both understanding and action. Ethics is concerned both with furthering our understanding of the 
nature of moral actions and arrangements and also with the practical implications of this 
understanding. 
This dual concern with moral knowledge and moral practice makes ethics relevant to a diverse 
academic and general audience. Given both the breadth of the subject and the range of those 
interested in it, researchers often seek to approach ethics on their own terms, cutting it down to suit 
their agendas and methodological traditions by emphasising certain aspects over others in order to 
focus on the questions and produce the forms of knowledge that they identify as important.  
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Within the academy, this tendency for managing the breadth and complexity of ethics is to some 
degree formalised and amplified through the division of intellectual and administrative labour within 
the academy: distinctions that are drawn between disciplines are often reinforced by organisational 
structures, for example, through the creation of distinct academic departments, professional 
associations and journals. Ethics is an area of significant interest to researchers from philosophy, law, 
sociology, theology, politics, economics and a wide range of other disciplinary backgrounds, yet the 
academic structuring of institutions means academics interested in ethics may infrequently exchange 
perspectives on ethics with those outside their immediate subject area.  
It is understandable that many researchers have become selective about the sorts of work they 
engage with, judging it in terms of its relevance to their own interests. While this sort of framing is 
useful, it can also produce a narrowing effect that can lead to research not being judged fairly and on 
its own terms. These divisions reveal something important about the multi-faceted nature of ethics, 
but at their most extreme such attitudes lead to calls for forms of disciplinary reductionism: attempts to 
draw boundaries around what is deemed to count as the study of ethics, or at least as worthwhile 
forms of such study. The tensions between philosophical and sociological versions of bioethics can 
take this form.  
Assuming an academic division of labour, it is easier to make a case for multi-disciplinarity than for 
inter-disciplinarity. Nothing much rests upon simply creating the space for scholars and researchers to 
pursue their projects within their preferred disciplinary frameworks.  Insofar as these are simply 
different kinds of projects each illuminating different facets of ethics from different directions then 
there is little reason not to celebrate a rich field of variety.   However, simply advocating breadth and 
variety is not enough. If we want to see how the facets of ethics might fit together then we need to be 
ready to support multiple conversations involving, and some collaborations between, people with 
contrasting perspectives.  
We can briefly reflect upon two sets of ideal typical distinctions as a heuristic in order to indicate both 
the range of ethics scholarship and the kinds of dichotomies that are sometime applied to it: the 
distinction between enlightenment and engineering aims; and the distinction between prescriptive and 
descriptive methods. We will first illustrate them with reference to the broad tradition of pure and 
applied philosophical ethics but also indicate their relevance to social science traditions of work. The 
point we want to make is that these distinctions cut across both philosophical and social science 
approaches to ethics and cannot be used to construct a clear division of labour between these broad 
domains. 
In exploring the relationship between philosophy and policy making, Dan Brock (1987) draws a 
distinction between scholarship that is primarily motivated by a concern for truth and scholarship that 
aims to bring about a particular set of consequences. This same distinction has been expressed in 
terms of a difference between models of ethical research that seek to provide ‘enlightenment’ and 
those that seek to help ‘engineer’ particular sets of outcomes (Cribb, 2010).  
The enlightenment model’s emphasis on truth might be thought of, for example, as encompassing 
those approaches to philosophical ethics that seek to produce theoretical knowledge of ethical 
concepts in their ideal form. Here the focus is to provide knowledge of idealized, universal concepts, 
which apply regardless of any specific time or context. John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971) 
provides a celebrated example of philosophical ethics that falls within the enlightenment model: Rawls 
does not aim to show how such institutions could actually be created in practice and this has been 
cited as a major line of criticism from some. Part of the basis for this criticism is a frustration that 
Rawls’s work is geared towards developing knowledge of justice rather than action towards justice. If 
Rawls’s work is to be considered useful for achieving practical change it must be of indirect use, e.g. 
because it is able to act in an informing or guiding capacity.  
By contrast, the aim of those working in the ‘engineering’ model of ethics is not to uncover abstract 
knowledge of ethics but to identify ethical problems and suggest ways to bring about change and 
achieve more ethical outcomes in practice. For instance, in The Idea of Justice (2009), Amartya Sen, 
whilst also working in the broad tradition of philosophical ethics, explicitly contrasts his approach to 
that of Rawls by describing it as primarily concerned with identifying and correcting manifest injustices 
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that actually occur in the world. Sen sees approaches such as Rawls’s as risking redundancy on the 
basis that ideal conditions do not exist in the world as we find it.  
Ethics scholarship in the social sciences can also be loosely classified as containing enlightenment 
and engineering components. Many sociologists and anthropologists, for example, are keen to stress 
the theoretical and truth-oriented nature of their work. Others are keen to stress the practical 
relevance and action-orientation of their work, and its capacity to help change things in valued 
directions (e.g. some instances of critical theory, action research or activist scholarship). 
It is also possible to distinguish between broadly ‘prescriptive’ and ‘descriptive’ methodological 
orientations. Again, whilst this distinction is not entirely clear-cut, it is a useful one to start from given 
our current purposes. What we are calling ‘prescriptive ethics’ involves asserting and defending moral 
claims. Within philosophical ethics (at least within the analytic as opposed to the continental tradition 
of philosophy), this typically entails using conceptual analysis and logical reasoning to construct 
internally coherent normative arguments. This kind of prescriptive ethical analysis involves a degree 
of abstraction since the construction of such arguments almost always involves concentrating one’s 
analysis on the facts, beliefs and principles which are considered central and ignoring (or abstracting 
from) the many distracting, everyday details that are not. This abstraction, coupled with a strong 
emphasis on formal reasoning processes, contributes to the impression that prescriptive ethical 
analysis is removed from the realities of everyday life. Philosophical ethics is sometimes seen as an 
essentially idealised exercise concerned with the nature of, and relationship between, abstract and/or 
hypothetical ideas or concepts. However, a similar characterisation could be applied to those 
components of social science and social theory that make ‘prescriptive’ claims and more or less 
explicitly argue for ethical positions. For example, proponents of critical theory – in Marxist, feminist 
and other variants – typically defend judgements about ‘what should be done’ (or, perhaps more 
typically, about ‘what should not be done’) with reasoning and methods that frequently operate at high 
levels of abstraction.56  
Prescriptive ethics is of value for both enlightenment and engineering purposes. It is of obvious use 
for those philosophical ethicists with enlightenment aims since the reasoning process provides a way 
of testing the theories and arguments that produce knowledge of abstract moral concepts. However, 
the prescriptive method also plays a key role in engineering approaches too, since without the ability 
to elucidate and defend ethical claims one would lack the basis upon which to challenge unjust or 
unethical behaviours, practices and circumstances or propose more ethical alternatives.  
By contrast one might say, for short, that the descriptive method involves establishing facts of ethical 
relevance whilst refraining from making normative judgements about these facts. This may be 
important for ethical analysis in general since ethical issues are often bound up with problems of 
knowledge, so that reducing knowledge deficits may contribute some way towards solving ethical 
problems. This is particularly obvious for consequentialism – where if one had perfect knowledge of 
which actions promoted most happiness (or equivalent) many ethical questions could be resolved – 
but it applies across a wide spectrum of moral and political thought. The Aristotelian view that the 
good life for human beings cannot be fully understood without knowing what sort of beings humans 
are has enjoyed support from numerous authors recently (Appiah, 2008; Sayer, 2011; Smith, 2010). 
This view suggests that information about the causes of human flourishing and suffering is of such 
obvious importance to ethical scholarship that the descriptive method should be seen as an inherent 
part of all ethical scholarship.  
Descriptive ethics can also help to reveal sites of ethical concern. This is true of social and political 
theory (and, of course, many other currents in the social sciences) that shine a light on the ethically 
significant features of the circumstances, practices and relationships that human beings are 
                                                     
56 Some people would want to distinguish between the forms of defence offered by sociologists and those offered by 
philosophers by saying that the former tend to assume their normative premises whereas philosophers are prepared to (or are 
often expected to) explicitly outline and defend their normative premises. This may be true in a very general sense but this 
distinction is easily over-stated: sociologists may make their normative premises explicit, or they may offer a different kind of 
defence of their normative position, for example by grounding it in commonly held moral intuitions. Moreover, even where 
philosophers attempt to take their defence of normative claims to a more foundational level there are legitimate questions to 
ask both about how far their attempts are successful and, more practically, how far the day-to-day work of philosophical 
bioethicists actually rests on this kind of foundational rigour. 
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embedded within. For instance, through its examination and critique of relationships of oppression 
and power in the development of European psychiatric practice, Foucault’s Madness and Civilization 
(1988) opens up psychiatry as an important and relatively under-explored site for ethical analysis. In 
addition to revealing problems worthy of serious attention the sociological and social scientific 
approaches to ethics help to develop understanding of ethics by interrogating often taken-for-granted 
norms and practices, and providing new kinds of evidence and new ways of conceiving of familiar 
evidence. 
These two functions of descriptive method, drawing attention to areas of ethical controversy and 
providing important content for normative reasoning, have lead some to regard those engaged in 
descriptive ethical analysis as ‘handmaidens’ for prescriptive ethical scholarship (Haimes, 2002). 
Clearly in this sense descriptive method carries an important, albeit indirect, role in meeting 
enlightenment aims. However, we would suggest that the descriptive method can also help with the 
construction of ethical theory in a direct sense, since observation of circumstances, arrangements and 
practices has an obviously important role to play in guiding our ideas about ethical practice across a 
wide range of contexts. Our understanding of ethics, and of ethical practice in particular, is often 
arrived at through experience and observation, as well as through processes of abstract reasoning. 
This suggestion reflects a meta-ethical commitment on our part: i.e. we believe that some version of 
‘ethical naturalism’ is true – that a meaningful and defensible ethics can only be articulated in relation 
to an understanding of the nature of ethical agents and the world in which they find themselves. We 
will say a little more about this in the next section. On this account descriptive method has an 
important and direct role to play in meeting enlightenment aims.   
The descriptive method also has a vital part to play in achieving more practical engineering aims in 
ethics since effecting change in unjust or unethical circumstances, practices and arrangements will 
require knowledge of those circumstances, practices and arrangements. Thus descriptive and 
prescriptive approaches can be employed, often in combination, to meet both theoretically orientated 
enlightenment aims and practically oriented engineering aims. It is possible to point to a great deal of 
general ethics scholarship that works between traditions to combine these different aims and methods 
(e.g. Appiah, 2008; Glover, 1999 & 2006; Sayer, 2011). Empirical bioethics can be understood as one 
broad field within this larger set of multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary scholarship. 
 
Managing pluralism in empirical ethics 
Arguments in favour of recognising ethics as an inherently pluralistic subject that accommodates a 
diverse range of aims and methods need to be considered against concerns about ethics becoming 
overly diluted. For example, Clouser (1973) warns of the risks of an overly inclusive definition of 
ethics, arguing that if ethics is to avoid being rendered “meaningless in virtue of its sheer generality” it 
must be “trimmed down to fighting weight” (pp787). Certainly there is a need to make sure that any 
piece of ethical scholarship does not lose its focus by attempting to be all things to all people. 
However, we suggest that much of this danger can be averted by paying closer attention to the aims 
of ethical scholarship, and on how methods support aims, on a case-by-case basis.  
The encouragement of much greater reflexivity about aims and methods within a broadly defined 
family of empirical bioethics could enable a better recognition and acceptance of the inherent diversity 
in forms of ethical scholarship. More importantly, it could do so without forcing unnecessary and 
unhelpful ‘closure’ on the discipline through unwarranted reductionism; or by over-stating the degree 
of distance between, or independence between, every strand of ethical scholarship.  
We suggest that the notion of methodological purity in ethics is basically misguided. As we have 
suggested enlightenment and engineering aims, and prescriptive and descriptive methods, all 
interpenetrate one another. For example, practically oriented ethical scholarship, including 
scholarship that predominantly employs descriptive methods to achieve some practical change will 
make at least an implicit appeal to normative principles.57  More controversially, others claim that 
                                                     
57 See, for example, the guiding function of ideal theory in Ashcroft (2008) and Robeyns (2008). 
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certain instances of descriptive ethics are inherently normative. For instance, Sayer (2011) suggests 
that it is more accurate to describe the holocaust as an event in which ‘millions were murdered’ than it 
would be to say that ‘millions were killed’.  In this instance, Sayer argues that accurate description 
requires the use of normative concepts and that using the more neutral term of ‘killing’ would be to 
mis-describe it in an important sense. This echoes influential arguments advanced within philosophy 
against certain forms of rationalistic ethical theory and the importance of ‘thick concepts’ in ethics 
(e.g. Williams, 1985).58 
Indeed, the construction of ideal knowledge about even the most abstract moral concepts seems to 
require at least some minimal knowledge of the world to which these concepts apply. As Doris and 
Stich (2005) put it “answers to important ethical questions require - and have very often presupposed 
- answers to empirical questions” (pp115: see also Appiah, 2008). For example, any moral theory that 
is entirely oblivious to naturalistic facts about human mortality or the practical realities of human 
flourishing and suffering will be deeply inadequate in an important sense. Ethics concerns itself with 
practical questions about what people ought to do, and since everything that is done is done in 
practice some reference to the real world of practice seems necessary and inescapable for ethical 
scholarship.  
We would like to stress that this argument for diversity does not amount to the claim that individual 
ethicists are not justified in reducing the aims and focus of their research, nor does it imply that they 
must seek to expand their methodological repertoire to embrace alternative methods of ethical 
analysis: no doubt such a claim would be as unhelpful as it is unrealistic. We see nothing wrong with 
working within the narrow parameters of a particular genre of ethics, but, where this applies, it is 
helpful to see that this is what one is doing. However recognising diversity and potential 
complementarity creates the conditions for developing innovative forms of ethical scholarship.  
Empirical bioethics falls into this category. In 2006, Borry et al. described evidence of what they 
termed an “empirical turn” in medical ethics and bioethics, citing an increase in the publication of 
research in which empirical research techniques are used. They cite work such as Molewijk et al.’s 
(2003) call for an “integrated empirical ethics” in which the processes of factual description and 
normative prescription are explicitly treated as mutually dependent, interwoven strands which 
influence one another at each stage of the research process. Approaches to ethics of this sort often 
rest on the problematisation of the distinction between facts and values, a claim that will no doubt be 
controversial for some, although there are a growing number who seem ready to make such a 
problematising move (Appiah, 2008; Blackburn, 1998; Doris & Stich, 2005; Gibbard, 1990; Harman, 
1999; Putnam, 2004). To use Hilary Putnam’s terminology, empirical approaches to ethics tend to 
view facts and values as separate but ‘entangled’ entities that must be considered in tandem.59  
The methodological implications of such a view have been explored by a variety of authors (Borry et 
al., 2008; McMillan & Hope, 2008; Widdershoven et al., 2009; Widdershoven & van der Scheer, 2008) 
with a central feature of these approaches being a desire to fuse together normative and descriptive 
techniques in an on-going cyclical process which leads to the advancement of both enlightenment 
and engineering aims. Method in empirical bioethics includes treating practice as a source of 
knowledge. For example, Molewijk et al. (2003) discuss how an empirical bioethics approach can be 
useful in the context of understanding the moral dimensions of clinical decision-making in medicine.  
This understanding allows the integrated model of empirical ethics to capture the complexities of 
clinical decision-making in a way that more standard approaches to bioethics do not. It rests on the 
insight that clinical decision-making is an ethical as well as a technical task which demands 
consideration of the values attached to courses of action as well as to the scientific facts, and treats 
these two strands as mutually intertwined. Molewijk et al.’s integrated empirical ethical approach calls 
for strong co-operation between bioethicists and scientists so that value judgements and technical 
scientific assessments can be made together and in light of one another.  
                                                     
58 See MacMillan’s (2016) chapter, in this volume, for discussion of how the notion of ‘thick concepts’ impacts upon the 
fact/value distinction. 
59 See MacMillan’s (2016) chapter, in this volume, for a more detailed exposition of this idea. 
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It is important to note that both ethical and scientific elements of decision-making are subject to 
revision during this process. For example, Widdershoven and Van der Scheer’s (2008) approach to 
empirical ethics, described as “pragmatic hermeneutics”, is critical of attempts which seek to frame 
ethical issues in terms of strictly defined principles based on abstract reasoning. Just as biomedical 
decision-making must be evaluated with reference to the moral dimensions of the situation, pragmatic 
hermeneutics suggests that ethical evaluation ought to be addressed pragmatically with reference to 
the particular biomedical (and psycho-social) context. Since the aim of the analysis is to provide a 
solid basis for moral action in particular cases and not (at least primarily) to produce general rules and 
principles for action, Widdershoven and Van der Scheer suggest ethical analysis should be sensitive 
to the complex concrete circumstances in which the subject of analysis is based in a way that requires 
a degree of empirically derived knowledge of these circumstances. (Also see the Landeweer. 
Molewijk and Widdershoven chapter in this text.)  
There is a danger that reductionist perspectives will choke off the potential of an integrated empirical 
ethics. We would like to see ethicists broaden their view of bioethics in a way that creates space for 
such innovative approaches to grow and develop. This demands reflexivity about the aims and 
methods of ethical scholarship which, we suggest,  can support a sense of security for scholars about 
their own work as well as a sense of toleration for the work of others. 
 
What qualifies as empirical bioethics? 
Given the broad conception of ethics, including bioethics, scholarship we have endorsed thus far we 
want to advocate for a relatively elastic conception of empirical bioethics that admits a variety of 
disciplinary communities. In particular we want to encourage the notion that people with histories and 
identities rooted in a range of disciplines, including not only philosophy but also sociology and other 
social sciences, can qualify as working in empirical bioethics. Developing the line we have taken to 
this point we would suggest that one important condition for work to qualify as empirical bioethics is 
that it pays attention to (or at least contains resources to respond to questions about) the rigour of its 
claims. For purely descriptive bioethics this will principally mean its empirical claims, but for most work 
it will include both its empirical and normative claims.60 This is a deliberately vague boundary. In 
particular we do not have a specific conception of rigour in mind. What counts as rigour will vary 
according to the relevant epistemic community and disciplinary framework, and, of course, according 
to the aims and focus of the specific research project under consideration. This degree of open-
endedness is designed to encourage a starting frame of toleration between communities and to 
encourage inter-disciplinary dialogue. Even on the basis of this very elastic conception then a lot of 
work is excluded from empirical bioethics – most obviously work in theoretical bioethics that does not 
use primary or secondary empirical data and makes no significant empirical claims. But it also will 
exclude an indeterminate amount of, but a good deal of, work where there is little attention to the 
relevant kinds of rigour and few or no discernible resources for others – even given interpretive charity 
– to analyse the bases of the empirical and normative claims being made or relied upon. Of course 
we are not suggesting that just because some conception of rigour is explicitly or implicitly deployed 
that others should automatically recognise it and accept that such work is of good quality or even 
sound. All we are suggesting is that such work will be over the threshold for being taken seriously as 
part of the extended family of empirical bioethics, and that any criticism or dismissal of such 
scholarship will have to be based upon a closer engagement with the work and the standards being 
applied rather than simply because it falls into a particular genre. 
Leaving aside purely descriptive or essentially non-empirical work for now, the challenges for people 
coming to empirical bioethics from philosophy or social science backgrounds will be slightly different. 
Broadly speaking, ‘philosophical bioethicists’ will have to find ways of (or be open to ways of) 
accounting for empirical rigour in their work, and ‘social science bioethicists’ will have to find ways of 
(or be open to ways of) accounting for their (more or less explicit) normative claims. We will say a little 
                                                     
60 Whether the phrase empirical bioethics should be used to embrace work that is purely descriptive is a reasonable question. 
We have no strong feelings on the matter and see it as simply a matter of specification – there are reasons that could be 
advanced in both directions. Generally we incline to more expansive and ‘welcoming’ usages of the term, although, of course, it 
is important to be clear in what sense it is being used in different instances. 
 75 
more about these challenges, but before doing so we should lodge another reminder that this 
distinction between ‘philosophical’ and ‘social science’ work is far from straightforward –the two 
already overlap considerably before any conscious attempt to bring them together in empirical 
bioethics or any other form of inter-disciplinarity (something which we will expand on as we continue). 
It might be assumed by some that it is easier for philosophical bioethicists to ‘add in’ a concern for 
empirical rigour into their work than it is for social scientists to ‘add in’ a concern for normative rigour, 
perhaps owing to ideas about the relative accessibility and specialisation of each skill-set. We would 
recommend scepticism about this assumption (as well as about the idea of the process being simply 
‘additive’). Indeed, we would suggest – in a slightly provocative spirit, and with the clear risk of 
exaggeration - that a better way of characterising the situation is that philosophical bioethicists can 
learn about the philosophy and methodology of empirical work and about normative reasoning from 
social scientists (as well as, as is more often assumed, vice versa). The social sciences contain very 
many rich traditions of work, many of which are highly reflexive about either or both epistemological 
and value claims. Most notably expertise relating to empirical rigour has its locus within debates about 
research methodology and epistemology, and whilst these are fundamentally philosophical (as well as 
operational) questions, these questions are most deeply embedded, rehearsed and contested within 
the large family of social science disciplines. This is only one part of the already existing and 
considerable inter-penetration of philosophy and social sciences.  
The case relating to normative reasoning is analogous, although less clear-cut. There are important 
currents of normative reasoning in social and political theory, which are embedded in both 
philosophical and social science circles. This applies most obviously to normative work in the 
continental tradition of philosophy, which has directly shaped critical and post-structuralist currents in 
a wide range of empirical (as well as theoretical) social science. Another, related, instance of this kind 
of long-standing cross-fertilisation, which has had a substantial direct effect in bioethics, is work 
across feminist philosophy and social science. Indeed, if anything, it is work in mainstream analytical 
philosophical ethics which is anomalous and which has been less frequently embedded within social 
science research (there are exceptions e.g. Sen’s work on ‘capabilities’ arose within, and has been 
widely applied to, economics and development studies). 
From the standpoint of analytical philosophical ethics the weak point of the forms of normative 
reasoning embedded in critical social science work will arise at what we have specified as the crucial 
threshold (for inclusion in empirical bioethics), namely the capacity of this work to provide an account 
of normative rigour. Part of the problem here is that much of the work that is done in critical and post-
structural social science, for example, advances ethical and political positions and arguments 
implicitly rather than explicitly.61 Furthermore it is intrinsic to much of this work (especially the post-
structuralist variants) to be sceptical about the possibility of positively establishing and defending 
ethical and political claims. In the most general terms this scepticism reflects a deep-seated worry that 
claims to knowledge are inevitably bound up with social power and invariably (re)produce forms of 
exclusion and oppression (and these kinds of issues are discussed further in Jackie Leach Scully’s 
(2016) chapter in this volume).  
Nonetheless we would suggest that even though this work has a tendency to resist normative scrutiny 
there are some genre-specific conceptions of quality that can be discerned and applied in this context. 
Translating this into the language of rigour may be somewhat awkward and reductionist but, for 
example and in crude terms, good quality work embodying ideology critique or deconstruction, will 
disrupt taken-for-granted readings, foster distrust about what the reader may previously have seen as 
unproblematic, normal, natural or neutral, and indicate new possibilities for understanding 
phenomena; including illuminating the way in which they arise through binaries, hierarchies and 
circuits of power that can be both uncovered and interrogated. As with debates about empirical 
methodology, those who want to critically examine and question the fundamental models and 
arguments underpinning this work can engage with a substantial body of work in (continental) 
philosophy, including Heideggerian, Frankfurt School, Foucauldian and more recent scholarship. As a 
result we take the view that at least some examples of critical social science work ought to qualify as 
                                                     
61 In this specific respect there are some parallels with the nature of argument in analytic philosophy, which is for the most part 
simply done rather than methodologically discussed. 
 76 
empirical bioethics. This work, we would argue, should certainly be included in family disputes about 
what counts as good quality empirical bioethics, rather than simply be excluded from the family. We 
say this because we believe the kind of normative reasoning associated with these currents of work 
has a valuable contribution to make to empirical bioethics. In practical terms it means that when 
empirical bioethicists attend to specific contexts (e.g. specific institutional policies surrounding 
informed consent; or the enactment of a population screening intervention) they should not only be 
paying attention to the social construction62 of the practices and policies they are studying, but they 
should be mindful of the value and ethical categories that are both embedded in the examples and in 
their own analysis of it. Do some of these practices and policies, or their own accounts, have 
gendered (or ‘raced’ or ‘classed’) assumptions built into them? Do the categories of analysis, which 
aspire towards neutrality or some positive conception of justice, actually serve to foster specific 
economic interests or ‘neo-liberal’ ideology more generally?  
It is these kinds of concerns that make the sociological critique of mainstream bioethics – including, 
for example, the ideological baggage of principalism - productive. Although there are clear tensions 
between these more sociological ways of ‘doing’ ethics and the more mainstream philosophical 
approaches to applied ethics, there are also considerable parallels and complementarities. For 
example, analogous criticisms of the limitations of principalism are routine within philosophical 
bioethics. And there are examples of analogous work in applied philosophical ethics that subvert 
dominant assumptions about ethical categories, and draw upon social and political theory (e.g. 
communitarian debates) – for instance, in the growing field of public health ethics. In other words, 
there is much common ground around which to build an inter-disciplinary conversation. Here, and 
more generally, we would argue that it is better to see the underlying tensions between disciplinary 
traditions as generative of productive dialogue within empirical bioethics rather than as a reason for 
drawing firm boundaries between different types of work. 
In this section we have concentrated on one (albeit broad) area of social science that has a clear 
normative agenda – arguing that bioethics related work informed by these approaches should be 
included within the family of empirical bioethics. However similar arguments can be advanced for a 
number of other areas including, for example, some work in phenomenologically inspired qualitative 
social research and even some quantitative work, such as that in the political arithmetic tradition.  
 
Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter presents an argument for recognising and embracing diversity of aims and 
methods within ethics in general and empirical bioethics in particular. In the face of historic and on-
going tension between those approaching bioethics from distinct disciplinary traditions, we suggest 
that bioethics is an inherently broad field which is not only able to accommodate a plurality of 
approaches, but is also open to innovative forms of collaboration between approaches. We suggest 
that reflexivity about aims and methods, toleration of difference, interdisciplinary communication and 
charity of interpretation will be important ingredients to developing genuinely interdisciplinary forms of 
ethics scholarship. As long as the result takes seriously standards of, and contestations about, rigour 
and does not otherwise shut down alternative forms of scholarship, we suggest that such diversity 
ought to be welcomed.   
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The development of empirical bioethics has involved serious engagement with questions of 
methodology and method. Those who have written widely about it have been largely concerned with 
the way in which social scientific inquiry and ethical inquiry can be brought together in a research 
setting in very practical ways. They do this, as we discussed in the preface, in order to make 
practically relevant normative claims, reflecting a more general concern amongst empirical 
bioethicists about the ways in which bioethics is practiced as a research enterprise. In this editorial, 
then, we shift our attention away from the central theoretical debates to methodological questions, 
focusing on the central issue of how empirical bioethics research should be conducted. Importantly, 
our shift away from theoretical issues does not imply that we depart entirely from these 
considerations. Indeed, as shall be seen, the ways in which empirical bioethicists articulate 
methodological approaches to conduct research of this type is critically dependent on the theoretical 
commitments they endorse. 
 
The core integrative approach that defines empirical bioethics inquiry raises a number of immediate 
methodological questions about how this integration ought to take place in ways that enable the full 
potential of both the social scientific and ethical components of the research to be maximised. Such 
integration, we will go on to say, presupposes the need for novelty in methodological design; good 
empirical bioethics research requires more than the combining of empirical and ethical phases of 
research activity if this approach is going to be defensible. 
 
The integration challenge has not stopped bioethicists from putting forward a wide variety of 
methodologies that lay out blueprints for how research of this type should be designed. A recent 
systematic review of empirical bioethics methodologies reveals 32 separate methodological 
approaches presented in the bioethics literature (Davies et al, 2015). This review also makes a 
number of additional observations about these methodologies that are worthy of considering at length. 
 
First, the authors of the systematic review claim that this typology of methodologies in empirical 
bioethics can be grouped as either ‘dialogical’ or ‘consultative’ in character, representing two poles of 
methodological orientation on which the majority of the methodologies identified can be situated. 
Dialogical methodologies are those in which the researchers design a study in such a way that they 
are able to establish a dialogue with their participants. Through this dialogue, the researchers co-
develop understandings of, and solutions to, the morally significant/challenging dimensions of 
practice, conducting their analysis and drawing their normative conclusions together (in a variety of 
possible ways). In contrast, consultative methodologies are those in which the researchers and the 
participants occupy discrete and different roles in the research activity. Here, the researchers act as 
external ‘thinkers’ or analysts, gathering empirical data, analysing this data, and then conducting a 
separate and/or additional ethical analysis to draw normative conclusions independently of the data 
collection process. 
 
This categorisation of the different methodological approaches that have been developed to 
undertake empirical bioethics research is useful because it allows researchers to recognise the 
different ways in which a normative conclusion can be reached, and how it can be justified. 
Immediately, therefore, we can see that methodological reflection of this kind returns us to more 
foundational questions about the form of practical ethical claims, and how such claims can be 
justified. Indeed, the second important observation emerging out of this systematic review is the way 
in which different methodological approaches take different positions on the question of normative 
justification. 
 
Davies et al. (2015) argue that these methodologies also differ in terms of how they seek to answer 
three central epistemological questions relevant to the integration of empirical and ethical inquiry. The 
first question is how a normative conclusion can be justified, with the various methodologies identified 
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differentiating themselves in terms of whether they see justification here as a matter of consensus-
building or as a matter of appeal to coherence. Broadly speaking, dialogical methodologies are more 
likely to justify a normative claim that is borne out of some kind of consensus amongst all of those 
involved in the research activity, and consultative methodologies are more likely to justify the 
conclusions they draw by reference to coherence. As Davies et al put it, “[a] research method that 
appeals to consensus to justify a normative conclusion finds moral authority in agreement of some 
kind”, and “[c]onversely, a research method that appeals to coherence finds moral authority… in 
rationality and consistency” (pp9). This kind of methodological consideration connects to questions 
about the nature of normativity in ethics, and raises issues that both McMillan and Sheehan dissect in 
Section 1 above. In McMillan’s articulation of the concept, normativity in empirical bioethics requires 
robust ethical argumentation that is more closely aligned to a coherence - rather than consensus - 
orientated approach to moral justification. This is not to deny, however, that those empirical 
bioethicists who endorse consensus approaches cannot offer their own substantive accounts of 
normative justification that is premised on the value of, and need for, social processes in articulating 
and strengthening moral claims. 
 
The second epistemological question concerns the analytic process through which the conclusion is 
reached. The different methodologies identified accord different priorities to the role of: 
 
i) the researcher or analyst who makes central judgements that give form to the normative 
conclusion; 
ii) the theory, and the consistent development and application of theory, in articulating the 
normative conclusion, or; 
iii) the stakeholders in the research who come together in a group process to formulate the 
normative conclusion.  
 
As outlined above, consultative methodologies tend to prioritise the central role of the researchers 
themselves in conducting analysis and making judgements as part of the research activity. Other 
consultative methodologies will be theory-driven, where the researchers endorse particular theoretical 
commitments prior to the onset of the research, with the analysis focusing on specifying how these 
commitments ought to be applied to a practical ethical problem in light of the relevant views and 
experiences of the consulted individuals. In contrast, dialogical methodologies are more likely to 
prioritise the stakeholders in the research; connecting a range of voices in order to link relevant 
practical experiences such that a normative conclusion is formulated through specific facilitative, 
deliberative, or consensus building processes. 
 
The third epistemological question concerns the kind of normative conclusion that an empirical 
bioethics research project aims to draw. This conclusion can be more or less generalisable, 
depending on how the analytic process has been formulated. Methodologies that prioritise the thinker 
or the theory are more likely to aim for generalisable conclusions that can extend beyond the practical 
context in which the empirical work has been conducted.  The corollary of this is that researchers 
operating with these methodologies will need to consider how their generalisable conclusions can be 
expressed in terms that are meaningful to, and engaging for, context-bound actors, in a way that 
meets what we called ‘the pragmatic condition’ in the Preface. Those approaches that are oriented 
towards the involvement of a specific group of stakeholders, or that strive to justify a conclusion by 
reference to consensus, may be focused on articulating action-guiding recommendations that are 
limited to the domain of practice in which these stakeholders are situated, or in which consensus is 
built. This kind of methodological consideration relates closely to the points raised in Section 1 by 
Sheehan about moral relativism; and those who defend a more ‘local’, consensus-building and 
stakeholder-orientated approach to empirical bioethics methodology will need to attend carefully to 
the ways in which the conclusions they draw attend to the objections that Sheehan poses above. 
 
 
Justification and Methodological Design 
 
For this section we have selected a range of empirical bioethics methodologies that span the different 
approaches identified in this systematic review, and which take different positions in relation to the 
three epistemological questions laid out above. These four methodologies are, we believe, broadly 
representative of the methodological field of empirical bioethics in its current form. In this section of 
the book we are moving on from foundational questions of justification that give shape to the 
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conceptual and disciplinary disagreements discussed in Part 1. However, our contention is that one 
cannot make sense of distinctive methodological approaches without careful consideration of the 
different philosophical and empirical commitments that empirical bioethics researchers endorse – 
implicitly or explicitly – in the ways in which they design their research studies. It is for this reason that 
we invited the authors of the first four chapters in Part 2 to articulate their methodologies alongside 
detailed justifications of the approaches that they endorse and defend. Whilst these four 
methodological frameworks represent very different approaches to doing empirical bioethics, we must 
reiterate that they are by no means the only accounts available. Recently published work on, for 
example, symbiotic empirical ethics (Frith, 2010), reflexive balancing (Ives, 2015), grounded moral 
analysis, moral participation, moral conversation (Dunn et al., 2012), and inter-ethics (Abma et al, 
2009 & 2010) could all have been showcased below.  In this volume we have selected diverging 
methodological accounts that endorse different justificatory strategies and associated methodological 
requirements; and our selection strategy is based on showcasing a variety of core ideas, rather than 
us, as editors, endorsing any one particular set of approaches over others. 
 
 
Four methodological approaches 
 
In Chapter 7, Landeweer, Molewijk & Widdershoven outline a methodological approach for EB that 
they refer to as ‘dialogical empirical ethics’. This methodology represents the culmination of many 
years of thinking about the central relevance of hermeneutic philosophy for empirical bioethics 
research (Widdrshoven, 2001; Molewijk et al, 2004; Abma et al, 2009; Widdershoven et al, 2009a & 
2009b; Landeweer et al, 2011; Voskes et al, 2013), and seeks to produce moral learning and direct 
improvement to practice by involving stakeholders in a process of reflection and dialogue on moral 
issues in practice. It is a methodology that Landeweer et al. have developed through combining two 
cross-disciplinary paradigms of ethical understanding and empirical inquiry: Gadamerian hermeneutic 
philosophy and responsive evaluation. The former philosophical approach presupposes that moral 
understanding and ethical action is forged through dialogical exchanges between individuals who 
come to understand and shape each other’s ‘dynamic horizon’ in communicative exchange. The latter 
empirical approach embodies the view that research participants are partners in inquiry and change, 
co-directing how the research takes place and how its conclusions are drawn. Using the example of 
research into the ethics of coercion in mental health practice, Landeweer et al. show how novel moral 
solutions to reduce inappropriate coercive measures was dependent on the facilitation and stimulation 
of dialogue between nursing teams, enabling both the research to take place – and its outcomes to be 
implemented – in the specific practice contexts in which these individuals work. 
 
In Chapter 8, van Thiel & van Delden provide a detailed account of ‘normative-empirical reflective 
equilibrium’ (NE-RE) as a methodology for empirical bioethics. In contrast to the dialogical approach 
articulated by Landeweer et al., NE-RE falls firmly within the consultative set of approaches, drawing 
heavily on the Rawlsian account of reflective equilibrium to endorse the view that moral intuitions, 
moral principles, morally relevant facts, and background theories should all be brought together, in a 
coherent fashion, in order to provide morally defensible arguments to practical ethical problems. Van 
Thiel & van Delden defend the role that moral intuitions can play in practical bioethical analysis, 
arguing against the view that incorporating intuitions is to render ethical analysis overtly subjective or 
erroneous. By emphasising the importance of incorporating intuitions that go beyond the personal 
insights of the researcher, van Thiel & van Delden defend the robustness of their ethical analysis and 
stress the value of obtaining unexpected insights, relevant descriptions of experience, and 
interpretation of moral considerations from a number of different angles. The authors also defend the 
use of coherence in their methodological approach, arguing against the objection that it is uncertain 
how much coherence is needed for reflective equilibrium to be reached. Drawing on an empirical 
analysis of the content of internet message boards, comprising comments on the appropriateness of 
growth attenuation surgery for a young girl with developmental disabilities, van Thiel & van Delden 
reveal a wide range of moral intuitions about how the case ought to be have been resolved. They 
incorporate analytic techniques designed to reveal ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ positive and negative inference 
relations between the intuitions that they systematically analysed and the relevant moral principles 
they identify (together with the moral theoretical considerations that underpin these principles) in order 
to make progress in their ethical analysis. 
 
In Chapter 9, Kim outlines a different methodological approach developed out of the political 
philosophy of deliberative democracy.  This is an approach to governance in a liberal democratic 
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society that demands the state puts in place mechanisms for governance that enable it to outline, and 
promote dialogue around, the reasons it gives to its citizens for the policy decisions it makes.  Further, 
it must do this in ways that are accessible to, and can be challenged by, these individuals in the public 
sphere (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). For Kim, a deliberative democratic approach within politics is 
the natural bedfellow to bioethical reasoning around decisions that concern public-policy making. The 
idea that “we could attempt to resolve the conflict by promoting a deliberation among citizens during 
which an attempt is made to find a common perspective” (pp??) is one that appears to be intuitively 
appealing, and Kim makes clear that such involvement in public policy-making is preferable, in our 
current political landscape, to deferring such decision-making to expert panels, commissions, or 
special interest groups. This methodological approach, as Kim acknowledges, poses a number of 
difficulties. One such difficulty is in specifying the methodological parameters for high quality 
deliberative exchange; ensuring that polarised views are managed in such a way that progress can be 
made in trying to formulate what Kim refers to as a ‘common good’ based policy recommendation. A 
second difficulty in adapting deliberative democracy for empirical bioethics is to articulate precisely 
how to reach a ‘common perspective’, or the ‘common good’, and what constitutes the justificatory 
force of this perspective. In Kim’s discussions of a deliberative democratic approach to the formulation 
of a policy for the recruitment of adults with dementia in clinical research, it is the focus on the need to 
develop an ethically defensible policy that applies to members of society broadly that justifies the 
attempt to find a consensus viewpoint within a piece of empirical bioethics research. This justification 
would not extend to bioethical issues that do not have a policy dimension to them (for example, where 
the aim of a piece of research is to shape professional practice in a small-scale context). Kim argues 
however, that it is the best way to justify practical ethical conclusions around contemporary moral 
disagreement in societies that endorse democratic modes of decision-making, and when the policy to 
be introduced necessarily requires the trading off of competing goods or values. 
 
In Chapter 10, Scully outlines a comprehensive feminist approach to empirical bioethics, developing 
and integrating complementary strands of analysis in feminist philosophy and feminist social science. 
In Scully’s account of feminist bioethics, the starting concern is that ways of doing bioethics, from 
conducting ethical analyses to identifying morally salient features of a given practice, are 
fundamentally gendered, and that this gendered dimension to practical ethics functions to contribute 
to oppressive practices – both in bioethics itself, and in the practical contexts in which the 
recommendations made by bioethicists are designed to have effect. Feminist empirical bioethics 
seeks to put forward “a toolkit for critical engagement with the politics of ethical and bioethical life”. As 
a methodology, Scully’s account of feminist empirical bioethics is one that allows a light to be shone 
on oppressive practices, advancing anti-oppressive and equality-based norms, by seeking to reveal 
imbalanced power structures, stressing the moral significance of human relationships and care, and 
placing marginalised voices at the heart of the process of identifying and analysing issues of ethical 
concern within society. As Scully attests, the justificatory foundations of feminist empirical bioethics 
are strongly anti-relativist, with empirical work functioning to advance ways of being and acting in the 
world that function to prevent exploitation, abuse, and oppression. 
 
Whilst these four methodological approaches represent only a snapshot of the methodological field of 
empirical bioethics research in its current form, even a cursory glance at the chapters below reveals 
some immediate and important differences. Landeweer et al. and van Thiel & van Delden seek to 
make methodological progress by clarifying a justificatory account of how practical ethical knowledge 
can be obtained. Relating back to different meta-ethical commitments, such knowledge is contingent 
on a central role being given to dialogical interpretation in the former and, in the latter, to the 
argumentative force of moral intuitions and coherence. In contrast, Kim’s methodological approach is 
justified by recourse to a particular political arrangement and to the explicit recognition that standards 
of democratic political involvement ought to be endorsed when bioethical research activities are 
orientated towards the formulation of public policy recommendations. Scully’s feminist EB 
methodology is one that gains traction and justification through its prior commitment to a set of 
normative values that require socio-cultural biases against women and other marginalised groups to 
be challenged. Scully argues that her account of an empirically-grounded bioethics that seeks to 
foreground the voices of those who experience oppression, or who are otherwise side-lined in the 
hegemonic discourses of contemporary ethical analysis, is the only way to enact these moral norms in 
invoking practical ethical changes in the world. 
 
In thinking about whether these approaches ought to be enacted in a piece of bioethics research, it is 
important to recognise that they are not exempt from criticism. Those who are digesting the different 
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approaches with a view to selecting a methodology for their own research would be well placed to 
reflect on a number of questions that concern both the justifications and design decisions that form 
part of these methodological strategies. We suggest that the following kinds of questions could 
usefully be posed by bioethicists who are seeking to select a methodology in their own research work: 
 
 Is the justificatory account underpinning the need to, and way of, integrating empirical and 
ethical analysis to resolve a specific practical ethical issue clear? Does this justification hinge 
on a meta-ethical, political, or normative ethical commitment? How might such a justification 
be challenged, and how would you defend the implicit theoretical commitments that the 
methodology is built upon? 
 Is the methodological design consistent with this justificatory account, and is it clear precisely 
how the analytic process ought to take place in a way that can provide sound normative 
conclusions? 
 What specific disciplinary conventions accompany the methodologies or methods selected, 
and how might these conventions be managed or amended when the EB researcher is 
working in a transdisciplinary fashion? 
 
Novel Research Practices 
 
The final two chapters in Section 2 move away from distinctive methodologies to offer a set of 
remarks about the wider challenge of forging a research identity and career in a field of inquiry that 
sits firmly outside standard disciplinary conventions. How can empirical bioethicists go about the 
business of conducting their research, even when they are armed with a methodological framework 
that they believe is best-placed to make justified normative conclusions; and how should these 
conclusions be disseminated and enacted? The points outlined in the final two chapters seek to 
engage with this question. 
 
Showcasing such concerns is important, we believe, because of the transdisciplinary quality of 
empirical bioethics methodological practice. In contrast to similar methodological approaches that are 
commonly adopted in the social sciences, empirical bioethicists are striving to articulate the added 
value that their novel approaches bring, whilst simultaneously attempting to develop research 
identities within broad fields of inquiry that remain demarcated in more circumscribed and disciplinary 
terms. How should this balance be struck? 
 
There are both attitudinal and practical considerations to attend to in answering this question. 
Empirical bioethics needs to give careful thought to how its practitioners ought to make sense of their 
research identity, and how they ought to conduct themselves, when they are engaged in a set of 
methodological activities that are both novel and emergent. In a recent paper that speaks to this 
issue, Mertz et al. (2014) argue that a ‘road map for quality criteria’ can be beneficial. Seeking to 
attend to this transdisciplinary concern by articulating a set of core standards for empirical bioethics 
research, their proposal borrows quality criteria articulated within philosophy and social science, but 
also identifies novel criteria necessary for attempts to integrate analytic approaches between 
disciplines. Their ‘interdiscipinary highway’ focuses on core study design and relevance criteria. The 
former set of issues require the empirical bioethics researcher to be clear on i) the research question, 
ii) the theoretical framework selected to justify and shape the integration of different empirical and 
ethical approaches, and iii) the corresponding methods adopted. The latter set of criteria require 
researchers to give careful consideration to the epistemic and social value of these design decisions 
(i.e. attending to implicit normativity in the research process). 
 
The shift to identifying generalisable standards in EB research is a laudable aim, particularly given the 
value of coalescing around shared practices when methodological diversity is such a significant 
feature of empirical bioethics research.. However, at a closer glance, Mertz et al’s proposal is focused 
more on provoking empirical bioethics researchers to reflect carefully on the choices they make in 
their studies, rather than in articulating clearly defensible standards of research conduct. Until further 
work on practice standards in empirical bioethics research has been completed,63 we would strongly 
endorse this position. 
 
                                                     
63 Such as the ongoing work on a European consensus building project on standards in empirical bioethics research, hosted at 
the Brocher Foundation in May 2015, and chaired by Jonathan Ives, Michael Dunn, Bert Molewijk and Jan Schildman. 
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Thus, a central requirement of research conduct in empirical bioethics requires an explicit and 
continual reflexive stance to be adopted when engaged in one’s research activities. In practice, this 
partially means giving due consideration to how one would defend the integrative dimensions of the 
research strategies adopted, or the methods deployed, as Mertz et al. claim. However, it also means 
recognising that conducting ethical reasoning in novel ways, and in new interpersonal spaces of 
inquiry, requires the EB researcher to consider how her own identity, uncertainties, and interactions 
with participants in the research setting, are negotiated and managed at each and every stage of the 
process. It means being aware that engaging in ethical reasoning in these ways can be potentially 
transformative and disruptive to the moral identities of study participants.  Not every individual who 
comes into contact with an EB researcher is, after all, likely to be as familiar with the process of 
developing, justifying and critiquing ethical arguments as the researcher herself; and the potential for 
disruption is significant.  Ensuring that these concerns are reflected upon, that the methodological 
process is amended as appropriate, and that each and every step of this process is documented and 
written into a research report, is also likely to be a necessary component of good EB research. 
 
An orientation towards reflexivity in bioethics research has been defended elsewhere (Ives & Dunn, 
2010), but such reflexivity looks to be of even more crucial significance in the context of empirical 
bioethics research settings, and this justification is not simply reflective of the need to attend to 
standards of research practice drawn from the social sciences, as Singh describes in her chapter in 
this volume. A more appropriate way of accounting for this reflexivity might be to understand it in 
terms of the concept of ‘moral craftsmanship’ articulated by Parker (2012). Whilst Parker deploys this 
notion to explain the ways in which clinical genetics professionals attend to the moral dimensions of 
their work, the focus of craftsmanship on how individuals strive to proactively seek out, manage, and 
continually re-evaluate both problems and solutions in moral matters lends itself to being applied in 
this context. In this sense, we might think that empirical bioethics researchers are engaged in the 
‘moral craft’ of undertaking novel forms of bioethics research, managing emerging difficulties and 
uncertainties as they traverse stable disciplinary standards in their research endeavours, striving to 
craft ethical arguments that have practical force in new and creative ways. 
 
This standard of reflexivity is taken up proactively in Chapter 11. Here, Farsides & Williams write as a 
medical ethicist and medical sociologist respectively. They offer extensive and detailed reflections on 
their own experiences of dealing with the methodological challenges of interdisciplinary research in a 
number of studies of morally contested areas of biomedicine. Working to develop their own 
methodological approach, and to adapt specific methods to conduct their research, the authors 
demonstrate that many of the challenges they faced extended beyond high-level methodological 
difficulties. Instead, Farsides & Williams discuss the challenge of gaining buy-in (from funding bodies, 
academic institutions, research ethics committees, and healthcare practice settings amongst others) 
when the activities involved are novel and difficult to situate within standard disciplinary paradigms. 
They also discuss the organisational difficulties that can emerge in empirical bioethics research that 
involves the facilitation of discussions between stakeholders of different types. Farsides & Williams 
remind us that it can be a logistical issue to organise times in which practitioners, managers, patients 
and family carers are able to sit down together to discuss ethical issues, and an intellectual and 
interpersonal challenge to facilitate groups of people that are characterised by pre-existing power 
dynamics and expectations (an issue that is also discussed by Landeweer et al. and Kim in this 
volume). 
 
The final chapter in Section 2 focuses on practical research challenges in empirical bioethics that 
extend beyond the moment of the research activity itself. Frith & Draper explore how empirical 
bioethics research can be reported and published, given its novel and interdisciplinary qualities. They 
consider the possibility of splitting up the more empirical and ethical phases of research inquiry in 
empirical bioethics, suggesting that researchers might seek to publish the outcomes of these 
components of research in the journals aligned with their respective disciplinary approach. Of course, 
an obvious concern that Frith & Draper consider is the viability of such a separation; certainly in the 
methodologies showcased in this book, the integration of empirical and ethical components in 
empirical bioethics research is such that the substance and outcome of the activity may no longer be 
separable. They also consider the possibility of separating the outcomes of a piece of empirical 
bioethics research, and publishing these outcomes separately. There are both practical and ethical 
concerns with this approach, as Frith & Draper explicate, including the risk of the richness of the data 
being sacrificed for pragmatic reasons. Their conclusion is – at least for the time being - pessimistic; 
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any strategy for publishing empirical bioethics research in the dominant paradigms for disseminating 
bioethics research will necessarily involve making compromises. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Developing research methodology in empirical bioethics has been, and is likely to remain, a strong 
focus of work in the field. However, without communication between those advocating different 
approaches, particularly concerning questions of justification and research design, there remains the 
very real risk that empirical bioethics will devolve into a fragmented grouping of different 
methodological silos that track pre-existing schisms in philosophy and the social sciences. 
 
The chapters below show that developing research methodologies in empirical bioethics means 
attending to central epistemological and meta-ethical commitments, and progress is contingent on 
defending these commitments in response to those articulating different justifications and 
methodological frameworks. One way of ensuring that progress in the field remains possible is for 
those involved in formulating empirical bioethics methodologies to seek to identify common research 
standards that can be agreed upon, regardless of the main philosophical differences between those 
working in the field. Further work here will undoubtedly by fruitful in maintaining the pace and 
progress that methodological development in empirical bioethics research has enjoyed over the last 
decade, and our hope is that this volume will stimulate the kind of interest and debate that will 
facilitate that continued development. 
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How to do empirical ethics research and what to learn from it? There are many theoretical conceptual 
discussions related to empirical ethics research, but less attention is paid to how empirical ethics 
research is done and how it contributes to health care practice. In this chapter we will describe an 
empirical ethical research project, which combines social scientific methods with normative aims and 
reflections.  
The chapter presents a specific kind of empirical ethics: dialogical empirical ethics. It describes our 
methodology, aiming to include stakeholders in a process of reflection and dialogue on moral issues 
in practice, resulting in joint moral learning and improvement of practice. The methodology will be 
illustrated by an empirical study, which aimed to foster reflection on the moral appropriateness of 
coercive measures and on developing moral solutions regarding the reduction of coercive measures, 
by stimulating dialogue between nursing teams. First, we will describe the theoretical framework and 
the normative underpinnings of the research methodology. Second, the research setting and activities 
will be outlined. Next, the main results will be described. After that, we will reflect on the 
methodological process of co-creating moral knowledge and fostering moral improvement in practice.  
We will end with some conclusions regarding the contribution of empirical ethical research to moral 
improvement in practice, and some challenges involved in making empirical ethical research into a 
well-qualified methodology for moral improvement of health care practice.  
 
Theoretical framework: Dialogical empirical ethics research 
Interest in empirical ethics has increased during the last decade, giving rise to a wide variety of 
viewpoints on its theoretical (normative) underpinnings and its methodological characteristics 
(Molewijk et al, 2009; Solbakk, 2012).64 Relatively few papers explicitly focus on the concrete 
methodology of empirical ethics (Molewijk et al, 2004 & 2012; Widdershoven et al, 2009a/b; Frith, 
2012; Dunn et al, 2012). Salloch and colleagues point towards the fact that many empirical ethics 
studies lack normative analysis and are merely crypto-normative, as “… they implicitly take normative 
statements as the basis of their ethical argumentation without mentioning or reflecting on them” 
(Salloch et al, 2012:3). In order to avoid this, we will describe in this section the theoretical and 
normative underpinnings of what we conceive as ‘dialogical empirical ethics’, how we deal with 
normativity, and how we perceive the role of the researcher in this approach to empirical ethics.  
Theoretical and normative underpinnings of dialogical empirical ethics research 
Our notion of dialogical empirical ethics research is based upon hermeneutic philosophy (Gadamer, 
1960) and responsive evaluation as an empirical research method (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). In line with 
hermeneutic philosophy, our approach is based on experiences in practice and aims to bring together 
various normative perspectives in dialogue. In line with responsive evaluation, it implies working 
closely together with participants in the practice, who are regarded as ‘stakeholders’ or partners in the 
whole research process (i.e. designing the empirical research process, developing the research 
questions, interpreting the results, and drawing normative conclusions). This is different from other 
types of empirical ethics research, in which the researcher reflects on empirical data (sometimes 
collected by other researchers), and draws normative conclusions by him/herself alone or with peers. 
                                                     
64 See for example the thematic issues on empirical ethics of Bioethics in 2009 and of Cambridge Quarterly in 2012. 
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The term ‘dialogical’ refers to a dialogue between practice and theory, between the ethical and the 
empirical research, and between ethics and practice. However, above all, dialogue in our empirical 
ethics research refers to interaction between various people with various roles, both practitioners and 
researchers, jointly exploring what is morally right. 
According to Gadamer, hermeneutics start from the basic viewpoint that human life is a process of 
interpretation. Hence, hermeneutic ethics focuses on how human beings interpret the situation 
morally. This interpretation is an on-going process and depends strongly on context and experiences. 
Hermeneutic ethics consists of three key elements: the notion of perspective, dialogue as a learning 
process, and practical rationality. The notion of perspective refers to the fact that human beings 
interpret the situation from a certain point of view based on former experiences. A perspective can be 
implicit or explicit, and is always partial. This is not problematic: it is the initial departure point of any 
reflection and normative judgment.  
Complementary to the notion of perspective is that of dialogue. Differences in perspective call for 
dialogue and exchange. Dialogue requires openness towards the other, and being prepared to 
investigate the validity of the other’s point of view:  
Dialogical understanding means that one tries to see the point the other person makes. It 
means being open to what the other has to say (instead of ignoring the response) and 
being prepared to accept it as potentially relevant and valid for oneself (Widdershoven et 
al, 2009a:238).  
Dialogue is not merely an instrument in order to reach morally better decisions or a higher compliance 
in moral decision making processes. Furthermore, it not only refers to reasoning as a rational and 
cognitive process, but also involves taking into account emotions and meeting the other as a person. 
Dialogue involves moral learning, as situations are reconsidered and revalued based on new 
interpretations and understandings in which initial presumptions are challenged and fuelled with other 
perspectives.  
Within a dialogue, participants come from different places and have different historical and cultural 
backgrounds, resulting in prejudices, which embody various values and meanings. Every participant 
in a dialogue has his/her own dynamic horizon: 
The horizon is the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a 
particular point of view (...) The word has been used in philosophy to characterise the 
way in which thought is bound to a perspective, and the way in which one’s range of 
vision is gradually expanded. (Gadamer, 1960:286)  
A horizon is not fixed, but flexible; one can go beyond one’s current point of view by taking another 
stance and looking from a different angle.  In a dialogue, the participants interpret each other’s views 
from their own perspective, but also aim to understand the perspective of the other, and see its 
relevance. According to Gadamer, a successful dialogue results in a fusion of horizons: 
To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself forward 
and asserting one’s point of view, but being transformed into a communion in which we 
do not remain what we were. (Gadamer, 1960:360).  
The third key element, practical rationality, refers to the fact that the stakeholders in general are 
considered to have practical knowledge of what is morally important and right. This knowledge is 
contextual and situated. The stakeholders know from experience what is morally relevant and are 
able to discern what matters in a specific situation. This does not imply that the stakeholders have a 
final view on what is morally justified: practical rationality is further improved by experience and 
dialogue. Morality in practice is seen as an on-going negotiation, a process in which practical 
rationality is expressed, reviewed and further developed.  
Responsive evaluation approaches to empirical ethics research aim to enhance the personal and 
mutual understanding of a situation by fostering on-going dialogues and joint reflection on relevant 
issues among various stakeholders (Abma et al, 2009a). With respect to empirical ethics, this means 
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that various stakeholders (including the empirical ethics researchers) reflect on implicit and explicit 
moral issues that play a role in the practice under study. A whole set of techniques is available to 
identify these moral issues, including in-depth interviews, brainstorming sessions, discussion 
meetings, moral case deliberations, and focus groups. A dialogical approach implies that the 
stakeholders present their issues and concerns, but also respond to the issues of others in order to 
obtain a shared understanding. A shared understanding does not automatically imply that there is (or 
should be) a consensus or mutual agreement. Differences can lead to a learning process 
(Widdershoven, 2001). The empirical ethics researcher charts the research progress and keeps track 
of his or her role in the research process. A dialogical attitude refers to an active and critical 
exploration of each other’s moral thinking and judgments. The responsive evaluation researcher tries 
to foster and support openness, respect, inclusion and engagement (Greene, 2001). 
To summarise, the theoretical and normative underpinnings of dialogical empirical ethics entail that 
moral knowledge is based on practical experience and perspective, calls for and is fostered by 
dialogue, and requires openness and awareness that moral insights are temporal and part of an on-
going process, which can be stimulated and improved by empirical ethics research. Facilitating 
dialogue between different perspectives is, therefore, an important normative condition and 
assignment for scientists who conduct dialogical empirical ethical research.  
 
Normativity within dialogical empirical ethics research 
Dialogical empirical ethics focuses, as the term ‘ethics’ indicates, on moral issues, moral reasoning 
and moral judgments. The primary focus is on the moral issues, moral reasoning and moral 
judgments of the stakeholders. Yet, dialogical empirical ethics is not merely ‘descriptive research’. It 
starts from normative choices about research questions and settings, and normative decisions about 
who counts as relevant stakeholders related to the research question. It further includes a normative 
analysis of, and conclusion on, moral issues of stakeholders (Molewijk & Widdershoven, 2012). In 
dialogical empirical ethics, the choice of the research question and the stakeholders, the normative 
analysis of the data and the normative conclusion, are derived in and with the practice under study. 
Within the process of analysis and drawing normative conclusions, other ‘external’ considerations can 
also play a role. For example, the researcher might bring in a certain viewpoint or concept that has 
not been considered thus far, or refer to a certain moral theory that might shed light on the moral 
issue at stake. Yet the relevance of such considerations should be acknowledged by participants, and 
they should be related to the practical experiences of those who take part in the dialogue (Landeweer 
et al, 2011). 
For the joint process of drawing conclusions in dialogical empirical ethics research, two criteria are 
important. In the first place, normative conclusions should be developed in a process of joint 
investigation. By exchanging perspectives, participants in dialogue develop new and shared views on 
what is morally right. In the second place, no stakeholder contribution involved in the process of 
drawing normative conclusions has a higher epistemological or moral status than any other. In the 
end, drawing normative conclusions is not about finding proof that shows that the products of the 
dialogue are right (that is, looking for a justification), but about moving towards better accounts and 
increasing our mutual understanding on what is morally appropriate in the specified circumstances 
(Frith, 2012; Hughes, 2001; Beauchamp, 2000). The process of drawing normative conclusions is not 
limited to discussing arguments and principles, but also consists of sharing and reflecting on practical 
experiences. Thus, normative conclusions are not abstract, but directly based on concrete and 
situated insights, which are open for joint investigation. 
 
The role of the researcher within dialogical empirical ethics research 
Within dialogical empirical ethics research, the researcher not only interprets the issues of 
stakeholders within a certain practice, but also acts as a facilitator of the interpretation and negotiation 
process between the stakeholders. The formulation of the research aims and setting, and the 
normative evaluation process are not directed by the researcher only but are organized in interaction 
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with participants in practice (Widdershoven et al, 2009a). The researcher has various roles, such as 
interpreter, educator, facilitator and Socratic guide. The role of interpreter indicates that the 
researcher has to focus on the meaning of issues and be sensitive to various perspectives on 
situations, findings and conclusions. The role of educator implies that the researcher should actively 
support the learning process and the creation of understanding by explicating various experiences to 
involved groups. The role of facilitator refers to the organisation of a dialogue among stakeholders 
and the creation of required conditions. In the role of Socratic guide, the evaluator will probe into 
taken for granted ideas, final truths and certainties, and bring in new meanings and perspectives 
(Schwandt, 2001; Abma et al, 2009a). 
Within dialogical empirical ethics research, the normativity of the researcher is acknowledged and 
explicitly taken into account. First, the researcher will have his- or her own normative motive. These 
are related to the conviction that dialogue is important for moral learning. Thus, the researcher acts 
from the presupposition that it is important to create room for experiences and to include all relevant 
stakeholders in the process of improving moral practice. Ideals of equality and democracy influence 
the way in which the researcher views the practice under consideration and responds to what 
happens. Thus, the researcher will be sensitive to and critical of differences of power or processes of 
exclusion, both with respect to persons and specific viewpoints. In principle, the researcher will be 
focused on the conditions and moral expectations in a given practice in order to foster openness and 
mutual learning. Second, the researcher might have normative considerations, ideas or opinions 
regarding the subject under study. The researcher will not start to present these immediately, but will 
explore them in response of what the stakeholders present and express. When doing so, the 
researcher does not present his or her views as superior, but questions existing rules and 
relationships and critically examines existing presuppositions. The researcher does not judge the 
practice under consideration as a final arbiter, but does give normative input by raising questions and 
inviting participants to reflect and deliberate in more equal and open ways.  
 
A example of dialogical empirical ethics: Improving the practice around seclusion by 
organising an exchange program for nurses at different psychiatric wards  
 
Background 
In 2006, a mental health institution in the Netherlands started a project aimed at reducing the amount 
of coercion and restraint of psychiatric patients. The central focus of the program was to improve 
contact and communication with the patient in the first phase of interactions. This initiative was called 
‘The first five minutes’, indicating the importance of adequate attention for the patient from the very 
beginning of each interaction (Voskes et al, 2013). The slogan that was used for this project was: ‘You 
never get a second chance to make a first impression.’  
As part of the project, professionals working at the three closed wards participating in this study were 
invited to develop and implement creative interventions to improve contact with patients on their 
wards. These so called ‘best practices’ focused on improving staff attitudes, working routines, and 
treatment procedures. The wards were invited to create new practices and strategies to prevent the 
use of coercion, with financial support of the management. 
The project was based on the assumption that wards would take over successful practices and 
strategies from each other. This, however, did not happen automatically. Moreover, the three closed 
wards of the mental health institution were not equally enthusiastic about the project. In order to 
facilitate the spread of successful interventions and foster enthusiasm about reducing coercion, 
researchers and management developed and organised an exchange program with psychiatric 
nurses between the three closed wards. The idea was to stimulate and inspire the nurses to morally 
reflect and learn from each other’s strategies. 
The exchange program aimed to foster insight into differences between wards and to stimulate a 
dialogue between nurses on how to understand, and subsequently morally improve, their practice, 
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and learn from each other. It aimed to enable the nurses to experience how other teams worked, to 
hear and experience what other nurses considered to be best practice regarding the prevention of the 
use of coercion, and to reflect on how these best practices might work within their own ward. The 
project was monitored and supported by researchers, who described how the exchange was 
experienced and which changes were realised. A core element in this project was that researchers 
organised and stimulated dialogue and reflection on best practice between the nurses, in order to 
foster (moral) learning concerning how to deal with complex moral issues involved in the prevention 
and use of seclusion. 
 
Organisation 
The exchange program took place in a period of two months. In the first month, two nurses of each 
ward changed working places and worked at another ward. In the second month, two other nurses 
assisted at another ward. In total 12 nurses participated in the exchange program. After two days of 
adjustment (i.e. learning time) the guest nurses who took part in the exchange program participated 
fully in the host team. They were selected based on willingness, and varied in working experience to 
stimulate diversity. They were asked to be open and look for differences in working routines and 
possible learning points for their own wards.  
 
Research method 
To monitor and facilitate the exchange program, a qualitative responsive research method was used 
(Abma et al, 2009a). This method aimed to foster quality improvements through reflections and 
dialogues between the participants of the program. Data collection existed in weekly logbooks (to be 
filled in by the 12 nurses), interviews and focus groups. The nurses who participated in the exchange 
program were asked to report weekly on their experiences and observations by writing in a logbook. 
Also interviews were conducted with the nurses before and during the exchange period. After each 
month a focus group meeting was organised with the nurses (n=6) to evaluate their experiences and 
discuss mutual insights. In the interviews we focused not only on differences between the wards, we 
also asked the nurses which practices and aspects they considered good and new to them.  
All interviews and focus groups were audio taped and entirely transcribed. Then four rounds of validity 
checks with all stakeholders followed. First, central interpretations were peer- debriefed and member 
checked among the researchers to foster credibility. Thereafter, these interpretations were validated 
with the respondents using summaries. Central topics that were found in the interviews were then 
discussed in focus groups. Next, the results were discussed with the project group members and 
team managers of the three participating wards. Finally, preliminary conclusions were presented at 
the wards to check for authentic representation of experiences. After a year, the team managers were 
consulted to get insight into long-term results of the exchange program.  
 
Results 
All participants considered the exchange program as profitable and inspiring, as it created new 
insights into why and how certain decisions were made and gave openings to improvements of 
practice. The nurses saw many differences between the wards and found their stay at the other wards  
useful: 
It created a new perspective regarding my own ward. When I got back I noticed more 
things that we do well and things we still can improve. (nurse) 
The differences experienced by the nurses concerned cultural aspects of the wards (i.e. dominant 
values and norms), procedures and working routines, and the structure (organisation) of the wards 
(Abma et al, 2009b). Although all wards a priori agreed on the importance of reducing coercion, 
normative views (for example concerning the importance of safety or being attentive towards patients) 
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differed. Procedures and routines were also different, for instance regarding the moment of 
intervention in case of tensions between patients and staff, the content of safety protocols and their 
use, or how quickly one should react to a patient’s request. At the level of structure, the wards 
showed differences in physical environment, facilities and level of comfort for patients.  
Differences in culture and structure influenced working procedures and routines at the wards and vice 
versa. This resulted in some interventions being more easily developed, implemented and secured on 
one ward than on another. For example, one of the wards in a more peripheral location had a team of 
nurses, closely working together with each other, the team manager and a psychiatrist. The 
psychiatrist trusted the nurses in making decisions. The responsibility for decisions regarding how and 
when to use coercion were shared between nurses and the psychiatrist. Yet, the close culture made 
them spend more time in the office than on the ward, compared to the other teams. Thus, it was 
difficult in this ward to implement interventions aimed at fostering interaction between staff and 
patients.  
In the focus group meeting, the differences between wards were discussed and analysed, resulting in 
moral learning. We will illustrate the process of moral learning and co-construction of new practices by 
elaborating on two examples. The examples are; (i) how to decide on the moment at which a patient 
is allowed to leave the seclusion room, and (ii) how to improve interaction between nurses and 
patients, by removing the separate office for nurses. Both examples show how the encounters in the 
exchange program, supported by analyses of the researchers, stimulated nurses to reconsider 
existing routines. The topics were jointly chosen by the researcher and project-management (i.e. the 
director and the project leader of the institution) to discuss in the focus groups. They related to the 
aims of the project to mutually analyse and stimulate processes of sharing best practice interventions 
between the wards. 
 
Deciding on allowing the patient to leave the seclusion room 
An important moral issue around seclusion concerns the decision to allow the patient to leave the 
seclusion room and return to the ward. This decision is precarious. Practitioners need to be sure there 
are no more risks involved for other persons. Yet, to determine safety is difficult and comes with 
uncertainties. During the exchange program, nurses became aware of differences between wards 
regarding decisions about allowing the patient to leave the seclusion room. In the focus group, the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different procedures were discussed.   
On the first ward, the staff evaluated every hour whether the patient could leave the seclusion room 
as part of a protocol. They tended to take more risks, which sometimes implied the patient had to be 
secluded again: 
We tend to take more risk in deciding to let the patient in the group again. At the other 
ward it seems to differ between the person [the psychiatrist on duty] who is authorised to 
make these decisions and that is an issue. They had some bad experiences, that is why 
they are more careful than we are. (nurse) 
On the second ward, taking medication was regarded as a precondition for allowing the patient to 
return to the group. The argument was that if things get seriously out of hand, it is justified to start 
involuntary medication and treatment: 
We consider it important to start with medication in the seclusion room (…) Otherwise the 
patient will end up back in the seclusion room again. That is how our psychiatrist thinks 
about it. (nurse) 
On the third ward, protocols were not strictly followed. Working experience and intuition were 
regarded as crucial elements in deciding about allowing the patient to leave the seclusion room. The 
nurses became aware of the risk of patients remaining longer in the seclusion room after several bad 
experiences: 
 94 
It has two sides. To follow your gut feeling is important, but it can also go wrong. Yet, if 
you don’t have a good feeling about it, you are to listen to that too. Protocols do help you 
back up your gut feelings. (nurse). 
The differences in approach between the wards made the nurses realise that routines and bad 
experiences may influence decisions and create arbitrariness; the time a patient stays in seclusion 
may depend on the ward to which he is admitted. While professionals on all three wards intended to 
use the seclusion room only when it was absolutely necessary, their decisions about when to stop 
seclusion were based on different choices.  The overall conclusion in the focus group was that each 
ward should develop explicit policies and procedures regarding the decision to allow a patient to leave 
the seclusion room. Applying these policies and procedures entails individual judgment, but gut 
feelings should not be the sole base for decisions; certainly not if the consequence would be that 
patients stay longer in the seclusion room. It was also concluded that protocols should be evaluated 
regularly together, to help prevent the negative influence of routines and bad experiences. Thus, 
becoming aware of other ways of working regarding the decision to end seclusion, broadened the 
nurses’ perspective and enabled them to develop new and shared ways of improving decision 
procedures.  
 
Working without a nurses’ office 
One of the wards had closed the office for nurses just before the exchange program, and established 
a counter desk at the ward. Although the nurses from the other two wards at first were sceptical about 
the idea not to have an office as a separate place to do administration and converse with colleagues, 
during the exchange they found that their worries were unwarranted. They experienced positive 
effects of working without a separate office: 
Working without an office was new for me, but soon I experienced it as positive. You can 
see much more and are able to anticipate much faster. You are able to prevent 
escalations much better (nurse) 
The counter desk had an impact on the daily work. It enabled the nurses to spend more time with the 
patients, but also made it necessary to explain to patients they cannot always be assisted 
immediately, since reports have to be written also: 
“ got used to working without an office quite soon, although I learned you have to be 
clear to patients when you need time to write your reports. A positive aspect is that you 
notice things sooner. (nurse) 
After the exchange, the nurses of the other two wards were enthusiastic about working with a counter 
desk. They advocated this intervention at their own wards. Both wards decided to follow in the 
footsteps of the ward that had closed the separate office. In a follow-up contact one of the team 
managers emphasised that the exchange program had helped to convince the staff of the advantages 
of closing the office: 
I see the exchange program as a powerful tool to create change. I had intended to close 
the office a while ago, but the nurses were against it. After the exchange program the 
participating nurses were very positive, and were able to convince the others of the 
advantages of closing the office. (team manager) 
In this example, new insights were developed through experience.  By experiencing other working 
routines, the nurses overcame prejudices regarding the use of a counter desk and were stimulated to 
consider advantages for their own wards.  
The normative aim of the exchange project was to create learning processes through experience and 
dialogue.  Regarding the issue of deciding when a patient would be allowed to leave the seclusion 
room, greater awareness of differences in approaches was created, which served as a start, and 
vehicle, for reconsidering routines and developing new protocols. Working with an open counter 
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instead of a separate office appeared inspiring, and resulted in changing the structure at the other 
wards.  
 
Discussion 
Dialogical empirical ethics research aims to broaden horizons, and support participants to develop a 
new perspective on which values are important and how to embed them in practice. Through making 
explicit experiences and fostering exchanges of perspectives in dialogue, participants are invited to 
see moral aspects of their work from a broader point of view, and to develop new and better ways of 
dealing with moral problems in practice. This process of moral development through fusion of 
horizons can be recognised in the exchange project discussed above. By experiencing different 
approaches to decision making about removing patients from seclusion, the nurses became aware of 
the need to combine practical knowledge and protocols, and to evaluate the decisions that are being 
made. This new view implied a change in all three the wards, and a development of a more generally 
shared approach to decisions about ending seclusion. By actually working in a ward without a nurses’ 
office, the nurses came to see the advantages of avoiding a structure that accentuates hierarchies, 
but does accentuate contact with the patients. In this case, the point of view of one of the wards was 
seen as valid, and consequently accepted and adopted, by the other two wards. Yet, this insight was 
not based on arguments in favour of closing down the nurses’ office, as these arguments were 
already known, and had not convinced the staff at the other two wards when propagated by the 
management. This example shows that a process of fusion of horizons is not primarily a matter of 
argumentation, but a practical learning process in which reflection on concrete working experiences is 
crucial.  
Conducting dialogical empirical ethics research is a rewarding activity as it increases both the insight 
of the researchers in moral issues and normative considerations in practice, and results in motivating 
research participants in practice to exchange views and come to new joint conclusions about what is 
morally right. Moreover, these two elements of dialogical empirical ethics are not distinct from one 
another. The researchers can only get insight into moral issues in practice by inviting participants to 
talk about their experiences and actually exchange experiences with each other. The insights, on the 
other hand, are fed back into practice through reports and proposals for the issues to be addressed in 
further dialogue meetings. While organising a process of making explicit experiences in practice and 
sharing them in dialogue, the researchers already change practice. They create conditions for 
openness and reflection, which result in new views and proposals for action. The researchers are 
actively involved in the learning process, as they arrange the invitation of stakeholders, make the 
agenda for the dialogue (based on their analysis of issues raised by practitioners in informal meetings 
and formal interviews), make suggestions for the interpretation of the results of deliberations, and 
assist in drawing conclusions for practice. The input of the researchers has a normative background, 
as it aims to create democratic conditions necessary for dialogue. It is also normative in that it entails 
a commitment with the issues at stake in morally improving practice. The researchers do not a priori 
formulate these issues, but they do take a stance towards what is morally important in practice. In the 
project described above, the researchers shared with the management the normative view that 
seclusion of patients should be prevented, and that further improvement in this area was needed, as 
the wards did not automatically implement positive interventions developed elsewhere.  
Dialogical empirical ethics implies a systematic investigation of experiences in practice and a 
structured procedure of organising reflection and dialogue between participants. As a scientific 
research method it shows similarities with action research (Reason & Bradbury, 2001), in that it aims 
to develop and improve practice in a cyclical iterative process. Like action research, it fosters insight 
into routines, culture and structure of a practice, and supports participants in practice to develop new 
ways of dealing with problems, by collecting data and organising feedback to participants in practice 
in a systematic way. In contrast to standard action research, dialogical empirical ethics explicitly 
focuses on moral aspects of a practice. Furthermore, dialogical empirical ethics research always tries 
to improve practice through dialogical research processes in which the actual improvement is 
determined during the research process.  This is done collaboratively with all the stakeholders; aiming 
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to develop rich moral descriptions and to foster moral reflection and joint moral learning, in order to 
create changes in practice, which are moral improvements.  
Dialogical empirical ethics research implies several challenges. The first is how to ensure that the 
right research questions are formulated and the right groups are involved in the research process. 
Given that research questions are based on normative assumptions, both the researchers and other 
parties in practice who are involved in the development of the research plan should reflect on the 
choice of the questions central to the research project, and be transparent about the assumptions. A 
presupposition of the nurse exchange project was that seclusion is morally problematic and should be 
reduced. A further presupposition was that processes of change, leading to improvement of practice,  
require insight into cultural and organisational differences between the wards. Based on these 
normative assumptions, the research question was to investigate whether and how an exchange of 
nurses between the wards could foster a dialogue on moral improvements without respondents 
feeling threatened or forced to change their practices. Nurses were invited to take part in the 
exchange programme, which was supported by the management. Thus, the nurses and the 
management of the wards were regarded as the main stakeholders in the project. In order to ensure 
that these two stakeholder groups had a shared vision of the research objective, the research 
question and its normative presuppositions were openly discussed with the nurses who opted for 
participation in the exchange programme. Other staff at the three wards was also informed and asked 
for consent. So, the normative aspects of the research aim, design and questions were shared 
between management, staff and researchers and agreed upon. Other potential stakeholders, such as 
patients and family, were not involved in this process, as they were considered to be only indirectly 
involved. This approach might be questioned, and one might for instance argue that patients should 
be involved, both in the formulation of the research question and in the further research activities. Our 
view is that such decisions cannot be solved beforehand, but should be transparent and open for 
discussion and revision.  
Another challenge is how to be normative and how to draw normative conclusions. As mentioned 
above, we consider the researchers in dialogical empirical research as normative agents who take 
part in the learning process. The normativity of the research is reflected in the normative aim of the 
research: moral improvements in the practice of coercion. Based on that aim, the research design and 
instruments are chosen. Two other normative elements are important: being transparent about the 
normative aim and assumptions of the research(ers) (i.e. no hidden agenda or manipulation of the 
stakeholders) and fostering a mutual process of moral learning for both researchers and research 
participants (i.e. not a one-way learning process). Finally, openness regarding the normative results 
or conclusions of the research process is also a basic normative element of dialogical empirical 
research. Even though the research starts with a normative aim and research question, researchers 
and research participants are asked to have an open mind regarding the final normative answers.  
A third challenge in dialogical empirical ethics research is how to validate the results. One of the aims 
of dialogical empirical ethics is to increase mutual understanding on what is morally appropriate in 
certain circumstances. The question then is how to ascertain that mutual understanding is improved, 
and how to be sure that this also results in a morally better practice. In the exchange program, a 
growth of awareness about routines could be established, as well as the intention to change practice, 
by developing new ways of dealing with protocols and by closing down separate nurses’ offices. Yet, 
the question remains whether these changes actually reflect moral improvements. Opponents of 
dialogical empirical ethics might argue that fostering mutual understanding might in fact strengthen 
and justify certain practices that are morally wrong. This might, for instance, result in justification of 
procedures that imply that patients stay longer in the seclusion room. Such criticism presupposes an 
external normative framework through which we can determine whether a certain conclusion is 
morally right or wrong. Within dialogical empirical ethics research, the existence of an external 
framework or final arbiter is not assumed. Yet, the researcher will be aware of possible criticisms and 
incorporate these into the moral inquiry with the stakeholders. Furthermore, the question ‘How do you 
know that this conclusion is morally right’, is addressed within the research itself, again together with 
the stakeholders. Dialogical empirical ethics aims to foster critical investigation of possible 
conclusions by organising interaction between various perspectives (Landeweer et al, 2011). In the 
research project presented above, we arranged critical reflection processes from various perspectives 
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by involving various stakeholders. Nevertheless, it is a challenge to create circumstances in which 
participants feel safe to critically reflect on their own ideas for improvements and bring them into the 
dialogue. Researchers have to be sensitive to the culture and routines of the practice, and find 
methods to create openness for constructive disagreement and critical change. The researchers’ role 
is not to establish which values and norms should guide practice, but they will inevitably have a view 
on both existing rules and new ones proposed by participants during the research process. In case 
they continue to have doubts, even after inviting other stakeholders and perspectives, the 
researchers’ interventions consist in addressing problematic issues and raising critical questions. This 
criticism is positioned within the same framework and practice of the research, which is an on-going 
dialogue with the stakeholders (i.e. we do not position the criticism after or outside the framework of 
the research). In the context of dialogical empirical ethics research, these actions can be regarded not 
as final normative judgements about practice, but as contributions to the process of searching for new 
and better ways of dealing with normative issues in practice. In the end, the aim of dialogical empirical 
research is not drawing a final normative judgement about the practice in the research report or the 
research papers, but creating a process of mutual moral learning in and with practice in order to 
improve the quality of care in a concrete health care setting.  
A final challenge for dialogical ethics research projects is to sustain the results that are obtained. 
Stimulating and facilitating dialogue between stakeholders not only aims to develop new insights, but 
also to create a breeding ground in practice for continuation of openness and reflection regarding 
moral subjects. For this, further commitment of practitioners and management is necessary. 
Implementing results of dialogical empirical ethics research requires both bottom-up engagement of 
professionals in practice, and top down support of middle and top management. Next to fostering 
insights, arguments and moral judgments, the researchers and stakeholders focus on how to 
implement these through new or adjusted work processes and structures. This process of 
implementation may be facilitated by organising follow-up research in order to monitor whether, and 
how, the lessons learned are implemented. 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter we presented a specific approach to empirical ethics: dialogical empirical ethics 
research. The aim of this type of empirical ethics is to include participants in practice in a process of 
reflection and dialogue on moral issues, resulting in joint moral learning and improvement of practice. 
We have elaborated on the theoretical background and the normative assumptions of dialogical 
empirical ethics, and described how it works in practice. We presented an example of a research 
project involving the exchange of nurses between three psychiatric wards, which aimed at creating 
learning processes regarding coercion, and fostering new ways of working which can help to reduce 
coercion. We also discussed some of the challenges involved in the practice of dialogical empirical 
ethics.  
Dialogical empirical ethics research aims to create a systematic process of exchange of, and 
between, stakeholder perspectives; making participants aware of the presuppositions in their 
approach and fostering openness to other ways of working. The role of the researchers is to create 
conditions for reflection and exchange, and to stimulate such processes by asking questions, 
providing suggestions for interpreting differences, and inviting participants to draw normative 
conclusions that may lead to new actions and experiments. By making explicit moral considerations in 
practice, and inviting practitioners to reflect and exchange views, dialogical empirical ethics research 
may contribute to moral development in practice; not by providing moral arguments and drawing 
theoretically sound conclusions, but by supporting participants in clarifying moral experiences, and 
achieving joint insight into what matters in the situation. By gathering experience based data and 
organising systematic steps of reflection and dialogue, dialogical empirical ethics research can 
contribute to moral improvements in practice, and foster change at the level of routine, culture and 
structure. 
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Reflective equilibrium as a normative empirical model: 
The case of Ashley X  
 
Ghislaine JMW van Thiel 
Johannes JM van Delden 
  
 
Ashley is a girl with profound developmental disabilities. At the age of six, she could not sit up, 
ambulate or use language. Ashley responds to others by vocalising and smiling. Improvement in her 
cognitive or neurological abilities is unexpected. In 2006, Ashley’s physicians reported that they had 
medically treated her to arrest her growth and physical development (Gunther & Diekema, 2006). The 
treatment included hormone therapy for growth attenuation as well as surgical removal of early breast 
buds and Ashley’s uterus. Ashley is now forever child-sized and according to her parents, her life is 
as good as it can be: she is their ‘pillow angel’ (Pillow Angel, 2014).  Ashley’s story went viral on the 
internet.  The reactions varied enormously:  some expressed the wish to make the treatment available 
to others (Allen et al, 2009), some found it ethically dubious (Isaacs et al, 2011), and another view 
was that Ashley was ‘butchered’ to meet her parents’ needs (MSNBC, 2007). Since The Guardian 
reported in March 2012 that at least 12 other children were undergoing the ‘Ashley Treatment’, and 
disability rights advocates believe that thousands of families are considering it, the justification of 
growth attenuation treatment for this group of children has gained renewed attention (The Guardian, 
2014).   
Cases like Ashley’s require ethical analysis and well-founded decisions on the acceptability of the 
treatment. There are, however, several methodologies that can be employed to arrive at such a 
decision. The question of which methodology is the most appropriate is at the heart of a long-standing 
debate (Anon, 2007; Ives & Draper; 2009).  In this chapter, we outline a method for moral reasoning 
that starts from John Rawls’s Reflective Equilibrium. We called it Normative Empirical Reflective 
Equilibrium (NE-RE). After the outline, we elaborate on some important criticisms of Reflective 
Equilibrium and their meaning for NE-RE. Subsequently, we analyse Ashley’s case, aiming to 
demonstrate how NE-RE can be used to arrive at a justified view on the ethical acceptability of real 
life ethical dilemmas.  
 
Normative empirical reflective equilibrium (ne-re)65  
Reflective Equilibrium was developed by John Rawls for the theoretical purpose of formulating the 
most appropriate conception of justice (Rawls, 1971). This ideal method of justification has later been 
distinguished from non-ideal models that aim at developing modest theories (Willigenburg, 1991) or 
can guide decision making in practical contexts (Arras, 2007). The term RE refers to a point in moral 
reasoning at which a (preferably broad) set of beliefs relevant to a moral case, form a coherent whole. 
In addition, RE is the description of a process of moral reasoning, aimed at justification of a moral 
view. Initially, two types of beliefs were taken up in RE: considered moral judgements and moral 
principles. Several authors have suggested amendments to the model, replacing some elements or 
introducing new ones (Daniels, 1979; Willigenburg, 1991). Currently, the beliefs that are potentially 
relevant to RE can be categorized in four groups:  
(i) considered moral judgements or moral intuitions;  
(ii) morally relevant facts;  
(iii) moral principles;  
(iv) background theories or ideals.  
The best combination of elements depends on the purpose for which RE is employed.  
                                                     
65 See also Theil & Delden (2010) 
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NE-RE is an amended version of Reflective Equilibrium (RE).  It comprises moral intuitions, moral 
principles, morally relevant facts and background theories. In addition, it has two distinct features:  
1) Moral intuitions of relevant agents other than the Thinker are taken up.  
Jmhv In most methods based on RE, the considered moral judgements or moral intuitions 
incorporated are the ones that come to the mind of the person performing the reasoning (we call him 
or her the Thinker). In some cases the Thinker is advised to broaden his scope by actively seeking 
‘formative experiences’ (DePaul, 1993) or to explore anything that may be relevant through a process 
of open inquiry (Ives, 2014). Our proposal in NE-RE is to broaden the set of relevant beliefs by 
investigating the moral intuitions of persons other than the Thinker (Delden & Theil, 1998). 
2) Empirical research is used to obtain data on moral intuitions or morally relevant facts. 
This research can be valuable in obtaining unexpected insights and descriptions of the experience 
and interpretation from different perspectives or angles.  
RE has both been welcomed and fiercely criticized. Two criticisms seem very important, and also 
pertinent to NE-RE: the role of intuitions and the nature of coherence. 
 
Intuitions in NE-RE: moral wisdom in the balance 
The confrontation with a moral case generally invokes spontaneous moral judgements that give the 
holder a preliminary sense of the direction in which a judgement about the case should go, elicited 
without awareness of underlying mental processes (Musschanga, 2008; Haidt, 2001).  This 
preliminary judgement is what we refer to when we speak of ‘moral intuitions’. These intuitions can be 
both pre-reflective and post-reflective. Pre-reflective interpretation occurs when a person is confronted 
with a moral situation he is unfamiliar with. In other cases the interpretation of a person is based on 
structuring of facts in previous cases and in this way influenced by experienced perception. This is 
called post-reflective interpretation (Haidt, 2001). Moral intuitions are relevant to ethical judgement,  
first, because they are usually the starting point of deliberation. Second, when a person comes to hold 
a moral intuition, he will generally feel the urge to look closer at the case and seek alternative 
interpretations of the circumstances (Willegenburg, 1991). Finally, moral intuitions connect ethical 
reflection to our everyday moral experiences.  
A major objection against incorporating intuitions into moral reasoning is that it poses the risk of 
constructing a moral theory which, in fact, is nothing more than a systematisation of a person’s 
subjective and biased judgements (Daniels, 1979; Strong, 2010). More specifically, the criticism 
entails the following:  if justification of the result of an RE process is based on coherence of a set of 
beliefs, each of these beliefs has to be reliable enough to guide the process of reasoning. Moral 
intuitions, it is argued, are subjective and can be erroneous. Therefore, they lack the credibility that is 
necessary to add to the justification of judgements in a coherentist model of moral reasoning like RE. 
To defeat the no-credibility objection, some authors suggest stringent selection of initial judgements at 
the start of reasoning, in order to prevent the ‘bad’ ones from entering the reasoning process 
(Swanton, 1991; Neilson, 1982; Singer, 2005). For example, Beauchamp and Childress (2013) argue 
for the use of the common morality as a reliable source of moral intuitions that can be allowed into the 
reasoning process.  
In NE-RE, we propose a different approach to correct for the problem of subjectivism and 
conservatism in RE. We follow DePaul in his claim that a justifiable outcome of moral deliberation in 
RE is not dependent on the general credence levels of the elements at the start of the reasoning 
process (DePaul, 1993; Theil & Delden, 2009). The justificatory power of a moral view resulting from 
NE-RE depends largely on the quality of the reasoning process. Therefore, the focus in NE-RE is on 
the strength of the arguments put forward in the process of reasoning towards coherence. In addition, 
we propose to broaden the set of relevant intuitions, using empirical research, to include the moral 
intuitions of persons other than the thinker (Theil & Delden, 2009).  Since it is likely that the moral 
judgements of people, who work and live in a certain practice, are usually at an intuitive level, it is 
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through these intuitions that moral theorising can gain access to a moral experience that generally 
cannot be found among people outside the health care practice. In our analysis of Ashley’s case we 
obtained unexpected insights, descriptions of experience, and interpretation from different 
perspectives or angles in an empirical study. The value of such an ‘encounter with experience’ has 
been described by others as well (Ives et al, 2008). 
 
Measuring coherence and knowing when you have enough 
The coherence among beliefs is essential for justification of a moral view attained through NE-RE. 
This, however, poses two challenges for NE-RE. First, the nature of coherence, and the way people 
should evaluate their beliefs with respect to coherence, is poorly described (Beauchamp & Childress, 
2013; DeGrazia, 2003; Rauprich, 2008).  In NE-RE we propose to use the notion of inference 
relations to analyse different types of coherence in a given set of beliefs. We look closer at the type of 
coherence that is present (or absent) among beliefs. In working towards coherence among beliefs 
regarding Ashley’s treatment, we outline the practical use of these ideas on measuring coherence. 
Second, in is unclear how much coherence is necessary to decide that the point of reflective 
equilibrium is reached (Patersson, 1998). Mere absence of contradiction is unlikely to be sufficient for 
a set of beliefs to qualify as a reflective equilibrium. Hence, minimal coherence should not be pursued 
at the cost of a comprehensive result. Connectedness among beliefs is essential to arrive at a 
convincing RE (Sayre-McCord, 1996).  These considerations give some guidance, but clearly do not 
answer the question of how much coherence is enough. For NE_RE, we explored the idea of 
Coherentism with different levels of justificatory power (van Theil, 2009).  This is based on the claim 
that the degree of justification of a single belief can vary due to factors other than coherence – 
understood as the inference relations between that belief and the other beliefs in the set. For 
example, some beliefs may have a distinguished initial status, and this can confer a certain weight on 
a belief. Durability is an example of a weighing-factor: we are likely to have more confidence in 
judgements that are confirmed in a history of cases.  Assessment of the relative weight of elements in 
a RE can help to evaluate the justificatory power of the view achieved through NE-RE. 
   
Hands on: NE-RE in the case of Ashley X 
Usually, reasoning in (NE-)RE starts with a number of considered moral judgements or moral 
intuitions.  In the Ashley case, we started to work towards RE with a search for intuitions of other 
people to enrich our set of initial moral beliefs.  
 
Qualitative empirical research: methods and results 
We chose Internet Message Boards that were opened for discussion shortly after the Ashley 
Treatment was made public. On 18 January 2007 – 3 months after publication – we entered the query 
‘discussion on growth attenuation Ashley’ into Google. It returned 40.600 hits. We chose three 
message boards as a source of data. First, we picked the one with the largest number of postings: 
MSNBC Message Board (2008) Kids and Parenting: All in the family (2334 messages). Secondly, we 
chose Have your Say (BBC, 2008).  The 497 messages on this board were from people who reported 
to come from one of over 30 countries. Finally, we selected the message board of Ouch! (2014), a 
website that aims to reflect the lives of disabled people.   
We extracted 438 pieces of text from a total of 3004 postings. Three criteria guided the selection: (1) 
the text comprised an interpretation of the case, (2) the writer expressed a judgement in terms of 
right, wrong, acceptable, praiseworthy etc. and (3) the text was not a lengthy and well-thought out 
discussion of the case.  By applying these criteria we expected to extract moral intuitions from the 
contributions. Subsequently, we assigned one or more labels to each piece of text. After labelling 339 
text pieces, we decided the point of saturation was reached because we had not added new labels for 
a while and it seemed unlikely new labels would be added. The results are shown in Table 1. 
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Confront empirically found intuitions with moral principles 
The qualitative research provided us with a set of initial moral beliefs (Table 1). The next step in RE is 
to confront moral intuitions with moral principles. In theory, these can be new principles, but it is likely 
that a thinker will come up with at least some of our commonsensical moral principles (i.e. keep 
promises, respect autonomous choices) (Arras, 2007). The confrontation entails a reflective process, 
in which intuitions and principles are considered together. In this process, principles can be 
abandoned, revised or restated and intuitions can lose or gain credibility based on their coherence 
with the principles.  In the Ashley case, we considered the principles of (respect for) autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and (respect for) human dignity and confronted them with the moral 
intuitions.   
 
Autonomy 
Many commentators on the internet hold intuitions that refer to the question: who has the right to 
decide about Ashley? We came across moral intuitions that emphasise the right of the surrogates with 
respect to decision making (for example, table 1:P6,P7). Others wrote that the parents are 
responsible for the care and they have demonstrated that they live up to what society expects from 
loving parents (P8).  The principle of respect for patient autonomy demands that we refrain from 
interfering with an autonomous person’s right to live his life according to personal values and beliefs. 
Ashley is not competent to give valid consent regarding the treatment planned for her. It is beyond 
question that the parents are the legal representatives of their daughter. The fact that they are 
Ashley’s loving caregivers adds significance to their preferences.  
On the other hand, the parent’s rights are limited by their duty to protect Ashley’s interests (C8).  
Some commentators point at the responsibility of society as a whole to defend the vulnerable if their 
representatives fail to do so (C16). This raises the question of according to which standard(s) the 
parents should make their decision. 
Substituted judgement is usually a guiding principle in these cases, and it would mean that Ashley’s 
parents should choose the course of action that Ashley herself would have chosen if she was 
competent (C14). However, substituted decision making in this case is hampered because the 
decision makers do not have a single lead regarding the choices Ashley, or more generally people in 
her position, would make (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013). In the absence of reliable traces of a 
person’s wishes, surrogate decision makers should decide in accordance with the best interest 
standard. This calls for an evaluation of the burdens and benefits of the treatment.    
 
PRO: Moral intuitions positive about the Ashley treatment 
P1 The treatment is ethical because the parents acted with the intention to help, not to harm.  
P2 The burden on Ashley’s parents should be lifted as much as possible. This justifies the 
treatment. 
P3 This is an ethical way of balancing the needs of the different parties in the family 
P4 The treatment is right. It adds to Ashley’s quality of life because she will be better cared for.   
P5  This is in Ashley’s best interest because people will respond to her better when she is a 
child. 
P6 The parents have the right to choose medical treatment for their daughter. 
P7 If society does not assist the parents in caring for Ashley, they should be free to take the 
measures necessary to care for her. 
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P8 The parents show to be responsible parents by taking care of her. This should be rewarded 
P9 Parents and doctors are in the best position to decide what is good for Ashley 
P10 Nothing meaningful is taken away from Ashley by this treatment. 
P11 The treatment is right because it avoids harm (menstruation, bed sores, sexual abuse, etc) 
P12  This is acceptable because the alternative for treatment – Ashley being cared for outside 
the home – is worse. 
P13 Corrective surgery is elected by many people and thus not unethical in this case 
P14 The doctors and parents proceeded carefully and are backed by an ethics committee. This 
is enough for justification 
P15 Medical treatment is used for the good of people – that’s what happened here 
 
CONTRA: Moral intuitions negative about the Ashley treatment 
C1 This is wrong because the motivation of the parents is selfish convenience.  
C2 There were no convincing medical grounds for the surgeries, this makes them therefore 
unethical. 
C3 The treatment is disrespectful and a violation of Ashley’s rights as a person.  
C4 The treatment denies Ashley valuable experiences that come with adulthood. 
C5 This sets a precedent to perform medically unnecessary treatment to other non-consenting 
persons 
C6 This is wrong because it is unnatural 
C7 We cannot rule out that Ashley might develop different than expected. Irreversible 
treatment is thus wrong. The family and doctors have now chosen her development. 
C8 Some decisions are not at our freedom to make. No matter the reasons we have. 
C9 The parents should either take on the responsibility to care for Ashley or let others do it. 
C10 The treatment is based on the paternalistic and false assumption that disabled people will 
benefit from imitation of ‘normality’. 
C11 This is an example of going way too far to keep disabled people alive. She should be left to 
die. 
C12 The treatment is unethical because there are less invasive options 
C13 Ashley should not be altered to meet the needs of society or her carers. Society and the 
carers need to change to meet the needs of people 
C14 No one would choose this treatment for herself, and that is reason enough not to put 
Ashley through it. 
C15 This is mutilation! 
C16 Society should defend the vulnerable 
C17 This is a waste of resources 
C18 They are experimenting on this girl just to stir the debate 
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Table 1: Moral intuitions regarding The Ashley Treatment 
 
Beneficence 
We came across the moral intuition that the intention of the parents and physicians is decisive for a 
positive evaluation of the Ashley Treatment (P1). Since the key question in this case is whether the 
parents made a wrong decision in spite of their good intentions, we decided to set aside this intuition. 
Many commentators in favour of the Ashley treatment frame it as a good thing for Ashley, because it 
promotes her well-being (P4,P5). The principle of beneficence refers to a moral obligation to help 
others further their important and legitimate interests (Beauchamp & Childress, 2013). Growing into 
adulthood is said to be one of the major obstacles to family care for Ashley. This claim is added to the 
belief that all children, regardless of the presence of a disability, belong in families (Gunther & 
Diekema, 2006). Considering the amount of care Ashley needs, it seems plausible that she will benefit 
if the burdens of care are lifted as much as possible (P2). Moreover, the parents may be able to care 
for Ashley at home for a longer period of time when she remains of ‘manageable size’ – as her 
doctors put it.  The treatment may prevent harms like bedsores and spasms (P11). This benefit could 
remain even if Ashley would be cared for in a different setting.  
  
Non-maleficence 
The principle of non-maleficence draws attention to two questions, namely: 
(1) Are the risks and burdens involved in the treatment proportionate in the light of expected 
benefits?  
(2) Is the least harmful option chosen to achieve the benefits 
It seems realistic to assume that the necessary caring activities will be performed more easily, better 
or more often when Ashley’s body remains small. Considering Ashley’s mental capacities, it is 
unknown, but unlikely, that she will have negative experiences related to her abnormal physical 
development.  The surgical part of the Ashley treatment serves additional purposes.  These were 
justified partly by arguing for the need to “reduce the long-term complications of puberty in general 
and treatment adverse effects in particular” (Gunther & Diekema, 2006:1014). Regarding breast-
development, the parents stated that Ashley might suffer from discomfort and that large breasts could 
‘sexualize’ her and make her more vulnerable to abuse by (future) caregivers from outside the home. 
On an intuitive level, we may believe that Ashley is not harmed if she remains small and child-like 
(P10). On the other hand, we hold the moral intuition that there is something morally meaningful to the 
fact that the manipulation of Ashley’s physical appearance seems to have gone beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the benefits for her care. For further exploration of this intuition, we turn to the 
principle of respect for human dignity. 
 
Respect for human dignity 
To grasp the meaning of dignity in the light of our moral intuitions regarding the treatment of Ashley, 
we point at two notions of dignity – unconditional dignity and dignity as moral stature (Graf, 2009; 
Nordenfelt, 2004).  Unconditional dignity is embedded in the nature of all human beings, regardless of 
their achievements or the condition they are in. Unconditional dignity can be violated, for example 
when a human is being treated as non-human, like an animal or a thing. In Ashley’s case the intuition 
was articulated that the treatment is disrespectful and a violation of Ashley’s rights as a person (C3). 
The treatment is considered ‘unnatural’ and ‘experimenting’, or as an unacceptable way of ‘taking 
care’ (C6, C18, C9).   The second notion, of dignity as moral stature, is applicable to the caregiver’s 
position. Van der Graaf calls this type of dignity ‘relational’: it can be gained by performing well in 
relation to others. Ashley cannot protect herself against violations of dignity and this bestows upon her 
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caregivers a more than average responsibility to uphold a certain moral standard.  In this case, it 
could be argued that altering Ashley’s body and preventing her ‘natural development’ is something 
that dignified caregivers would not opt for (C7). Some commentators hold the view that the parents 
must have been driven by selfish convenience, which is also contrary to dignified parenting (C1).  The 
idea that the treatment may be a violation of dignity is fuelled by the fact that the parents seem to be 
doing more than just facilitating optimal care for the benefit of their child.  The desire to ‘desexualize’ 
Ashley affirms especially the presumption that the parent’s aspirations reached further than facilitating 
home-based care. Regarding the justification of these aspirations, there is no evidence that having 
the physical appearance of a child is beneficial to Ashley. It is possible that people in general respond 
better to mentally handicapped children than to adults with the same disability. But will Ashley actually 
experience the difference? If not, changing her appearance serves to make people other than Ashley 
more comfortable. Medical treatment of a non-consenting person to meet our own needs is a violation 
of unconditional dignity. It is also an infringement on the moral stature of her parents and doctors as 
dignified caregivers.   
At the start of our reasoning we found a variety of intuitions and principles. We confronted these with 
each other and tried to adjust and interpret them with the aim to fit them into a comprehensive and 
coherent view on the case.   
 
Second round of reasoning: background theories and moral ideals 
After confronting intuitions with principles, and vice versa, we introduce background theories and 
moral ideals in a second round of reasoning. The purpose of involving background theories is to 
reduce the risk of subjectivism through evaluation of the acceptability of moral intuitions and principles 
from an independent source (St John, 2007). This is termed the ‘independence constraint’. Currently, 
more specific guidance on criteria for selection that allow the Thinker to defend his choice of 
background theories against critics is lacking. To choose relevant background theories in the Ashley 
case, we considered the fact that our confrontation of intuitions and principles resulted in the 
preliminary view that the growth attenuation is ethically defensible but the surgical treatments are not. 
The difference in ethical evaluation is based on the assumption that the arguments legitimate a 
medical intervention that influences Ashley’s growth. However, the argument for surgical treatment to 
prevent menstruation and breast-development is, in our view, not sufficiently justified. The relevant 
question here is whether or not, in Ashley’s case, it was appropriate to look for options from the realm 
of medicine to relieve care. In other words: was a medical intervention indicated or were non-medical 
– emotional or social – problems or solutions decisive in this case? These questions touch upon more 
general theories about the goals of medicine. Therefore, to critically evaluate our preliminary view on 
the Ashley treatment, we chose to bring general views on health, disease and the role of medicine 
into the reasoning process. 
   
Was Ashley medically treated for a disease? 
Some authors suggest that the goals of medicine are multidimensional and include promoting quality 
of life and increasing the length of life (Brulde, 2001). However, health is still taken to be the central 
goal in medicine (Nordenfelt, 2007).  If the goal of medicine is health, then the concepts of health and 
disease mark off legitimate medical practices from illegitimate variants. This demarcation is exactly 
what we need in our normative discussion on the Ashley treatment.  Generally speaking, there are 
two competing theories of health. The first one is Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory of Health. A person is 
healthy if all his organs make at least their statistically normal contribution to his survival or to the 
survival of the species to which he belongs. A diseased person has a dysfunction that can be 
detected by medical methods. Second is the Holistic Theory of Health. A person is healthy if he has 
the ability to reach vital goals for minimal happiness. These goals, are on the one hand, influenced by 
historical developments and, on the other hand, individually relative (Khushf, 2007).  The biostatistical 
theory of health leads us to recognise the fact that, regardless of possible benefits, it is disturbing that 
the healthy functions of Ashley – such as her bodily growth and development – were not protected or 
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restored, but are now abnormal due to medical intervention. The holistic concept of health leads us 
towards accepting that patients are allowed to bring values other than physical functioning into the 
medical arena. This view fits our preliminary conclusion, that the growth attenuation is likely to help 
achieve a legitimate goal. The parental worries about menstruation and sexual abuse may have been 
inspired by fear of Ashley becoming an adult or by the fact that the parents realise that someone in 
Ashley’s condition is extremely vulnerable. In arguing for the necessity of these interventions, parents 
and physicians seem to move away from what we can reasonably assume is valuable to Ashley. And 
by doing this they leave the realm of legitimate medical practice. 
 
Towards reflective equilibrium: examining the level of coherence 
The final step in the practical application of NE-RE is thorough analysis of all connections in the set of 
beliefs we identified in the Ashley case to assess the justificatory power of the set of beliefs now 
considered to be in equilibrium. In this chapter, we limit our assessment to a rather quick-and-dirty 
inspection of inference relations between the beliefs, to give the reader a sense of how a Thinker can 
proceed. 
 
Strong positive inference relations 
We can roughly distinguish three strong positive connections that determine the moral view we 
endorse after analysis of the Ashley treatment through NE-RE: 
(i) Growth attenuation and good care (beneficence) 
We found positive inference relations between the growth attenuation and the aim of providing Ashley 
with the best care. Thus, there is coherence between the action of growth attenuation and the goal of 
good care.   
(ii) Growth attenuation and the obligation to choose the least invasive option to achieve good care.  
The principle of doing no harm requires that the least invasive option is chosen to achieve the goal of 
caring for Ashley. Growth attenuation can be seen as no more invasive than other measures to 
sustain good care, such as hoists and institution-based care. This judgement positively connects with 
the principle, and in doing so constitutes coherence among these beliefs. 
(iii) Growth attenuation and the goal of promoting well-being  
We compared the reasons for growth attenuation in the Ashley case with accepted indications for this 
treatment. An argument in favour of the Ashley treatment is based on the analogy between Ashley 
and tall adolescent girls who wish to minimize any further gain in height for social or cosmetic 
reasons.   
 
Weak positive inference relations 
Besides the strong connections, we see several positive relations that add to the overall coherence, 
but are less convincing on their own.  
(i) Surgical treatment and the obligation to choose the least invasive intervention for prevention of 
complications of puberty 
The connection between the surgical treatment and this obligation is much weaker, for two reasons. 
First, the complications of puberty remain vague and second, less invasive options seem available.   
(ii) The Ashley treatment and the goal of medicine to promote vital goals for Ashley’s happiness  
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We analysed different views on the goals of medicine in working towards wide reflective equilibrium. 
According to a holistic view, we can identify a positive connection between this treatment and the 
value of providing loving care for Ashley.  
 
Negative inference relations 
Considering our set of beliefs, we see at least three negative connections. 
(i) Surgical treatment and the prevention of harm (as in sexual abuse)  
The surgical treatment was defended by Ashley’s parents by referring to the risk of sexual abuse. 
However, there is no evidence that the surgical treatment will prevent the harm. Thus, this connection 
is not producing coherence. 
(ii) The Ashley treatment and the goal of medicine to protect and restore health  
The central goal in medicine is health. There is a negative connection between this goal of medicine 
and the Ashley Treatment, due to the fact that Ashley’s healthy functions were hampered. Our 
negative judgment about the surgical treatment coheres with the principle of non-maleficence. 
(iii) Respect for human dignity and the Ashley treatment  
The Ashley treatment goes beyond influencing Ashley’s body-size towards manipulation of her whole 
appearance. It is questionable if this is beneficial to Ashley. This is weakens coherence between the 
principle of respect for human dignity and a positive judgement about the Ashley treatment. 
 
 Discussion: ethical analysis of the Ashley case through ne-re 
The model of NE-RE allows us to combine empirical and normative elements in ethical decision 
making. Our inventory of arguments for and against the Ashley Treatment may raise the question of 
whether this empirical work adds significantly to the set of beliefs/intuitions that were considered. Can 
an individual Thinker come up with these beliefs without the investigation? This is an empirical 
question, which is difficult to answer without experiment. However, in the academic debate, the moral 
significance of the distinction between the growth-attenuation part of the treatment and the surgical 
part surfaced, but was not explored further (Stein, 2010). In addition, those in favour of the treatment, 
decided not to focus on the surgical part without much argument (Allen et al, 2009; Diekema & Fost, 
2010; Wilfond et al, 2010). These arguments may not have been dismissed so easily when the moral 
intuitions pointing at a relevant distinction were assigned equal prima facie status as other relevant 
beliefs. 
Another issue is the choice of the background theories. We chose to analyse the moral intuitions and 
principles from the perspective of a theory of health and medicine. However, it may be argued that a 
theory of social responsibility or personhood should have been explored instead.  For example Brosco 
(2006) and Feder Kittay (2011) refer to the social model of disability and a care ethic respectively, and 
convincingly show the relevance of this perspective for the moral evaluation of the Ashley Treatment. 
RE (and NE-RE) does not provide guidance in the choice of elements. A different result may be 
produced by another Thinker, and this has been recognised as a weakness of (NE-)RE (Knight, 2006; 
Strong, 2010).  
Our use of NE-RE for normative analysis of the Ashley Treatment may serve as an example of the 
application of RE, which can be used by others when considering  different moral issue. The example 
may also stimulate further critical discussion of NE-RE, which can be the starting point of 
improvement of the model itself.  
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Theory and Practice of Democratic Deliberation in 
Bioethics Research*  
 
Scott Kim 
 
*Parts of this chapter have been adapted from:  Kim S. et al. (2009). "Assessing the public's views in 
research ethics controversies: deliberative democracy and bioethics as natural allies." Journal of 
Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics 4(4): 3-16. 
 
Should we allow family members to make research participation decisions for their incapacitated 
loved ones when the research involves invasive procedures? (Kim 2011)  How should we determine 
what are ‘essential health benefits’ for insurance plans? (Institute of Medicine, 2011)   How should we 
balance the promise of emerging technologies—such as synthetic biology—with the risks of malicious 
use or unintended consequences?  Like most policy issues, such questions cannot be answered 
solely by arm-chair reasoning.  Yet given the ethical nature of the problems, one might hope for more 
than the usual special interest politics to settle the matter.  Such policy debates should at least be 
informed by the moral views of the public.  But eliciting informed and well-considered moral opinions 
of the lay public can be challenging.  The issues may not be widely familiar and they may involve 
complex scientific, legal, historical, and ethical dimensions.  Traditional surveys risk eliciting 
superficial and uninformed opinions that may be of dubious quality.   
This chapter describes how the theory and practice of deliberative democracy (DD) is especially 
useful in such situations.  The first section provides a theoretical rationale for why DD is especially 
suited to inform bioethics policy questions, with a brief overview of how DD is being used in bioethics.  
The second section is a practical, detailed guide to conducting DD research in bioethics.  There are 
many varieties of DD methods, and it is impossible to describe them all.  Thus, a detailed case study 
is presented to illustrate the broad principles of DD; this will provide the reader with a sense of how to 
adapt such methods to her own specific needs.  The final section discusses some potential pitfalls of 
deliberations and how they can be avoided. 
 
Bioethics and Democratic Deliberation as Natural Allies 
Democratic Deliberation: The Rationale 
How policies in fact are made is a large and complex topic (Kingdon 2002) and this is reflected in the 
fact that DD has been used to inform policy in various ways.  Some DD studies are initiated and 
implemented by government agencies.  For example, between 2001 and 2005, the Minister of 
Planning and Infrastructure in Western Australia used DD methods to directly inform policy-making 
through almost 40 deliberative engagements with the public (Gregory et al, 2008).  At the other end of 
the spectrum are methods designed to elicit views of citizens that can be used to inform policy 
discussions, in a consultative model, with no involvement at all by a policy developing entity.  In this 
chapter, I shall assume a consultative model of DD in which a researcher’s goal is to provide an 
independent assessment, by means of normative opinion surveys—that is, surveys of the public’s 
considered moral judgment about a bioethics issue.  But how should the public’s moral opinions be 
sought?  How can we be sure that the opinions, elicited via surveys, are considered moral judgments 
of the public?  
The methodological issues fall under two broad but interacting domains.  First, how can we be sure 
that such surveys are based on the respondents receiving accurate, unbiased, and reasonably 
comprehensive information?  Second, how can we be sure that the ethical opinions elicited are in 
some robust sense ‘considered’ opinions?  Since most laypersons may not be familiar with a given 
ethical issue—or be familiar only with public information generated by partisan interest groups—and 
given the human tendency to seek information that affirms preconceived intuitions, rather than the 
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more difficult work of keeping one’s mind open and challenging one’s own views (Haidt, 2012), the 
respondents will need a chance to engage in a process that helps them develop, examine, and 
challenge their views.  Ideally, this should be an interpersonal process that involves consultation with 
experts representing diverse viewpoints and deliberations with peers in a setting that promotes 
careful, considered, and civil dialogue.  
This is a tall order for a researcher who seeks to conduct normative opinion surveys in bioethics.  The 
amount of work needed to satisfy the above criteria will vary depending on the topic.  For some 
issues, perhaps the media have done a reasonable job of educating the public and the issues are 
familiar enough so that most citizens are exposed to an adequate range of arguments regarding the 
issue.  But for most issues in bioethics, meeting those criteria will be difficult.  Over the past few 
decades, political philosophers and political scientists have developed theories of deliberative 
democracy (DD), an approach to incorporating public opinion in policy-making (Chambers, 2003).  
These scholars, together with policy researchers and citizen activists, have been using a variety of 
empirical methods to engage the public on various policy issues (Carson et al., 2005; Gastil & Keith 
2005; Fishkin, 1997; Thompson, 2008).   
Although the boundaries and definition of DD are not always clear, what is common to all theories of 
DD is the idea that informed and deliberative input of citizens is seen as the ideal for democratic 
governance (Bohman & Rehg, 1997).  This deliberative input is more than simply summing up or 
aggregating opinions in some coordinated fashion.  Some DD theorists, for example, argue for an 
ideal of reciprocal justification.  As Gutmann & Thompson (1997) note in one of the earliest attempts 
to delineate the implications of DD for bioethics, DD theory asks “citizens and officials to justify any 
demands for collective action by giving reasons that can be accepted by those who are bound by the 
action” (pp38).  
On the surface, deliberative democratic ideals seem to embody a fairly non-controversial vision of 
citizen participation in the political process.  But the popularity of deliberative democratic theory in 
political science and philosophy is a relatively recent phenomenon.  As Bohman & Rehg (1997) note, 
during the middle of the 20th century, the dominant theories of democracy tended to be suspicious of 
public deliberation and saw reason as instrumental, as a tool for gaining the upper hand in interest 
group politics, as a tool in bargaining with opponents, or as a means of aggregating preferences most 
efficiently.  In contrast, deliberative democratic theory is a normative theory that takes citizens’ views 
seriously in informing policy.  Much of the philosophical literature on DD is devoted to working out the 
essential elements and critiques of this core idea of citizen deliberation as the basis of governance 
(Bohman & Rehg, 1997; Elster, 1998; Freeman, 2000; Chambers, 2003). Deliberative democratic 
theory is more optimistic about the idea that citizens can deliberate and reason together and come to 
share a common good, at least to some degree. 
Deliberative Democracy and Bioethics 
It is not hard to see why DD theories have important implications for bioethics.  Such theories provide 
a broad theoretical framework for what is implicitly accepted within bioethics.  How should our public 
policy regarding controversial bioethics issues be resolved?  One approach is to provide some 
background rules (no violence, no fraud, etc.) but allow the flow of money and influence to determine 
the outcome, without an attempt to promote a ‘common good’ perspective.  Let the stronger interest 
groups win, as long as they play by a set of rules.  Alternatively, we could attempt to resolve the 
conflict by promoting a deliberation among citizens during which an attempt is made to find a common 
perspective.  The possibility that people can change their minds based on giving reasons and 
evaluating others’ reasons is left open.66  Such a perspective would respect the citizens’ abilities to 
consider tradeoffs necessary in public policy, rather than assuming that they will only protect their own 
personal interests. The interaction is not just for purposes of influence; people treat one another as 
decision-makers who deserve respect by being provided with reasons that they can evaluate and 
respond to.   
                                                     
66 See Sheehan (2016) and Landeweer et al (2016), both in this volume, for two different perspectives on this question. 
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It would be discouraging if policy solutions to modern bioethics dilemmas were addressed only by 
means of special interest group politics, or based only on economic considerations or other forms of 
power.  If this were the normatively accepted way of resolving ethics policy problems, it is hard to see 
why such problems would be considered ‘ethical’ problems at all.  This concern has been implicitly 
recognised in that, historically, the usual mode of addressing bioethics issues has been to turn to 
expert panels and commissions (Jonsen, 1998).  These commissions have been hugely influential, 
with much of the current U.S. human subject research regulations, for example, being a product of 
one of those commissions (Levine, 1986).  These commissions do embody some key components of 
DD, in so far as they publicly deliberate, attempt to incorporate diverse and opposing viewpoints, are 
led by evaluation of reasons and arguments, and, to a limited degree, represent an interdisciplinary 
perspective, including representatives from the public or from patient advocacy groups.  But panels 
are limited in that they draw on the moral intuitions of a few and it is not clear whether they reflect the 
moral views of the public.  Also, it is important not to confuse DD with representation by layperson 
groups, such as patient advocacy groups.  Political action by advocacy groups is an essential part of 
our democratic system.  But they are operating as an interest group.  Thus, the inclusion of such 
groups in deliberations of ethics policy issues is not an automatic indication of democratic 
deliberation. 
Practice of Deliberative Democracy 
Public deliberation has had a long and active history, quite apart from the theoretical developments in 
political philosophy (Gastil & Keith, 2005).  There are now many models designed to implement 
deliberative democratic methods in policy-making.  These models go by the name of Deliberative 
Polling (Fishkin, 1997), Citizens Jury (Crosby et al., 2005), 21st Century Town Meetings (Lukensmeyer 
et al., 2005), National Issues Forums (Melville et al., 2005), and others (Gastil & Kelshaw, 2000).  
Thus it is not correct to talk about the deliberative democratic method.  Some have adapted and 
combined these methods, in attempts to improve public deliberative input into policy (Carson et al., 
2005).  In fact, there has been such a proliferation of empirical work in DD that there are now multiple 
reviews and theoretical reflections on the relationship between the theory and practice of DD 
(Chambers, 2003; Carpini et al., 2004; Ryfe, 2005; Thompson, 2008), with a recent edition of a 
prominent bioethics journal featuring several articles on DD (Goold et al., 2012). 
Deliberative Democracy Studies in Health Policy and Bioethics 
The area in bioethics that has used DD methods most actively is public priority setting and resource 
allocation. Between 1981 and 2006, 175 such articles reported on 190 public studies of public 
engagement conducted in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Mitton et al., 2009).  
Although not all involved deliberative methods, the authors note that “in each successive time 
period… the proportion of cases in which at least one deliberative method was employed increased,” 
with 37% of studies involving deliberation by 2000-2006 period (Mitton et al., 2009; 224).  More 
recently, a review of peer-reviewed articles from 2000-2012 on public deliberation of health policy or 
bioethics issues (restricted to papers with the words ‘deliberation’, ‘deliberate’, or ‘deliberative’ in title 
or abstract) yielded 31 papers published in 15 different medical, social science, and policy journals 
(Abelson et al., 2013). Quite recently, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality completed a 
demonstration project comparing four different deliberation methods and a control arm (Carman et al., 
2013).  They elicited public input on the use of research evidence to limit healthcare decision-making, 
and the methods ranged from a reading material only control group to a Citizen’s Panel lasting 2.5 
days.   
DD methods are used in other areas of bioethics.  As discussed below, DD methods have been used 
to address the dilemma of enrolling incapacitated adults in dementia research (Kim et al., 2010 & 
2011).  In compliance with the Federal regulations regarding emergency research without informed 
consent (21 CFR 50.24), a variety of methods have been used to meet the ‘community consultation’ 
requirement (Baren & Biros, 2007).  Research with biobank samples or medical records are 
increasing the focus of public deliberation studies (Damschroder et al., 2007; Secko et al., 2009; 
Botkin et al., 2012).  It is notable that the current Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical 
Issues in the U.S. is headed by one of the leading scholars of deliberative democracy, and their 
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reports have prominently endorsed democratic deliberation as a method for informing difficult 
bioethics policy issues (Gutmann, 2011). 
A Case Study of Democratic Deliberation    
Ethics of Dementia Research: Appropriateness of the Topic for DD 
Dementia research requires participation of persons with significant cognitive impairment who may 
have difficulty providing informed consent (Kim et al., 2001, Okonkwo et al., 2007).  Despite several 
decades of debate, there is as yet no uniform and clear legal policy regarding the involvement of 
decisionally impaired adults in clinical research in most jurisdictions of the US (Saks et al., 2008). 
Although US regulations allow research with incapacitated adults based on consent by their legally 
authorised representatives (LAR) (45CFR46, 102c, 111.a4, and 116), the regulations defer to states 
for defining the LAR and few states have done so (Hoffmann & Schwartz, 1998; Saks et al., 2008).  
Three states have modern laws on the issue (California, Virginia, and New Jersey) but have diverged 
on how to balance the potential benefits with risks (Saks et al., 2008). In the UK, there are three 
different regulations that may apply depending on the location and type of research involving persons 
with dementia (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2008).  Given the absence of uniform and clear policy, 
Alzheimer disease research centers (Cahill & Wichman, 2000; Karlawish et al., 2002) and research 
ethics review boards (Bravo et al., 2010;  Gong et al., 2010) vary significantly in their practices.   
A DD method is well suited for this controversial topic.  Prior to our DD work on this issue, all studies 
on this topic had been traditional surveys (Wendler et al., 2002; Bravo et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2005 & 
2009; Karlawish et al., 2009).  The topic involves several domains of specialised knowledge that need 
to be conveyed:  the nature and purpose of scientific procedures in Alzheimer disease (AD) research, 
the rationale and structure of the current human subject protections system (including history of 
abuses, current oversight system through Research Ethics Committees, the ethical framework behind 
current regulations), the context of current AD research (the actual remaining capabilities of persons 
with moderate AD, the role of family members, etc.).  It is a challenge to present all of the necessary 
background material in an understandable and comprehensive manner.  Further, given that the topic 
is not a widely discussed issue among the public, it is unlikely that the public will have been exposed 
to the range of arguments for and against various policies. 
Using the ethics of dementia research as a case study, the following sections discuss in depth several 
key methodological issues for a DD researcher in bioethics:  rationale for an experimental design; 
development of study materials; procedures for the democratic deliberation session itself; necessity of 
facilitators; and monitoring and evaluation of the quality of the DD process. 
Brief Overview of the Study 
Our study elicited the public’s views regarding a policy for surrogate consent for four dementia 
research scenarios of varying risks and potential benefit:  a lumbar puncture study to develop a 
diagnostic test, a randomized clinical trial of a drug, an efficacy study of a vaccine, and an early phase 
neurosurgical gene transfer study (Kim et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2011).   
Participants were members of the general public aged 51 and older recruited via random digit dialing 
telephone calls within a 60 mile radius of Ann Arbor, Michigan.  They were randomised into three 
arms:  persons who completed surveys only (simulating a traditional survey, ‘survey only group’), 
persons who received written educational materials about ethics and science of surrogate-based 
research (educational materials plus survey group, hereafter referred to as ‘education group’), and 
persons who participated in an all-day democratic deliberation session (‘DD session group’).   
There were three measurement time points:  a survey sent to all participants one month prior to the 
DD session date (after which the subjects are randomised into the three arms); a second survey after 
the DD session for the DD group, or around that time by mail for the two control arms (survey only 
group and education group) who did not attend the DD session; a third survey to all groups by mail 
about one month after the DD session.  
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Participants assigned to the DD session group attended a day-long meeting that was comprised of 
plenary and small group sessions facilitated by trained facilitators.  Two national experts (in AD 
research and in research ethics) presented detailed information, and were also available throughout 
the day, traveling together from table to table answering any questions. 
Rationale for Experimental Design 
Because DD methods are relatively new to bioethics research it is important to assess whether a DD 
procedure has any impact at all on people’s opinions.  A randomised controlled experiment 
maximises internal validity, by accounting for any trends caused by factors extrinsic to the 
deliberation.  The survey-only control group provided a traditional cross sectional survey comparison.  
The education group provided a comparison that sheds light on the mechanism for the impact of DD.  
That is, if the DD session does make a difference in the respondents’ views, is it explained by the 
increase in information provided to the respondents or is deliberation also necessary?  Given the cost 
and effort of DD sessions and the relatively novel use of DD in research ethics, we felt that adding this 
additional comparison group answered a valuable research question for relatively little additional 
expense. 
Further, the experimental design maximised internal validity in a setting where the limitations to 
external validity are unavoidable.  Although practitioners of deliberative consultation methods like ours 
cite generalisability as a strength (Fishkin & Luskin, 2005), it is important to recognise the limitations 
in sampling.  DD methods require considerable time and effort from the participants—in our case, a 
full day of participation plus completion of several surveys.  Setting aside an entire day for research 
involvement necessarily creates a certain level of selection bias.  This is unavoidable as long as 
research relies on volunteers.  However, by using a randomised design, we increase the rigor with 
which we can examine the impact of the DD intervention.   
Development of Study Materials 
Video introduction to the DD day 
An all day on-site session provides a unique opportunity to creatively inform and educate the 
participants.  We provided a highly informative yet experientially driven background on Alzheimer’s 
disease with a 30 minute segment of a critically acclaimed public television documentary, The 
Forgetting: A Portrait of Alzheimer’s (Arledge, 2004).  The segment was generated by discussing 
successive subsections of the film with 4 laypersons who had personal experience with AD (all of 
whom participated in a previous study we conducted). 
Plenary Session Presentations.   
The presentations on AD clinical research and on the ethics of surrogate consent for such research 
require extreme care to ensure that they are, in combination, balanced and fair.  The integrity of the 
DD method depends on this.  The presentations must also be audience-friendly and comprehensive 
enough for informed opinion formation, revision, or refinement.  These presentations (slides plus 
notes) were first developed for an earlier DD study (Kim et al., 2010). The research team worked 
closely with an advisory panel that comprised a political science expert in deliberative democracy 
methods, a senior AD researcher, a bioethicist-sociologist, a geriatrician, a director of a human 
subject protections program at an academic medical center, a qualitative research expert, a 
gerontological nurse, and a caregiver of a person with AD.  The penultimate versions of the 
presentations underwent a final systematic review by the advisory panel, additional external experts 
(in both AD research and bioethics) and laypersons.   
Attitudes toward Surrogate-Based Research.  
The survey was a shortened version of an earlier instrument that had been validated and used in a 
previous study (Kim et al., 2005).  The survey elicits respondents’ attitudes toward surrogate consent 
for dementia research, using 4 research scenarios of about 120 words each that depict a lumbar 
puncture study, a randomised clinical trial for a medication, a vaccine trial, and an early phase gene 
transfer trial.   
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DD Day Procedures 
Two weeks prior to the DD date, the members of the DD session group were provided with copies of 
the experts’ presentations.  Participants were asked to read through the presentations before the 
meeting, and to prepare any questions they have for the experts. 
On the day of the DD session, DD group participants were randomly assigned to tables, in groups 
ranging from 5-7 persons per table, with the aim of having 6 participants per table, along with a 
facilitator.  The sequence of events was designed to create an atmosphere of openness, respect, and 
collaboration within the groups (breaks and lunch are not listed below):  
 Plenary Introduction that lays out the agenda for the day. 
 First Small Group Session.  Participants introduce themselves using an ice-breaker exercise. 
The facilitator explain his or her role.  The video segment of The Forgetting documentary is 
presented and discussed.  
 First Plenary Session.  The audience is encouraged to ask questions during and immediately 
following each presentation.   
o Presentation on “Clinical Research in Alzheimer’s Disease,”  
o Presentation on “Ethical Issues in Surrogate-Based Research.”   
 Second Small Group Session.  Participants are given a chance to reflect upon and discuss 
the 2 plenary presentations.  This allows for reactions and corrections to each other’s 
understanding of the materials presented and to discuss the overall ethical dilemma of 
surrogate consent for dementia research.   
 Second Plenary Session.  Each research scenario (lumbar puncture study, new drug 
randomised clinical trial, vaccine study, gene transfer study) is discussed and the audience is 
given a chance to direct questions to the experts.  This session is crucial because areas of 
incomplete understanding or concern shared by the audience will be brought out and 
interactively hones and corrects people’s understanding of the issues. 
 Third Small Group Session.  By this time, the participants are quite comfortable with each 
other, have discussed the facts surrounding the issues, expressed their opinions and have 
had a chance to hear others’ views generally about SBR.  During this session, the participants 
are asked to answer as a group (for each research scenario), “If patients cannot make their 
own decisions about being in studies like this one, should our society allow or not allow their 
families to make the decision in their place?”  The groups are also asked to provide their 
rationale: “Why should surrogate consent be allowed or not allowed?”   
To maintain balanced, expert responses to all questions, the two experts (AD clinical researcher and 
bioethicist) are available and travel together from table to table to answer questions throughout the 
day.  The extensive interactive component of the day minimizes the chance that the participants are 
basing their views on incorrect or incomplete information. 
 
Key Role of Small Group Facilitators  
The entire DD procedure is based on the premise that optimal conditions must be provided to 
encourage rigorous, high quality deliberation over a controversial ethical issue.  Although this could 
happen in the small groups by luck, having a facilitator ensures that the conditions for such 
deliberation are optimised.  The trained facilitators optimize the process of discussion rather than act 
as content experts.  Their training consists of two parts: one, a review of the facilitator’s role, how to 
deal with difficult situations, and an annotated guide for the three small group deliberations; two, an in 
depth discussion and role play using scenarios collected from analyzing the previous DD small group 
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sessions.  A pilot study can help develop various points that are potential problems and examples of 
particularly good facilitation.   
Standardising the roles for facilitators is crucial to promoting good deliberation and minimizing 
unwanted group dynamic effects (Crosby et al., 2005).  They must outline the ground rules for 
discussion, keep the group on task, promote respectful exchange of information, prompt clarification 
of statements, encourage expression of opposing viewpoints and participation by everyone, and limit 
domination of discussion by some participants.   
At the same time, because laypersons naturally begin to defer to ‘expert’ opinion (Levine et al., 2005), 
the facilitators are reminded of this potential pitfall.  Facilitators should not insert themselves into the 
discussion such that their opinion dictates the content of the group’s outcome.  The rule of thumb the 
facilitators are encouraged to keep in mind in determining whether to intervene in a particular situation 
is:  Be neutral in content, but active in process.   
Evaluating the Quality of Deliberations 
Do the participants of DD method actually engage in a reasonably high quality deliberation that is 
informed, thoughtful, and consisting of civil exchange of ideas?  Since the validity of the outcome 
relies on DD fulfilling its promise, a DD study should monitor and report on the quality of the 
deliberation.  These are not simple phenomena to measure, and a single approach is not sufficient 
(Steiner et al., 2004; Fishkin & Luskin, 2005; Neblo, 2007; Thompson, 2008).   
We assessed quality in various ways (De Vries et al., 2010; De Vries et al, 2011).  First, we assessed 
the participants’ perceptions of civility and respect, fairness of the process, participant trust, and the 
value participants place on information and deliberation (Steiner et al., 2004; Thompson, 2008), using 
a self-report questionnaire administered at the end of the DD session day.  Second, to assess the 
level of engagement and equality of participation (Cohen, 2007; Thompson, 2008), we tracked some 
simple metrics.  The number and types of questions from the audience during the expert 
presentations and during small group deliberations provided a measure of active participation.  We 
also recorded the number and length of times (text length) each participant speaks during small group 
deliberations.  It is not necessary that everyone speaks the same number of times or for the same 
duration to ensure equality and good deliberation, but it is necessary that no one or two individual(s) 
dominate(s) the discussions and that everyone has the opportunity to speak their mind (Neblo, 2007).  
  
Third, the small group deliberations are qualitatively analysed to address a variety of questions that 
touch on the quality of deliberation:  How are disagreements resolved? Are mediation and 
compromise common (Steiner et al., 2004)?  What are the common themes and rationales for the 
groups’ policy recommendations (DeVries et al., 2013)?  Are facts used accurately—and if not, do the 
participants correct each other?  Are the participants keeping to the task?  Is there evidence of 
polarization?  Do the comments reflect appeals to a ‘common good’ perspective or are the reasons 
given for opinions mostly based on partisan perspectives? 
Limiting the Potential Pitfalls of DD Methods 
The potential pitfalls of the deliberative process are widely discussed among scholars of deliberation, 
with the main concerns having to do with group dynamic factors (Mendelberg et al., 2002; Carpini et 
al., 2004; Levine et al., 2005; Ryfe, 2005).  A key worry about DD methods is that rather than arriving 
at a ‘common good’ based policy recommendation, DD will lead to group polarisation (Sunstein, 2002 
& 2007).  In group polarisation, deliberators move to more extreme positions in the direction of their 
own pre-deliberation opinions (Sunstein, 2002).  This may occur because participants gather selective 
information supportive of the views they already hold from peers who are like-minded.  Thus their 
prior opinions are not challenged and indeed grow more extreme.  Polarisation may occur also 
because of social comparison/peer pressure (the simple desire to be perceived favorably by the 
group), and confidence by corroboration (people gain confidence after feeling group support, so more 
extreme viewpoints can be expressed) (Sunstein, 2007).  
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Steps can be taken to minimize polarization.  Rather than a gathering based on affinity, DD 
participants should be randomly chosen. DD procedures that are careful to introduce balanced 
information may be less susceptible (Sunstein, 2002).  To counteract the reduced argument pool in 
groups that already favor one view over another, balanced expert information is crucial, and careful 
vetting by various perspectives is important.  Group facilitation by an independent facilitator is crucial 
in helping to curb the natural group polarising tendencies by ensuring that participation is equitable 
and respectful of minority views, and by encouraging arguments based on giving of reasons and 
rationales rather than simply asserting strongly held positions.  
It is crucial to note that no method of opinion elicitation is perfect and every method has its own 
potential pitfalls.  The question is a comparative one.  It is not a question of whether DD methods are 
perfect but instead whether, when compared to traditional survey methods, their additional cost, effort, 
and potential pitfalls are outweighed by its ability to elicit considered and educated opinions of the 
participants.    
Conclusion 
There are many potential bioethics topics that could be addressed using DD-based methods.  Some 
of these topics have already been well-described in the literature (Gutmann and Thompson, 1997).  In 
general, any bioethics topic with broad policy implications that require a genuine tradeoff of goods or 
values (e.g. individual privacy and control versus welfare of community) would be a potential 
candidate.  However, because DD studies are challenging and expensive, researchers should 
continue to address methodological issues in their DD studies.  In particular, future refinements 
should focus on maximising validity while at the same time minimising cost.  For example, given the 
challenges to external validity posed by recruiting people to an all-day (or even several day) event, if  
broadly generalisable data are needed for a particular policy issue, then it may make sense to 
conduct a DD study in combination with a relatively less expensive but more representative (e.g., 
national probabilistic sample) cross-sectional traditional survey.   
Democratic deliberation and bioethics are natural allies.  They both take the normative opinions of the 
lay public seriously, and strive to elicit and be guided by those opinions.  Such opinions are especially 
valuable when normative analysis alone cannot provide sufficient policy guidance and when a 
perspective beyond special interest politics is sought.  Of course, no method of eliciting such opinions 
is without limitations and potential pitfalls.  However, DD methods are more likely than traditional 
methods to elicit the considered moral judgment of ordinary citizens regarding challenging and 
controversial bioethics policy issues. 
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Feminist empirical bioethics 
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This chapter examines the feminist contribution to empirical ways of doing ethics, and especially of 
doing bioethics. The focus on bioethics reflects the high level of feminist empirical activity in that field 
of ethical inquiry. This is not to suggest that there is no feminist work going on in other forms of ethics 
than bioethics: distinctively feminist perspectives are present and have influence throughout 
contemporary moral philosophy, in social and political theory, and other areas of applied ethics. But in 
practice, bioethics has been notably and distinctively open to empirical forms of inquiry, exemplified in 
its taking of the so-called empirical turn (Borry et al, 2005) over the last 20 years.  
One reason for this openness is the substance of the issues that bioethics addresses. Most often, 
these are to do with advances in biomedical knowledge that lead to new forms of theoretical 
understanding in the life sciences, or of practical healthcare, or both. They tend to present new moral 
dilemmas because they involve acts, relationships and identities that may be completely new, or 
transformed versions of more familiar ones. Think, for example, of how the introduction of assisted 
reproductive technologies has generated not just new babies but also new ways of thinking about 
babies, new ways of being parents, and also new ways of linking public healthcare policy to private 
family life. In these situations, the need to base normative ethical judgements on what is actually 
going on, rather than just extrapolating from how things have been or appear to be, is clear. And on 
the new social territory formed through interaction with technological change, getting an adequate 
understanding of what the feminist philosopher Margaret Urban Walker called “actual moral and social 
orders” (Walker, 2008:195) means undertaking empirical research. New technologies and the 
resulting social practices, then, do not just create new empirical realities, but can also open up 
conceptual space for fresh, empirically based ethical thinking. Bioethics is rarely ‘ethics as usual’ (and 
if it is, it probably isn’t good bioethics). 
So although much of what I say about feminist empirical approaches is applicable to ethics overall, 
specific examples will relate to recent work that has flourished within feminist bioethics. I’ll also have 
something to say about the distinctive features of an academic discipline (i.e. feminist ethics) that 
emerged out of an activist movement with avowedly ideological aims (i.e. feminism), and what that 
implies for the ethics of the discipline itself. Throughout I understand ‘empirical’ in the broadest sense, 
to include any ethical inquiry that draws in a meaningful way on real world material. This may be a 
looser definition than many social scientists would be comfortable with, but I use it to mark as clear a 
distinction as possible between this way of doing ethical work, and approaches that depend more or 
less entirely on abstract arguments that seem compelling to the individual ethicist. I therefore include 
ethics that undertakes original research using standard social science methodologies, both 
quantitative and qualitative ones such as interviews, questionnaires, and ethnographies; but I also 
include forms of ethical and especially bioethical reflection that consciously and conscientiously draw 
on empirical data about real world practices, acquired by others, to provide a factual basis for 
theoretical assertion and the crafting of good and workable policy.  
 
The bioethical turn to the empirical 
The empirical turn in bioethics is usually explained as being driven, at least in part, by the 
unsympathetic critique coming from the social sciences (see, for example, Zussman, 2000; Holm & 
Jones 2004; DeVries et al, 2007; Turner, 2009; Hoeyer, 2006). It is important to note that the social 
science critique is not directed solely to the lack of a sound empirical basis for many of the claims that 
bioethicists make. More generally, it takes in the epistemic resources, conceptions of moral agency 
and subjectivity, and forms of rationality particularly favoured by moral philosophy and, by extension, 
first-wave philosophical bioethics. Beyond the accumulation of more facts from the frontlines of 
medicine and healthcare, curing bioethics’ “abstraction from sociopolitical realities of everyday life” 
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(Twine, 2010:53) requires a fundamentally different approach to bioethical thinking. What has been 
called (at least by those who advocate it) critical bioethics (Hedgecoe, 2004; Twine, 2005), which 
emerged as the empirical turn was gaining momentum, also makes the case that bioethicists need to 
do more than “root their enquiries in empirical research”; they also have to “challenge theories, using 
evidence, to be reflexive and to be skeptical about the claims of other bioethicists, scientists and 
clinicians” (Hedgecoe, 2004:120).  This is an empirical approach that aims to go beyond the 
straightforward documentation of ethical situations and decisions, providing a methodology for 
analysing them and ultimately making (better) normative judgements about them.  
These demands for more empirically grounded and critically minded bioethical approaches routinely 
overlook the pioneering and on-going contribution of feminist ethics and bioethics to that work (Tong 
1997; Scully et al, 2010). The claim that good normative ethical judgements can’t be made without 
empirically based knowledge of what really goes on in the world has been a key feature of decades of 
feminist social and political ethics. Equally, it is feminist theory’s longstanding epistemological and 
ethical commitments that have driven its skeptical examination of the social, economic and political 
arrangements that determine precisely which empirical questions are asked, and who gets to ask 
them.  
 
Feminist ethics and bioethics 
“The question of what constitutes a specifically feminist bioethics is far from self-evident, and it is 
certain that no one definition could tie up all the avenues of approach that one could claim to be 
feminist.” (Shildrick, 2008: 29) 
 
At the heart of feminist ethics and bioethics lies the basic observation that dominant ways of doing 
ethics and bioethics are gendered. This means more than that most professional ethicists are male 
(although that is usually the case): it is a claim about the nature of the societies within which ethical 
thinking is carried out and the way that practices and institutions of bioethics are organised. It implies 
that the perspective from which bioethics detects morally troubling issues in the health or life 
sciences, and their ethically salient features, is likely to be skewed in ways that track along gendered 
lines. A further implication is that such bias is likely to “contribute to culturally inscribed oppressive 
practices” (Fitzpatrick & Scully, 2010:3). 
What feminist empirical ethics offers, then, is a tradition and a toolkit for critical engagement with the 
politics of ethical and bioethical life. Feminist ethics starts from the premise that many of the 
empirically discernible facts on the ground are not in any meaningful sense ‘natural’ (Jaggar, 1991; 
Tong, 2013). They don’t just happen, but are the result of social organisations that mean certain 
features and values of social life are taken for granted and that some outcomes are more likely than 
others. Feminist inquiry therefore looks long and hard at the socially and politically derived power 
relations inherent in ways of knowing within philosophical thought.  
But it is also more overtly political. Feminism has the ultimate goal of achieving equality and justice for 
women (and other marginalised groups too), and this has some fairly significant consequences for 
any feminist-inspired approach to ethics (Jaggar, 1991). For one thing, it can’t risk being relativist – at 
least not as ethical relativism is generally understood.67 To diagnose certain ways of providing 
healthcare or of using life science knowledge as contributing to gender oppressive practices means 
that there are alternatives that do not, and that therefore ought to be preferred. As a discipline, then, 
feminist bioethics is constantly striving to reflect both its allegiance to the values of properly rigorous 
academic inquiry and its commitment to the strategic goal of gender justice and equality. Balancing 
the two is not always an easy task. 
 
Feminist ontology and epistemology 
                                                     
67 See Sheehan’s (2016) chapter, in this volume, for a detailed discussion of moral relativism and how can be understood.  
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Feminist ethics’ political commitment is one reason for its bias towards empirical methodologies of the 
kind discussed in this book. Clearly, not all forms of feminist ethics are empirical, and many feminist 
theoretical ethicists would be justifiably irritated at the suggestion. Nevertheless, the aim of 
uncovering the structures that generate those actual (and actually oppressive) moral and social 
orders mentioned earlier is often best served by a rigorous empirical inquiry into what happens in real 
life. Equally important to feminist ethics’ empirical basis, however, are feminist theory’s characteristic 
ontology and epistemology. These distinctive features have driven a fundamental reconsideration of 
moral philosophy’s central concepts of the moral self, agency, and autonomy, and of its favoured 
modes of information gathering and reasoning.  
Feminists argue that the models of the self and of the moral agent that philosophical bioethics has 
tended to adopt are profoundly shaped by the gendered political and intellectual environments within 
which they were first devised (Stanley & Wise, 1993; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). In traditional moral 
and political philosophy the moral self is characterised as an atomised, disembodied, socially 
disembedded, effectively interchangeable locus of consciousness, whose moral deliberations are 
aimed at maximising the benefits to themselves through rationally arrived at and usually reciprocal 
arrangements with others. Critics of this model of the moral self, not all of them feminist, reject it on 
the grounds that it leaves out fundamental features that are essential to real moral selfhood and 
agency. Moral subjects, the argument goes, are also embodied and emotional beings who are 
connected to each other in wider interpersonal and social networks of dependency, responsibility and 
necessity that are often neither reciprocal nor rationally deliberated (Lindemann-Nelson, 2000).68  
The traditional ontological norm tends to be accompanied by a particular epistemological view as well. 
Classical moral philosophy works with an epistemic norm of a single subject in conscious search of 
the knowledge that she needs in order to make her reasoned and (bio)ethically sound decisions. This 
kind of epistemic subject is primarily concerned with assembling information from relevant sources, 
determining its accuracy and authority, and avoiding biases either in her acquisition of information or 
her interpretation of it, before then using that information to support rationally defensible processes of 
ethical evaluation. It’s worth noting that, according to this picture of the moral subject and the 
processes of ethical evaluation she undertakes, empirical approaches in themselves do not present 
any notable challenge to the epistemological framework of mainstream philosophical bioethics. 
However, one consequence of the feminist theoretical view of subjectivity and agency as generated 
through social roles and relationships, is that the resources available to, and processes involve in, the 
moral subject’s normative deliberation have to be reconsidered. A socially constituted self has 
epistemic and imaginative resources that may well differ significantly from those of the isolated self of 
traditional moral philosophy. Her view of what counts as impartiality or objectivity in moral deliberation 
may be different as well. 
Feminist ontology therefore raises questions both about the kind of knowledge needed to back up 
normative judgements, especially judgements about the practices and values of people with 
experiences very different from our own, and the nature of the normative judgements that can be 
made. The philosophical tradition that understands ethics ideally as “abstract, general in form, and 
independent of unique circumstances, social contexts, or cultural backgrounds” (Rehmann, 2010:38) 
necessarily also dismisses not just women’s perspectives, but the notion of (epistemological and 
moral) perspectives altogether. Feminist ethics, by contrast, argues that all ethical evaluations are 
based on experience and discourse, that all experience occurs within historically and culturally 
defined contexts, and all discourse is situated within some personal perspective or other. Neither the 
experiences that bioethics is interested in, nor the discourse of bioethics itself, are any exception.  
Characteristically, feminist epistemologies are social ones that shift the focus of attention away from 
the individual acquiring and processing information, and onto the social structures within which 
knowledge is formed, exchanged, given value or rejected. Feminist epistemologies specifically charge 
that gendered arrangements of social advantage and disadvantage lead to equally gendered 
                                                     
68 Proponents of a more traditional ontology may respond, with some justification, that the critique targets an out-dated 
caricature, and that rather more nuanced views of moral subjectivity are held in contemporary moral philosophy. I would argue, 
however, that much of bioethics, where it discusses the nature of the moral self at all, still rely heavily on this unreconstructed 
view of the detached and disembodied moral subject. 
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distributions of epistemic authority. Feminists and other theorists from marginal perspectives are 
mostly concerned with the epistemic effects of social positioning: the difference that belonging to a 
particular social category makes to the knowledge that one has, and also to the credibility that such 
knowledge has in the eyes of differently situated others. The claim is that being a member of a 
particular social category influences people’s experiences, and as a result certain sensitivities are 
promoted and certain values or outcomes prioritised.  
Standpoint epistemologies go on to make the further claim that social asymmetries are reflected in 
epistemic asymmetries as well. Differences in how events are perceived and interpreted follow not 
from the observer’s social identity per se - it isn’t that because you are a woman you will necessarily 
display certain cognitive and affective characteristics - but because the social norms and behaviours 
that go along with that identity open up particular perspectives that are not associated with other 
identities (Harding, 1991; Hartsock, 1987 &1995; Wylie, 2003). Members of any marginalised social 
group, for example, are likely to gain particularly acute insight into the domains of life that are most 
affected by the holding of subordinate social positions. Feminists are primarily, but not exclusively, 
interested in the epistemic and ethical effects of the social positioning that comes about as a result of 
being a woman. Feminist standpoint epistemology, therefore, does not claim that the insights of 
women are necessarily better, but only that those most affected by gendered injustice are also the 
ones most likely to be able to spot where and how it occurs. 
A pioneering and formative feminist text that developed a robust case for a critical social epistemology 
was Margaret Urban Walker’s Moral Understandings (1998). In it, Walker argues that any kind of 
ethical work is carried out within a framing history of important, but generally unacknowledged, prior 
decisions about such things as: what constitutes a moral problem in the first place; what credible 
ethical evaluation looks like; and who has the authority to make (and impose) normative judgements. 
Walker describes conventional moral philosophical analysis as operating with what she calls a 
theoretical-juridical template. It sees moral theory as “a compact, propositionally codifiable, 
impersonally action-guiding code” or “a compact set of law-like propositions that ‘explain’ the moral 
behaviour of a well-formed moral agent” (Walker, 1998:7-8). Her counterargument is that this 
template bears little relation to the activities of real moral life, where ethics is a collaborative social 
practice through which relationships, responsibilities and commitments are agreed upon and 
consolidated.  She argues that the attention of ethicists should be shifted away from the making of 
ethical end-judgements and decisions, which form a very minor part of moral life, and redirected 
towards the epistemically and ethically prior world of moral perceptions, descriptions, narratives, 
defences, explanations and so on.  
Crucially, these features of moral life are also amenable to empirical examination. Indeed, Walker 
contends that genuine ethical analysis is impossible without a deep understanding of the ways in 
which moral theories and normative judgements are made meaningful through practices and 
discourses. If ideas about moral good and moral selves are generated out of the concrete 
circumstances of relationship and communities, then evaluating these goods and selves normatively 
requires a grasp of the specific ways in which they are understood in those contexts, and – for 
bioethics in particular -- how such understandings may be changed, for example through the adoption 
of a new biomedical technology. This is of course an empirical project, and Walker and other 
influential feminist philosophers such as Annette Baier (1995) see generating such an ‘empirically 
saturated’ analysis as a central, and neglected, task of all ethics.  
Redirecting ethicists’ attention towards the social, cultural and political contexts of knowledge also 
entails a more critical stance towards the kind of (moral) knowledge that is going to be taken as 
authoritative. The feminist critique of standard empirical approaches to ethics is that they take for 
granted that we (the inquirers) are already familiar enough with the agents, acts and attitudes involved 
that we can assess them ethically. It is a form of epistemological myopia, or possibly arrogance, that 
assumes that people don’t vary much in terms of how they identify a situation of moral difficulty, frame 
the problem, identify and weigh up the salient features, and so on. Being conscious that this 
assumption might be flawed is particularly crucial in the case of bioethics’ engagement with radically 
new social practices and identities that are often generated by innovations in the health and life 
sciences. Before attempting normative judgement of egg donation, for example, it is necessary to 
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know how egg donation actually happens: how it is formally regulated and institutionally organised, 
but also how women go about donating and receiving eggs, how they make the relevant decisions, 
who they talk to about them, where they get information, what can go wrong, what sorts of language, 
opinions and practices shape the emerging social identity of the egg donor (and especially of the 
‘good’ egg donor who has donated eggs in what those involved consider to be an ethically 
responsible way), and so on.  
Moreover, if there is empirical evidence that an act or identity is vulnerable to systematic 
misrepresentation, there are additional implications for doing bioethics responsibly. Many feminist 
bioethicists would argue that part of their task is to critically examine and help to improve the 
representations, narratives and cultural practices that provide the epistemic resources serving 
normative thinking by both professional ethicists and the general public. The epistemic humility 
inherent in standpoint epistemology offers some protection against the trap of assuming that even 
empirical data on bioethically relevant practices will necessarily enable ethical observers (that is, us) 
to occupy the same epistemic or moral space as any of the agents directly involved in or affected by 
those practices. 
It is precisely because of these theoretical commitments, then, that feminist ethics has an empirical 
orientation. That is not to say that all feminist approaches to ethics therefore have to be empirical. But 
the theoretical arguments that experience is gendered, that relationships are most commonly 
asymmetric in terms of power and dependence, or that a person’s social and cultural positioning 
generally results in epistemic and analytical bias, all point towards the need for what some feminist 
bioethicists have called a ‘naturalised bioethics’ (Lindemann et al, 2008), better grounded in the 
natural, social, political and institutional worlds. This is a bioethics with a sense of the empirical 
realities of practices under ethical scrutiny: both a fine grained understanding of what actually goes on 
rather than what we think goes on, and a broader, more skeptical perspective on the reasons why 
particular practices – and especially ethically troubling practices – take place.  
Its ontological and epistemological commitments mean that a central part of feminist ethics’ project is 
also to re-examine what counts as ethically valid and relevant information, how ethical issues are 
described, whose experiences count as data, and how an issue is defined as ‘ethical’ at all. This re-
examination of ethical orthodoxies predates, but converges with, the more recent calls for a ‘critical 
bioethics’. From its outset, feminist theory has provided ethics with tools for examining the relationship 
between social position and the generation of knowledge: how the social organization of authority 
determines what it is possible for people to know and to think. Critical approaches to ethics 
acknowledge that even the idea of what counts as ‘valid’ ethical evaluation is a consensus produced 
within practices, discourses and institutions that are themselves shaped by social and political 
dynamics. According to Walker, such relations of dominance and authority “allow some people….to 
obscure what is really happening to whom and why.” This idea underpins feminist ethics’ distinctive 
understanding of empirical ethical inquiry, as aiming to provide a “fund of knowledge that needs to be 
enlarged and theoretically articulated in general accounts and specific studies of different relative 
moral positions in differentiated social lives” (Walker 1998:219). 
 
Distinctive features rather than distinctive methodologies 
In the preceding discussion of the theoretical basis for, and distinctive features of, feminist empirical 
ethics, I have tried to avoid suggesting that there are defined methodologies that feminist bioethics 
adopts, or ought to adopt, to do its empirical work. What is distinctive about feminist inquiry into an 
ethical issue has more to do with the features that it prioritises for empirical examination: the elements 
of the story to which it pays particularly close attention.  
 
Paying attention to power structures 
With its origins in a project that was catalysed by, and has gone on to examine in great depth, the 
experience of being ‘other’ to the gender norm and how the position of the ‘other’ is generated and 
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stabilised, contemporary feminist bioethics requires “that we look at society … and at the dominance 
of some voices and the exclusion of others within societal and professional conversations about 
morality and ethics” (Walker, 2010:3). As a result feminist ethics has an acute sensitivity to the 
asymmetric power relationships threading through social, political and economic structures that 
differentially disadvantage women (and a whole range of other marginalities too).  
Feminist ethics’ argument is that mainstream philosophical ethics’ habits of abstraction, 
decontextualisation, and the drive to universality are not of themselves wrong, but that they at best 
obscure, and at worst exacerbate, the biases of the human collectives within which these ethical 
analyses are made. Thus a central difference between feminist and most other empirical approaches 
in bioethics is that the former holds a commitment to go beyond providing an empirically enriched 
knowledge of situation and context, and to dissect out the biases inherent in the “concepts, ideals, 
and methods of the Western ethical tradition” (Jaggar, 2000:462) that inevitably reflect the epistemic, 
and other, structures of the societies in which that tradition was developed. 
As a result, feminist bioethics entails a politically astute scrutiny of the relationships of power and 
authority present within many of the situations it has to address. These include differences in 
professional standing, social status, knowledge, dependency, and vulnerability. Such differences 
shape the interaction between providers of healthcare and knowledge (of different sorts) and the 
recipients of that care or knowledge. Traditionally, clinical and research ethics have been very good at 
attending to the imbalances of power and authority between individual physicians or other healthcare 
professionals and their patients (and sometimes their families) in the context of the clinic or research. 
Bioethics is practiced at elaborating principles and guidelines that provide some protection against 
abuses or exploitation within these mostly dyadic relationships. But until quite recently, mainstream 
bioethics has been markedly less conscious than feminist ethics of the larger scale distributions of 
power that result from social stratifications including class, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, and so on, 
and which – feminist critics would argue -- are also essential to a comprehensive ethical 
understanding. For example, explorations of the ethics of stem cell research have tended to focus on 
the moral status of the embryo, sometimes set against the moral claims of those who might be helped 
by stem cell-based therapies (see e.g. Holland et al, 2001; Brown, 2013). By contrast, feminist 
analyses are more likely to focus on power disparities of different kinds: between stem cell 
researchers and the women donating embryos for research, but also the larger-scale social and 
political forces that make women more vulnerable to ethically problematic practices, such as a global 
trades in oocytes or embryos (Baylis & McLeod 2007; Dickenson, 2006).  
Much classic feminist bioethical work has been concerned with the gendered experience of 
healthcare or biomedical research. ‘Gendered experience’ here covers both the fact that women 
encounter different events from men (menstruation and pregnancy being obvious examples), and that 
they experience common events differently from men (such as differential access to clinical trial 
participation). However, at least as much attention has been given to the ways in which women’s 
particular accounts of their experience are excluded from, or included within, bioethical discourse.  If, 
as many feminist ethicists would argue, moral understandings are generated as communities and 
societies deliberate over evidence and interpretation, it is necessary to ask those communities and 
societies questions about who is given (or takes) authority to be part of these deliberations, and 
whether the resulting allocations of epistemic and ethical authority are just or not. And while this 
skeptical perspective was first applied to gendered power arrangements, it equally well gives feminist 
bioethics the capacity (and, some would say, the responsibility) to apply the same sort of excavatory 
gaze to other stigmatised social categories, and the ways in which the experiences and accounts of 
their members are handled. 
 
Paying attention to relationality and care 
Feminist ethics is further characterised by its attention to the fact that human beings live in connection 
with each other. Although feminist bioethics has often focused on (and been condemned by its critics 
for focusing on) close interpersonal relationships between family members, or between healthcare 
workers and patients, or researchers and research participants, it is also concerned with the larger 
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scale relationships constructed through social organisations and formal institutions (Gilligan, 1982; 
Tronto, 1993; Carse & Lindemann-Nelson, 1996).  
This attentiveness to relationality has often led to the conflation of feminist ethics and the ethics of 
care. Not all feminist ethicists are concerned with issues of care, however, and not all care ethics is 
feminist. Nevertheless, there are several reasons why feminist bioethics has taken a particular 
interest in questions of care as they arise within health and life sciences. One is the gendered nature 
of the practices of care (Kittay, 1999; Kittay & Feder, 2002; Eckenwiler, 2013). Care ethics makes the 
normative claim that moral deliberation can or should be, and empirically often is, based on caring for 
and about others. In this context care can be the hands-on labour of some people looking after others 
who are physically dependent, such as children or frail elderly people, but it can also be understood 
as a central moral value, and as an ethical orientation towards others. What is key to all 
conceptualisations of care is the foregrounding of connections between individuals and within 
communities, and of the vulnerabilities that they generate. Care ethics emphasises both 
dependencies and interdependencies as central to moral response. Moreover, care ethics also 
recognizes that human relationships are very often asymmetric rather than reciprocal.  
At least some forms of care ethics have been accused of essentialising the link between women and 
care practices: implying that the fact that women undertake the bulk of care labour says something 
about women’s intrinsic caring nature rather than about more complex social and economic 
organisations. The charge is that in doing so care ethics reinforces highly conservative views about 
gender roles. Nevertheless, it is an empirically verifiable observation that globally, most caregivers are 
women, whether they do unpaid care work within the family or are employed to give care to others 
who need it. A substantial amount of pioneering empirical feminist work has been devoted to 
examining the ethical consequences, for women and men, of care practices around the world.  
Lisa Eckenwiler’s (2013) recent work on global care relations is an example of feminist bioethics 
addressing an issue that can be shown empirically to affect women more than men. It also illustrates 
how existing empirical data can be used in a forensic examination of global economic and political 
inequalities that are gendered in complex, and sometimes unexpected ways. Eckenwiler draws on a 
wide range of academic research, policy documents, grey literature and other resources to inform a 
discussion of the processes through which the economy of long-term care is being transformed by 
radically shifting age profiles in most countries of the world. Eckenwiler is of course not the first to 
point out the consequences of an ageing and increasingly disabled population. Other writers in public 
health have described a burgeoning cadre of long-term care workers who, because of the low status 
given to care (which is itself a function of the gendered nature of such work) and chronic 
underinvestment in the care sector, find themselves working and living in extremely poorly resourced 
conditions (Eckenwiler, 2013). Feminist ethicists have also examined the role of family caregivers 
who, often with little or no social support, “strive to support their loved ones and often suffer ill health 
themselves” (Eckenwiler, 2013) as a result (Lanoix, 2013; Tong, 2013b). Eckenwiler’s work, however, 
extends a global empirical reach to consider the implications, both for the carers and those in need of 
care, of encouraging the migration of healthcare workers from the ‘source countries’ of Africa, the 
Philippines, India, China and South Korea, even though many of these places have their own rapidly 
growing long-term care needs: “The state of long-term care policy in the United States [and other 
developed countries] is contributing, however indirectly and unintentionally, to global workforce 
shortages and deepening health inequalities” (Eckenwiler 2013:2). This work is most obviously 
feminist because it focuses on an aspect of healthcare that is heavily gender-specific, and where 
despite the importance of the work that they do the women involved tend to remain invisible because 
they slip under the gendered radar of most bioethics. Eckenwiler cites numerous empirically based 
sources to substantiate her claims that “[a]dult daughters provide the most care” and that family 
caregiving “represents a critical piece of the global health workforce that is poorly documented and 
understood” (2013:21).  The inclusion of unpaid care labour in this account is classically feminist; 
theorists of the gendered social relations of production note that although unpaid care work makes an 
essential contribution to the processes of production, it is discounted by standard economic theories 
which ignore what is produced in the home as opposed to products that can be exchanged on the 
market. Finally, Eckenwiler’s work is also distinctively feminist in that it is consciously attuned to 
power asymmetries. It situates the analysis of the accumulated empirical information firmly within 
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“wider patterns of power and privilege, oppression and victimization, scarcity and plenty” (Code, 2006: 
280). 
 
Paying attention to embodiment 
A third distinctive feature of feminist empirical work is that it takes seriously the body and experienced 
embodiment as constitutive features of moral life.  Feminist ethics’ empirical interest is rooted in the 
observation that the experiences of women differ in significant ways from the experiences of men. 
The kinds of experience that can be had, and the sense made of them, will differ, to varying extents, 
according to whether that person is a woman or a man. In acknowledging that much of this difference 
is the result of gendered social arrangements, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that a 
gendered difference in experiences is, directly and indirectly, an embodied one (Alcoff, 2006; Bartky, 
1990; Young, 2005). The moral subject has/is a body with different physical characteristics and as a 
result undergoes different kinds of experience, whether that is directly because of biology (for 
example, pregnancy as a bodily experience currently restricted to women), or indirectly because of 
the differential social position that societies offer to those bodies that are labelled as female or male. 
What makes the feminist attentiveness to embodiment useful to bioethics is that embodied experience 
becomes available, and taken seriously, as material for normative work.    
Although standpoint epistemologies are primarily concerned with the epistemic effects of a particular 
social positioning, feminist theory retains the awareness that a gendered social positioning comes 
about as a result of embodiment. I have a social identity as a woman because I have a body that is 
phenotypically female. This isn’t always the case; situated knowledge can also result from class, 
religion, and other categories which may be embodied in complex and subtle ways but which are not 
primarily to do with bodily features. But in many other instances of marginality, including gender, 
observable ethnicity, or disability, there is a direct link between the material presence of the body and 
the kind of situated knowledge that the body can have. 
Taking the embodied nature of experience into account makes a further epistemological point. 
Feminist ethics argues that the materiality of embodiment places genuine constraints on ethicists’ 
capacity to ‘put ourselves in another’s shoes’ in the effort to understand those others’ ethical 
perspectives, however good the empirical data we may have about the lives others inhabit 
(Mackenzie & Scully, 2007). There is always some residuum about having/being a particular kind of 
body, and the experiences that come with it, which is not transmissible to another person.  
It is worth noting here that feminist bioethics’ engagement with the body as a source of morally 
relevant difference has itself been found problematic by some feminists, who are concerned that it 
may essentialise biologically based difference and by doing so it puts at risk the feminist goal of 
transforming the social identities associated with gendered embodiments. Nevertheless, feminist 
theory attempts to give an account of the body that does not fall back into arguing that bodies are 
either solely material, or conversely solely a product of discourse, but retains a sense of the 
(empirically discoverable) possibilities and impossibilities that result from the particularities of the 
body. 
 
Paying attention to marginal voices 
As we’ve seen from the earlier description of Lisa Eckenwiler’s work, some feminist ethical inquiry 
draws on empirical material that is not in itself feminist to inform a socially and politically grounded 
account – in that case, of the global practices of care. However, other feminist ethics involves direct, 
hands-on empirical work. This may be necessary in areas where, for example, longstanding health or 
social care practices are being reshaped by the advent of new biotechnological innovations. It is not 
‘business as usual’, and there may be no existing empirical material to draw on. This kind of feminist 
bioethics therefore makes use of a range of social science methods, both qualitative and quantitative, 
to assemble information that provides as accurate as possible a basis for ethical reflection and 
normative claims. 
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Feminist empirical ethics tends to draw on a wider repertoire of sources of knowledge than some 
more familiar forms of empirical social science (Harding, 2005; Hughes & Cohen, 2010; Letherby, 
2011; Ramazanoglu & Holland, 2007). That is, it may not privilege institutionally organized natural and 
scientific knowledge (though it does make use of it), but also attempts to include in a systematic and 
rigorous way the personal experiences of individuals. There is a strong tradition within feminism, for 
example, of drawing on phenomenological or narrative accounts to ‘ground’ theory in lived experience 
(and it is worth noting there is an equally strong tradition of feminist debate about the theoretical 
usefulness of such personalised, subjective accounts). 
One example of feminist empirical research into the bioethical experiences of a socially marginalised 
group is provided by a project that I was involved in, with colleagues from the universities of 
Newcastle and Durham UK, between 2011 and 2014.69 The aim of this research was to examine the 
ways in which lay people who self-identified as religious make ethical evaluations about new 
reproductive and genetic technologies (NRGTs). The methodology included interviews with members 
of various Christian and Muslim faith groups who had personal experience of making a decision to 
use (or not to use) an NRGT to address infertility or a genetic condition. We also held group 
discussions, or dialogue groups (Banks et al, 2006), with people who had not had any direct 
experience of NRGTs but were willing to discuss the ethics of their use in the abstract. From those 
with personal experience we also gathered further information, such as how they had actually gone 
about making their choices, and the effect it had on their later lives and their faith; whether, in 
retrospect, they would have done anything differently; and whether they had any suggestions to make 
about improving the process.  
I’m describing this research as a form of feminist empirical bioethics, not because it addressed an 
issue of particular salience to women (though for many novel reproductive interventions that is clearly 
the case), but rather because it was a systematic attempt to explore the bioethical perspectives of the 
‘religious’: a category of people who, in the United Kingdom and much of mainland Europe, are 
socially and epistemically marginalised. The United Kingdom is an increasingly secular country in 
which faith group membership is often nominal. Most bioethical discourse and public bioethical 
deliberation in the UK is avowedly secular and politically liberal; the theological or doctrinal opinions 
that do make their way into public bioethics tend to echo the official positions of particular faith groups 
on health and life science technologies.  There is an obvious but generally unaddressed scarcity of 
information on how lay members of faith groups interpret their faith’s official position, and whether and 
how they then use that interpretation to form their own ethical stance towards NRGTs in general. In a 
wider context there is equally little knowledge of how people of faith, confronted with a personal need 
to consider using treatment for infertility or genetic conditions, then navigate their way through the 
possibly conflicting imperatives of their personal wishes, the wider ethical consensus of society, and 
the teaching of their faith group.  
Part of this project involved us as researchers identifying the epistemic and ethical resources of the 
religious groups we were investigating. Throughout, we were also attuned to the various ways in 
which differences in authority and status – often gendered differences, but also differences tracking 
along structural hierarchies, and across and between different faith groups – affected such things as 
people’s ability to get hold of adequate information about their faith’s opinion on the technology, their 
personal comfort in the clinical setting, and the ease with which they could raise issues relating to 
their faith practices, or their capacity to contribute their views as people of faith to public bioethical 
consultations. For example, our Christian participants were members of the state religion; most (but 
not all) were white and had been living in the UK for generations. By contrast our Muslim participants, 
most of whom had grown up in the UK, were members of a minority faith, and their families of origin 
came from countries such as Iran or Bangladesh. Their social position was therefore very different 
from that of the Christian participants. Our research suggested, among other things, that many of the 
participants felt that their faith commitment had indirectly excluded them from NRGT services that are 
in principle available to all. Indirectly, because they were not actively denied access to these services, 
but because the values and attitudes that came along with their identity as Christian or Muslim – and 
                                                     
69 For more details of this study, see the project website http://www.ncl.ac.uk/peals/research/project/3979 
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that were relevant to their infertility, genetic condition and/or its treatment – were, they felt, routinely 
neglected by their healthcare services. On the whole, our participants felt that this had less to do with 
hostility towards their religion or ethic identity than with their faith commitment being discounted as 
trivial or irrelevant. This had further impact on their capacity to contribute to public bioethical 
discourse. Many (but not all) of our interviewees and dialogue group participants said they would 
hesitate to contribute faith-specific points of view to public consultations or debates. 
 
The feminist ethics of empirical bioethics: responsibility, and reflexivity 
In this final section, I want to pick up on one further distinctive feature of feminist approaches to 
empirical bioethics. Feminist empirical methods benefit from academic feminism’s long engagement 
with the ethical and political responsibilities of doing research (e.g. Finch, 1984; Edwards & Mauthner, 
2012; Wilkinson, 1998; Ackerly & True, 2008). Questions about the moral responsibility that the 
feminist researcher holds towards the individuals and groups she is researching, as well as towards 
the discipline she serves and the academic institutions with which she is associated, are familiar to 
feminist researchers, especially those who make use of qualitative methodologies and who are 
confronted very directly with the often problematic relationship between the investigator and those 
being investigated through the common qualitative methods of interviews, focus groups or 
ethnographic observation. 
All empirical investigation is an opportunity to acquire better information and correct factual 
inaccuracies about actual practices, beliefs, rationales and so on. The critical ethos of feminist 
bioethics means that it directs its attention towards those practices, beliefs and rationales that are 
traditionally neglected or obscured, arguing that this will guarantee ethical theorising that is not just 
better factually informed but also more just: empirical accuracy therefore becomes an ethical as well 
as a methodological necessity. For the individual researcher, feminist ethics places a responsibility on 
the ethicist to be sensitive to the skewed distribution of epistemic authority within social relations in 
ways that are both critical (looking at how that authority is distributed in the situations under 
investigation) and self-critical (reflecting on the epistemic authority possessed by the ethicist, and its 
consequences).  
Both these aspects – of critique and self-critique – are illustrated in the example I want to use here.  It 
has become something of a staple of bioethical teaching and debate: the case of “choosing deaf (or 
disabled) children” (Mundy, 2002; Scully, 2008). Most nondisabled people, and many disabled people 
too, share the moral understanding that even minor physical or mental impairment involves some 
degree of disadvantage and suffering, which any good parent would want to avoid for their child if at 
all possible. This mostly undisputed consensus on the absolute undesirability of physical variation that 
is disabling lies behind the fascination of bioethicists and public towards the possibility that some 
people might wish to select for rather than against impairments in their children. To most nondisabled 
people, such a choice is profoundly counterintuitive. 
Because of the practical impact of bioethical discourse about impairment on the lives of disabled 
people, the empirical realities of this widely discussed example demand careful examination. 
Currently what evidence there is (and the scarcity of reliable information here underlines the more 
general point that our empirical knowledge of the phenomena about which bioethics is asked to make 
judgements is often woefully limited) suggests that some disabled people do express a desire to have 
a child with the same impairment as themselves. Most notably and notoriously, this has been be the 
case with some members of the signing Deaf community, many of whom identify themselves as a 
linguistic minority group rather than as disabled. However, there are few known examples of even 
Deaf people undertaking active steps towards having a child with a particular impairment, rather than 
just expressing a preference. The best attested of these, and the one that sparked the first wave of 
media and bioethical attention in the early years of this century, was that of Candace McCullough and 
Sharon Duchesneau (Mundy, 2002). These two Deaf women deliberately went in search of a sperm 
donor with a genetically related hearing impairment in order to increase their chances of having an 
audiologically deaf child.  
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Feminist analyses of this case have highlighted two things. One is that the bioethical choices (in this 
case, selecting the features of a future child) made by people from unfamiliar communities who hold a 
minority point of view are grounded in the situated knowledge and experiences of their particular 
contexts. Discounting these perspectives, or neglecting to inquire after them at all, is an epistemic 
injustice. Most importantly, it remains an injustice irrespective of whether or not these perspectives 
then stand up to subsequent ethical analysis.70 The case of ‘choosing deaf [or disabled] children’ has 
been widely discussed in the media and also in the bioethical literature (among others, see Anstey, 
2002; Levy, 2002; Savulescu, 2002 & 2007; Hayri, 2004 & 2010; Johnston, 2005; Scully, 2008 & 
2011), but mostly unaccompanied by any data indicating, for example, how common a preference for 
a disabled child might be among disabled or Deaf people, how often any preference is acted on, or 
what the reasons for preference might be.  
At this point, many philosophical bioethicists would respond that these empirical facts are irrelevant to 
the making of a philosophical argument. It doesn’t matter whether or not a preference is common, or 
why it is expressed; what they as ethicists are doing is using the intellectual tools of their discipline to 
examine the normative case for the preference, and if the information they draw on is flawed or 
patchy, that’s not actually a problem for the making of a well-structured evaluation.  
By contrast, feminist ethics holds that an ethicist bears political and moral responsibility to be mindful 
of the consequences for real people of abstract and abstracted theorising. Whether any one 
bioethicist intends it or not, a lot of bioethical thinking eventually does percolate out into the public 
domain and go on to influence public opinion and policy. Theorists may believe themselves doing no 
more than fearlessly following a philosophical argument to its conclusion. Others, however, might then 
consider they are entitled, or even obligated, to carry those theoretically derived conclusions through 
into practice.  
From a feminist research perspective, the exploitation of real people’s experience – or at least an 
empirically etiolated version of it – in the service of making philosophical points is irresponsible and 
profoundly unethical. I’ve been present at a number of conferences or seminar discussions in which 
the example of ‘choosing deaf children’ was invoked to illustrate anything from issues in identity 
politics to the semantics of predicting future regret. Each occasion involved the making of claims 
about the rationales behind deaf or disabled parents wanting a deaf or disabled child, but without any 
evidence that these claims bore any relation to the reasons that these parents would, in fact, give. 
The risk is that unsubstantiated ideas, used for the purpose of making an argument, are the 
explanations that are then incorporated into the bioethical literature, and that may in time influence the 
deliberations of advisory and policy bodies.  
That this is not just a hypothetical risk is exemplified in the story of the UK’s 2008 revision of the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act.  This revision contained a clause banning licensed fertility 
clinics from using gametes or embryos that contain serious, known genetic conditions, if alternatives 
are available (Scully, 2011). Given that the number of cases in which this is known or suspected to 
happen is so low, and also that the lack of agreement on contested terms like ‘serious’ is widely 
recognised as a problem, the insertion of this clause was surprising. It certainly was influenced by the 
media interest in the perceived oddity of ‘choosing deaf babies’, but may also have something to do 
with the disproportionate interest of philosophical bioethics in the structure of a counterintuitive ethical 
choice, rather than in the empirically discernible reasons behind that choice. Less surprisingly, the 
eventual insertion of this restriction in the law generated a strongly hostile response at the time from 
some members of the Deaf and disability community (Emery et al, 2008). 
As bioethicists, having the power to define the terms, to give a particular account of events, and to 
have one’s arguments and claims taken seriously by those with the authority to make things happen, 
is a power over the lives and wellbeing of others. This power, feminist ethicists would argue, creates 
responsibilities. In a paper published in 2008 the philosopher Eva Feder Kittay, who has written 
extensively on ethics and cognitive disability, proposed four maxims of good practice in ethical 
theorising (epistemic responsibility and modesty, humility, and accountability), asking theorists to 
                                                     
70 For discussion of different forms of epistemic injustice, see Fricker (2007); Hookway (2010); Code (1991); Alcoff (2000). 
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attend to the ethical and practical consequences of the argumentative procedures and examples they 
use (Kittay, 2008).  
A further area of ethical responsibility has to do with reflexivity about one’s own position as 
researcher. Feminist epistemology takes social, cultural and historical position to be important to the 
formation of distinct epistemic perspectives that need to be taken into account when others’ moral 
practices and choices are evaluated. But feminist epistemology also recognises that the forms of 
knowledge taken for granted by moral philosophy and philosophical bioethics are not immune to this 
epistemic distortion. Feminist bioethical approaches necessarily also involve the critical examination 
of the positions from which we, as bioethicists, carry out our empirical investigations and reflect 
normatively, of the empirical methods used, the epistemological and sociological assumptions that the 
use of them reveals, and so on. The inescapable human reality is that all of us are situated observers 
whose observations are shaped not only by explicit moral beliefs but by much of what we take for 
granted experientially, socially, institutionally and culturally. Feminist or any other approaches cannot 
offer a foolproof way around this, other than the constant and necessary reminder that all thinking is 
thinking from a particular vantage point. This includes the thinking of the moral philosopher: bioethics, 
whether empirical or theoretical, necessarily is done from a perspective that is dependent on 
bioethicists’ own personal backgrounds and biographies, and also their disciplinary and professional 
training, and their institutional roles within national and cultural environments.71  An uncritical and 
unself-critical empirical bioethics might try to investigate the ways in which an unfamiliar community, 
such as the Deaf community, ethically evaluates a novel biotechnology, to examine those choices 
within the framework of the normative judgments of moral philosophy; a more skeptical and distanced 
approach is necessary in order to examine the cultural, economic and political conditions that shape 
bioethicists’ own lines of sight. Within feminist standpoint epistemology this form of self-scrutiny 
contributes to what is called ‘strong objectivity’ (Harding 1993): one that is not grounded in any 
attempt at epistemic neutrality, but that reflects on a diversity of situated knowledge in order to form 
better, although never complete, knowledge.72 
 
The future of feminist empirical bioethics 
Feminist ethics as a whole, including feminist bioethics, is currently at something of a pivotal point in 
its life. Some distinctive features of feminist approaches – particularly their use of empirical methods – 
have been absorbed into the mainstream of bioethics, and are no longer remarked on as feminist 
(Scully et al, 2010). Other aspects of feminist ethics remain positioned as legitimate alternative 
perspectives. Acknowledging feminist bioethics as an alternative is not, however, the same as 
integrating its insights into the mainstream of the field. Although sometimes obscured by the 
competing imperatives of academic research, feminist bioethics’ basic political agenda means that it 
is still driven by a transformative commitment. While mainstream bioethics may have been able to 
assimilate feminist bioethics’ empirical drive, its specifically political goals – which as we have seen 
inform its epistemological and methodological stances – remain outside of the mainstream. 
Nevertheless, feminist bioethicists continue to believe that the distinctive insights provided by these 
approaches are of essential value to the work of bioethics as a whole.  
Bioethicists who have taken the empirical turn believe that normative ethics must still have some 
tethering in fact, if the values and norms it prescribes are going to have any relevance to real world 
practices. The well recognised problem here is the relationship between the empirical material, 
whatever form that takes, and the normative content of ethics. Empirical inquiry as commonly 
understood deals in natural and social scientific facts, while ethics as commonly understood deal 
prescriptively in norms and values. Ethical work with a substantial empirical component always risks 
the charge of being purely descriptive and, because of that, not just losing sight of the normative goal 
of ethical inquiry but losing the capacity to be normative at all. Pellegrino for example writes that it is 
                                                     
71 This has not gone entirely unnoticed by others working in empirical bioethics methodology, albeit not from an explicitly 
feminist standpoint: see, for example, Ives & Dunn (2010). 
72 This notion of moving towards better, but incomplete, moral knowledge is reflected, to varying degrees in Ives’ (2014) 
‘Reflexive Balancing’, Landeweer et al’s (2016) Dialogical Empirical Ethics (in this volume), and the account of moderate 
objectivism outlined by Sheehan (2016, this volume). 
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not possible to “extrapolate from the ‘is’ to the ‘ought’ without destroying normative ethics” (Pellegrino, 
1995:162). 
The extent to which the division between descriptive facts and normative values is real, and/or 
sustainable, has been extensively discussed as part of the sociology and philosophy of knowledge, 
and this is not the place to replay that particular debate.73 The point I want to make here is that a 
distinctive version of this concern about empirical inquiry eroding ethics’ normative capability is held 
by most feminist ethicists, who by definition believe that some forms of attitude and behaviour towards 
women are wrong and others right. The specific point about women has to be extended as a more 
general claim. As I said earlier, feminist ethics may be pluralist but it can’t ultimately be relativist. 
Feminist bioethicists want to be able to set normative boundaries to define morally wrong and morally 
right behaviours in order to prevent exploitation, abuse, oppression and so on of women (and other 
marginalities) in the contexts of health and life sciences, and this normative ethical goal holds 
whatever the empirical data may say about the prevalence of exploitative or oppressive practices, and 
whether or not they are endorsed by powerful groups in society.  
Feminists would argue that neither an empirically informed knowledge of others’ lives, nor the 
capacity for a more critical approach to the sources of our own and others’ ethical beliefs, requires us 
to abandon bioethics’ normative function of characterising the morally preferable courses of action in 
healthcare and life science research. And given the current pace of technological and social change 
in these domains, it is unlikely that the demand for the normative work of bioethics will fall off in the 
future. The case in favour of more empirical work to inform the normative work of bioethics on 
unfamiliar biomedical terrain is compelling. Feminist approaches offer ways of doing not just more, but 
better, empirical inquiry: an ethics that is inclusive of marginalised voices and minority experiences, 
attentive to the hidden cognitive and social biases (including our own) that can derail supposedly 
impartial reflection, alert to injustice, and that retains a clear sense of the ethical and political 
importance of normative capability. 
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Lessons from experience: Establishing and running 
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In this chapter, we draw on our experiences of working together since 1999 on a variety of projects 
funded by bodies including the Wellcome Trust and the ESRC.  These projects generally focus on 
what we have described as ‘morally contested’ areas of biomedicine. Our work often takes as its 
starting point the adoption or expansion of an ethically challenging health technology, examples of 
which include innovative antenatal screening, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), and embryo 
donation for human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research. A further common feature has been the 
focus on the views of practitioners, clinicians, scientists etc. rather than patients. This is primarily 
because historically, practitioners have tended to be a neglected and under researched group when 
contrasted with patients. Whilst research into the views and experiences of those accessing ethically 
contentious technologies remains important (Franklin, 2013), it is also very important to understand 
the views and practices of those providing (or choosing not to provide) the services. 
A significant feature of our work is an established and enduring cross-disciplinary collaboration 
between Clare Williams (CW), a medical sociologist and Bobbie Farsides (BF), a healthcare ethicist. 
Whilst the core collaboration has proven remarkably straight forward, there has been a need to reflect 
carefully over time on how to build wider collaborations – the skill set needed, the ground rules 
required to ensure amicable working, and the ‘philosophy’ that should inform shared practice around 
issues such as anonymity of participants, data sharing etc. An early project revealed the potential for 
disagreement within interdisciplinary research teams, and the experience of resolving the situation 
and then reflecting carefully upon it proved very helpful when establishing the working principles for 
subsequent projects (Williams et al, 2005).  
Since first working together in 1999 we have gone on to collaborate with co-applicants from a variety 
of disciplines including lawyers, clinicians, embryologists, anthropologists, scientists and surgeons. In 
every project we aim to provide space for each discipline to contribute to the overall endeavour, but 
also for individual co-applicants to extend and enhance their personal scholarship through access to 
high quality data. In what follows we will discuss our methods, focusing particularly on Ethics 
Discussion Groups (EDGs), which we believe constitute a methodologically innovative and empirically 
rich example of interdisciplinary methods and research in action.  
 
Ethics Discussion Groups – concept and purposes 
EDGs are a method of collecting data from groups of staff, following periods of interviewing, and 
sometimes observation. They are attended by staff who have previously been interviewed for the 
project being undertaken.  For us, EDGs serve a number of different functions.  
First, as a component of a mixed methods approach they provide an opportunity to supplement 
information collected during interviews.  Importantly, they also provide interviewees with a second 
opportunity to reflect upon the issues and consider their views, in a setting that emphasises their 
identity as a team member.  
Second, EDGs are extremely useful in terms of shedding light on group norms and values, and on 
work place cultures. In some settings hierarchies are obvious and unshiftable, whilst in others the 
democratic nature of the group is clear. The way in which the team sees itself sitting within the larger 
institution is illuminating and, because of our intimate knowledge of more than one centre, we can 
explore how the centre pitches its culture and norms within its professional networks. Commonly, 
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participants tell stories of ‘how things are done elsewhere’ and it is sometimes the case that, 
unbeknown to participants, we have detailed knowledge of that ‘other place’.  
Third, EDGs are also excellent at identifying shared and common knowledge, and conversely, they 
can reveal knowledge that staff assumed was shared, but was not. We are particularly interested in 
how ideas and Unit policies are shaped, and what makes people think and act in the way they do. For 
example, one of CWs research interests is the interface between private and professional moral views 
and how this manifests itself in the clinical setting, and EDGs often illuminate this interface. We are 
also interested in challenging assumptions of homogeneity in moral outlook within teams, having seen 
over the years that a well supported team can accommodate a wide range of views and practices 
relating to their work (Farsides et al, 2004).  
To date we have run over 20 EDGs for mixed groups of staff, over 4 different research projects,  
usually with six to eight staff in each group - so around 150 healthcare staff have participated in these 
groups. We should emphasise that EDGs are not the same as focus groups as standardly understood 
and conducted.  One feature of the method that makes it distinctive is the work that is undertaken 
before they are held. EDGs only take place once the research team is successfully embedded within 
the centre, observations are beginning to inform the project, participants have been interviewed and a 
preliminary analysis of transcripts has taken place. Another feature that makes EDGs distinctive is the 
way they are run and the role of the facilitator. 
 
Facilitating EDGs 
In our projects the EDGs have all been facilitated by BF, with the social scientist researchers who 
have previously undertaken interviews with participants formally present as observers but also, 
importantly, as ‘familiar faces’ who can welcome participants, make introductions, and generally help 
create a non-threatening atmosphere whilst participants are arriving.  In contrast to focus groups, the 
approach of these EDGs is more akin to a philosophy seminar where the facilitator intervenes and 
gently challenges individuals in the group setting, providing counterarguments. BF is an ethicist 
whose background is in philosophy. She has over twenty years’ experience of teaching ethics at 
undergraduate and graduate level. This experience has proved invaluable in conducting the groups 
and has led us to question whether it would be possible to proceed without experience of conducting 
seminar style discussions. We, and in particular BF, are not only interested in recording the accounts 
that people give of their work; we are looking for consistency, coherence, and the values attached to 
concepts and choices. We are also interested in comparing what they say within the Group setting 
against what they said previously when interviewed, and to observe how views begin to develop and 
shift in discussion with colleagues. We are interested in the link between theory and practice and will 
match what is said in groups to what has been observed in the clinical setting. In line with the  
‘philosophy seminar’ approach, we might challenge participants to acknowledge and explain any 
discrepancies noted.  Perhaps interestingly, we tend not to label anything ourselves as an ethical 
issue, but leave that to staff to decide.  However, if an issue we have begun to think of as critically 
important to the project fails to emerge in discussion we will guide participants towards it. Over the 
years we have come to realise that asking staff to identify ‘ethical’ issues in relation to their work can 
lead to a narrowing of both the topics raised and the ensuing discussions, as staff try to identify what 
they think of as ‘ethical’ issues. In a number of cases, staff have told us that they do not encounter 
ethical issues in their work, only to go on to produce a long list of ethical clinical, scientific and policy 
dilemmas, once we remove the word ‘ethics’ from the conversation (Brosnan et al, 2013). 
The role of the facilitator is key, in that the group needs to feel safe and comfortable in terms of clear 
house rules, appropriate behaviour etc. At the same time, however, the facilitator will seek to push the 
group out of its comfort zone without exposing individual members. On numerous occasions the 
groups have brought people into a room together whose work is intricately connected, but who have 
never had a discussion before; or in some cases have not even met before. The groups also give 
established teams an opportunity to observe one another afresh and to move beyond what may have 
become all-consuming clinical agendas. The non-hierarchical nature of the groups’ composition 
means that (if supported to do so)  junior staff can give voice to concerns or present issues in the 
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company of senior colleagues. However, we are always mindful of the fact that participants have to 
leave the EDGs and go straight back to what is often very demanding clinical work, where they have 
to work as a team. One of the important tasks for the facilitator is to ensure that no issues have been 
raised and not dealt with, and that discussions do not result in staff leaving the room feeling unsettled 
or negative about their work, their colleagues or their centre. Information leaflets about the EDGs 
contain advice as to where support or counselling can be obtained if participants feel they might need 
this. In addition, when facilitating, BF emphasises this information before and after the EDG, as well 
as providing her own contact details should staff want to discuss anything further.   
 
The product of EDGs 
After running an EDG we have at least two sets of data from the same group of people: interviews 
and EDG participation. In addition, we may well have data from observations. However, the group 
discussions add a crucial layer of data that is in itself analytical in the sense that participants are 
conducting analyses (of) themselves, through being provided with the unique opportunity to reflect on 
both their own and others’ views on particular topics. The data is discussed at regular multidisciplinary 
research team meetings throughout the project. For example, we may discuss a particular transcript; 
a selection of excerpts from a number of transcripts on a particular theme that a team member is 
interested in; compare interviews and EDGs in terms of what has been said in these different settings; 
or compare excerpts of transcripts from participants in different centres. These multidisciplinary team 
discussions have been extremely illuminating in terms of throwing into relief philosophical, conceptual 
and disciplinary differences and similarities between team members. The importance of mutual trust 
between team members cannot be over emphasised. What we aim to identify is a set of issues that 
often lie below the radar of ‘normal’ ethical scrutiny. We believe this approach is unique in its ability to 
provide a sociology of ethics in the making (Williams & Wainwright 2013.  
  
Towards successful interdisciplinary working – lessons learned along the way 
The first step towards a successful project on staff views and practices is ‘buy in’ from centres where 
the work in question is being conducted. This entails detailed discussions and negotiations up-front, 
usually before funding has been secured, to ensure that the project is understood and accepted by 
the relevant people and that recruitment can begin as soon as possible once the project commences. 
As we tend to work on innovative technologies the number of centres involved is usually limited, so 
factors such as confidentiality and anonymity are a key issue to be discussed at a very early stage. It 
has often been necessary to cover a range of centres in different parts of the country, and on a very 
practical note it is important to know what travel will be necessary when planning and costing a 
project. It is invaluable to identify a key collaborator in each centre and to include at least one key 
clinician as a co-applicant on the project. We have also found it productive to return to centres to 
conduct further studies, and indeed projects have been developed in response to requests from 
participating centres that specific issues need consideration.  
An added value of pre-project collaboration is the clarification of the research question, ensuring that 
the issues identified are of relevance to participants. The first Wellcome Trust funded project we 
worked on together was entitled ‘Cross Currents in Genetics and Ethics around the Millenium:1999-
2001’. However, when we arrived at the selected centres we soon discovered that staff did not want 
to discuss new ways of screening and testing in an antenatal setting until they had shared their 
concerns about current protocols, most frequently the routine screening for Down Syndrome. As the 
publications from the project demonstrate, practitioners had many unresolved issues and the project 
adapted to meet their needs. This was acceptable to the funders and the project was deemed a great 
success, but it raised an interesting issue of how far we should go to ensure that our research agenda 
‘chimed’ with our participants. 
This is not a simple issue. On the one hand, it is practically important to engage the interest of 
potential participants and to ensure that they feel their time has been well used. For this reason one 
needs to craft a project in such a way as to ensure that the research question has resonance for 
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participating centres. However, the researcher also has a responsibility to raise issues which are 
invisible to people doing the work, or to introduce issues which are being avoided or dealt with 
habitually rather than critically. And, although it is important and productive to be on good terms with 
the participating centres, it is also important to retain a degree of independence and a commitment to 
report honestly and if needs be, critically, upon what is observed74. It should always be born in mind 
that these centres are often undertaking what is seen as ground-breaking work which would often be 
the subject of praise and encouragement from potential patients and others. We therefore spend time 
prior to, and during, the project thinking about the potential impact of findings and how we might best 
provide on-going and end of project feedback and support to individual centres.  
Commitment from participating centres is also crucially important because of the relatively demanding 
methodology we have developed. Commonly we would conduct individual, semi structured interviews 
with a high proportion of centre staff covering a range of relevant professionals, and including both 
junior and senior staff. We would also conduct informal interviews and observations in the workplace, 
as part of a wider approach which might include observing clinical consultations, laboratory 
procedures, team meetings etc. The staff we interview and observe are the staff who would then be 
asked to participate in EDGs, so the time commitment for them and their centre is not insignificant. It 
is also important that the semi-structured interviews and observations are carried out in a way that 
retains and emphasises the credibility of the researcher and the research team. In practice this means 
that the researchers need to understand the work that is being carried out and be cognisant of the 
practical issues that help to shape the working environment. We do not approach centres and 
participants without having a good understanding of the technology under study, which is 
considerably helped by the input of clinical co-applicants and collaborators. However on some 
occasions it might require more than this - for example, on one project the researcher who conducted 
the ethnographic observations and interviews also attended and participated in a post-graduate 
course offered by one of the centres. Without this, we would anticipate a drop off of participants 
agreeing to participate in the project interviews and EDGs, as they are too busy and too immersed in 
their own work to have the time to bring a researcher up to speed. 
Given the business of the centres we study we have arranged EDGs at varying times in the working 
day, including 8am and 7pm, to accommodate clinical priorities and to fit with normal patterns of 
working. As well as ensuring maximum attendance, being invited to fit in to the centres’ usual routines 
affords a sense of legitimacy and endorsement. The fact that staff were willing to attend at these 
times also indicates the paramount importance of maintaining the on-going credibility of the research 
team, which includes forming good working relationships based on mutual trust.   
Establishing contacts and relationships with centres early on has also proved helpful in securing 
ethical approval and research governance approval from individual Trusts and institutions. At a very 
practical level, committees are reassured that recruitment issues have been given due consideration 
and that the researchers have the trust of participating centres. We have never had any problem with 
securing ethical approval for our work, despite the sensitive nature of the problems we consider, and 
attribute this at least in part to our good working relationships with centres and staff. However, on 
some occasions we have had to adapt our plans slightly to accommodate the requirements of the 
committees. On one occasion for example, the ethics committee was unhappy that the lead clinician 
in a centre we were studying was also a co-applicant on our project. They required that the individual 
concerned should not see raw data and should not be aware of when, where or with whom interviews 
and EDGs were taking place. We agreed to this limitation with some regret, having previously 
included centre leads in EDGs with great success.  
Appreciating that these centres are not sealed off from the rest of the world, we also interview a range 
of external stakeholders, who give us a different perspective on the technology we are investigating. 
Although it would be possible to run follow up EDGs for stakeholders too, our key focus has to date 
been on the clinical teams offering services and this is where the stakeholder interviews make a key 
contribution.    For example, key disability rights activists provided us with an important contrasting 
perspective in relation to pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. In projects where we have been 
                                                     
74 This may be considered to contrast to the approach outlined by Landeweer et al (2016), in this volume, who explicitly avoid 
engaging in any external critical appraisal of conclusions arising from, or views expressed during, the group process. 
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interested in developing specific policy recommendations or where participating staff have requested 
it, we may formalise this process. One successful example of this was by running a multidisciplinary 
Ethics and Policy Workshop with 20 invited UK stakeholders (who included, for example, patient 
activists we had interviewed, representatives of a variety of policy and regulatory bodies, and 
clinicians and scientists), to consider whether embryo donors should be able to restrict the future use 
of human embryonic stem cells from their embryos. The Workshop was also attended by all of the 
multidisciplinary research team and was facilitated by BF, who drew on information gained through 
project interviews, observations and EDGs, which had been discussed by the research team in 
relation to its use in the Workshop.  Participants cited tensions between pure altruism and a more 
reciprocal basis for donation; and between basic research (in which genetic material would never form 
part of another living human being) and treatment applications. Two restriction models were agreed 
on, to acknowledge the specific ethical issues raised by obtaining informed consent for embryo 
donation (Ehrich et al, 2011).  The fact that these models were debated, agreed and then promoted 
by leading stakeholders in this area (and participants’ names and affiliations appeared on the article 
setting out the recommendations) gave these models a legitimacy that they may otherwise not have 
had. 
Not all interview participants wish to take part in EDGs and this in itself can prove interesting. For 
example, in one study hospital chaplains were prepared to speak very openly on a one to one basis 
but felt unable to do so within a group. It can also be the case that a person assumes that their views 
are very out of step with those of their colleagues and therefore they do not feel comfortable ’exposing 
themselves’. In this situation we might encourage (but never put too much pressure on) a participant 
to join a group in the knowledge (gained from interviews with that participant and others) that their 
views are not going to cause the impact they assume. Because we know the individual views that will 
be brought into the room we can to some extent predict how a particular individual will ‘fit’ and be 
prepared to support them. 
Organising the EDGs is not easy and can be very time consuming.  We may have ideas about who 
we would like to participate in each group, but this may have to be adjusted once we know who is 
available, and when. Once we know who is going to participate in each EDG, the team goes through 
the interview transcripts of participants, discussing any pertinent observations and picking out 
potentially interesting topics to be discussed in an EDG context. We will also have asked interviewees 
at the end of their interview if they would like to suggest topics that might usefully be discussed in 
their EDG. So these EDG’s are in a sense ‘tailor made’ for the particular set of participants attending 
that EDG, and in our experience that is important in terms of making the discussion relevant.  On 
occasion we have spoken to interviewees prior to their participation in a group to ask for permission to 
include a very specific issue or case they have spoken about which might be traceable back to them. 
This means that they are prepared for it to be mentioned and if they are not comfortable we will 
approach the subject in a different way.  The team meeting observations in particular have proved 
particularly useful in terms of identifying how centre policy decisions are arrived at. The knowledge 
gained by observing these meetings is also very useful in terms of providing key topics for individual 
staff interviews and for the EDGs.  By their very nature, the staff within these centres often have a 
large say in terms of, for example, which tests they will offer, which patients they will treat and how 
they will respond to new professional guidance, and team meetings are where these important 
decisions get taken.  
In looking back at the transcripts of both interviews and EDGs one appreciates the role and power of 
story-telling when professionals relay their experiences and reflect upon their practice. Often, project 
participants would return to an archetypal case (sometimes clearly real and current, sometimes less 
reliably so) in order to make or challenge a point, or to express their personal take on a professionally 
shared experience. Sometimes the theme of story-telling was both unexpected and recurrent, such as 
the stem cell scientists’ wish to return to and reflect upon their early experimental work with animals. 
Some cases stood as exemplars of particularly challenging ethical issues, such as the woman 
wanting a termination for a ‘trivial’ reason, or the couple whose wish for a ‘perfect’ embryo challenged 
the embryologists’ view of what counts as such. This is further evidence, if needed, of the fact that a 
rigid ethically focused framework was unnecessary when running the EDGs, in that participants could 
to some extent set their own ‘ethical agendas’ within the groups.  
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Staff perspectives 
What we could not have fully appreciated at the outset of our work back in 1999 is the benefits to staff 
of participating in EDGs (Alderson et al, 2002). One component of the methodology not yet mentioned 
is the informal but rigorous evaluation of the research experience. Each EDG participant has a 
telephone debrief conversation with one of the project researchers, and these conversations have 
provided useful feedback on the methodology. This is important, as although there is an established 
literature on participating in research including focus groups, interviews and observations, the EDG 
experience is unique. Participants noted numerous benefits, including support – for example: 
Sometimes there are things that you don’t want to admit that you’re having a tricky time 
with. It’s reassuring to know that other people are as uncertain as you are…we 
discussed issues that I normally try to suppress (consultant obstetrician). 
I liked the reassurance of hearing that other people worried about the same issues, and 
how broad and varying the range of good practice could be (junior midwife).  
They also appreciated the time to reflect on their work and clarify their thoughts: 
It’s rare to have the chance to sit and contemplate and seriously discuss issues and hear 
about other people’s thoughts; I don’t usually have the time (senior midwife). 
They’re issues we all deal with all the time, but we don’t discuss them, partly because we 
think we can’t. But this provides time to formulate what you think. It was extremely helpful 
to me personally to order my thoughts. That helps you to be clearer to patients 
(consultant obstetrician). 
A number of participants also used the opportunity to request the involvement of the research team in 
issues relating to the project but beyond its original brief, taking us into the realm of a form of action 
research.   For example, one paediatrician was very keen to introduce antenatal testing for a gene 
causing deafness, for families who had previously had a deaf child. Her purpose for introducing this 
was to enable families whose foetus had the gene to prepare for the birth of another deaf child. 
However, it became apparent in her individual interview that at no time had she considered that 
couples might use this information to terminate the pregnancy. At her request, this was one of the 
issues selected for discussion in her EDG, where she realised that termination might indeed result 
from the offer of testing. During the evaluation, she requested a further discussion with BF, following 
which she decided to delay the introduction of the testing until further discussion with her clinical team 
had taken place. Further examples have involved teams who have taken part in one of our projects 
requesting that we return and facilitate a group discussion of an on-going issue of concern. And, on 
one occasion, a community clinician requesting our input to a multi-agency workshop, which arose as 
a result of a problem being identified during an EDG. 
 
Concluding comments 
Martyn Pickerskill (2013) has identified three ways in which ‘sociology in ethics’ can be useful. First, 
sociological research methods such as interviews can be used as part of an ethical analysis, which he 
describes as ‘empirical ethics’. Secondly, he illustrates how sociological frameworks can be used to 
reframe issues of ethical concern. For example, drawing on interviews, Wainwright et al (2006) used 
the concept of ‘ethical boundary work’ to show how hESC scientists constructed some embryos as 
more ‘ethical’ than others, and drew lines around which embryos they would and would not work with. 
Finally, Pickerskill argues that sociological analysis of ethical issues can help illuminate key matters of 
legal, bioethical, clinical and regulatory consideration.75  In our projects we have many examples of 
how sociology in ethics can be of value. However, in this chapter we have focused primarily on the 
                                                     
75 See, for example, Scott et al. (2012) on the validity and quality of consent for human embryo donation. 
 145 
use of sociological methods in our various projects and how the particular methodology we have 
developed builds upon but also extends standard sociological approaches.  
We believe that this approach to interdisciplinary mixed methods research has enabled us to develop 
a broad, but detailed and contextualised, understanding of the complex social worlds involved in the 
development and implementation of diverse innovative health technologies. In retrospect, we realise 
that we were also ahead of the curve in terms of ensuring that our academic work had impact beyond 
the academic papers we have successfully published across the years. The work is not without its 
difficulties, but the data produced can be exceptional in so many ways. Undertaking these projects 
has required a ‘leap of faith’ on the part of our participants, and we are hugely grateful to all those 
who were prepared to take such a leap. We hope this chapter illustrates the importance of 
inter/multidisciplinary research and the benefits that can accrue when people from a variety of 
disciplines come together around a particular topic, in a spirit of collaboration and intellectual curiosity. 
Crucially, this requires the ability to be critical about one’s own disciplinary background. The benefits 
of this work include contributions to ethics, clinical and scientific practice, policy, regulation and 
sociology. The data collected has contributed to books, numerous articles, regulatory and policy 
developments and many conference papers. However, the benefits are also individual – to work on 
such projects is stimulating, enjoyable, and fun! Finally, we hope that this chapter will encourage 
others who might be hesitating to take the plunge into the fascinating and rewarding world of 
interdisciplinary research and methods.  
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Publishing research in empirical ethics: Quality, 
disciplines and expertise 
 
Lucy Frith 
Heather Draper 
 
 
 
This chapter looks at some of the challenges for reporting and publishing results in empirical ethics, 
an emerging methodological approach to ethics research. Many of these challenges have their origins 
in how empirical ethics is defined and where it sits in relation to other disciplines. Accordingly, we 
consider the relationship between bioethics and empirical ethics, situating these discussions within 
the debates over whether bioethics is a discipline and the implications this has for the quality of 
scholarship and the publishing of results.76   We explore the construction of academic disciplines in 
general and examine questions such as: is bioethics a discipline in its own right? Is it a branch of 
philosophy? Or is it a combination of several disciplines that collaborate to answer certain questions? 
Following from this, we will consider what counts as expertise in bioethics, as this has a bearing on 
what bioethicists are seen as contributing when they undertake research in empirical ethics.  These 
insights will then be applied to how empirical ethics should be reported. We will conclude that as 
empirical ethics grows, general quality and reporting standards will emerge and these will gain more 
general acceptance as empirical ethics becomes more established.  
 
 
What is an academic discipline? 
 
The word ‘discipline’ is commonly used to delineate a pre-ordained category of academic enterprise, 
almost like a Platonic form; an ideal type. For an area of inquiry to be seen as lying within a specific 
discipline it has to follow certain rules and procedures, draw on particular theories, and publish and 
disseminate in appropriate journals and forums.  
 
Disciplinary conventions can be used as a way to draw boundaries between acceptable and 
unacceptable scholarship. These conventions can be used both formally, in academic journals or 
conference presentation requirements, or informally over coffee when discussing someone’s work or 
job candidates; ‘she is not a proper philosopher’ or ‘that is not proper sociology’. These ‘not proper’ 
comments are pejorative value judgments and such criticisms are often levied at bioethicists. As 
Lewens observes, it is often said that the problem with bioethics is, ‘that most bioethicists have a 
limited grip on ‘serious philosophy’’ (2004:121) and therefore are not proper philosophers.   
 
The increasing importance in the UK of disciplinary boundaries is due partly to the advent of the 
research assessment exercises (RAEs), which have been organised around subject discipline panels 
that assess research in a particular domain.77  The increasing importance of disciplinary boundaries 
with their own definitions of what counts as ‘appropriate’, ‘good quality’ and ‘meaningful’ research, 
operates alongside a contrary force: the drive for inter-disciplinarity, defined as, ‘any form of dialogue 
or interaction between two or more disciplines’ (Moran, 2001). Inter-disciplinarity aims to break down 
artificial boundaries between subjects and is seen as a way of addressing the grand challenges facing 
humanity, such as climate change and food scarcity, something that funders, and hence Universities, 
are keen to encourage. For example, the Research Councils UK states:  
 
The Research Councils already support a great deal of inter-disciplinary research, which 
benefits from drawing together insights and approaches from a number of established 
research disciplines…RCUK wishes to support an enhanced culture of interdisciplinary 
                                                     
76 Empirical ethics is a particular methodological approach and as such is applicable to other areas of applied ethics such as 
business ethics. 
77 In the UK, RAEs are used to rank Universities and rank is used to make inferences about the quality of the research 
produced by different institutions and research clusters within institutions. There is sometimes a mismatch between what the 
different subject panels set out in their guidance on eligibility and markers of quality, and how institutions interpret this 
guidance. Institutions have tended to be conservative and to stick within mainstream examples of research in any particular 
discipline. As a consequence, bioethics is seen not have a natural fit in any of the subject panels (Kong et al, 2011). 
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and multidisciplinary research in the UK and to ensuring that its peer review and funding 
infrastructure is supportive of such work. (RCUK, 2014)   
 
Inter-disciplinary work comes with costs: there is uncertainty over where to publish the results, 
difficulties with assessing quality, and outputs do not fit into any of the standard assessment 
frameworks. All this can limit understanding and appreciation of inter-disciplinary research. As Marilyn 
Strathern commented: “one knows one is in an interdisciplinary context if there is resistance to what 
one is doing” (2005:130). All these issues  are relevant to empirical ethics and we will consider them 
below. 
 
If inter-disciplinarity means crossing disciplinary boundaries, this raises the question of what these 
boundaries are.  There are many accounts of what a discipline is, and there is not space in this 
chapter to go into this in detail. As Krishan (2009) states, there are different approaches to 
conceptualising academic disciplines that include sociological, anthropological, philosophical, 
historical and management/organisational perspectives.  In an attempt to determine what the essence 
of a discipline is, Krishan sets out the following elements: 
 
 “disciplines have a particular object of research (e.g. law, society, politics), though the object 
of research may be shared with another discipline;  
 
 disciplines have a body of accumulated specialist knowledge referring to their object of 
research, which is specific to them and not generally shared with another discipline; 
  
 disciplines have theories and concepts that can organise the accumulated specialist 
knowledge effectively;  
 
 disciplines use specific terminologies or a specific technical language adjusted to their 
research object; 
 
 disciplines have developed specific research methods according to their specific research 
requirements;  
 
 disciplines must have some institutional manifestation in the form of subjects taught at 
universities or colleges, respective academic departments and professional associations 
connected to it.” (Krishnan, 2009:10) 
 
The more of these characteristics a subject can claim, the more likely it is to be seen as an academic 
discipline capable of producing a body of scholarship (Krishnan, 2009). The last element is crucial as, 
 
only through institutionalisation are disciplines able to reproduce themselves….A new 
discipline is therefore usually founded by way of creating a professorial chair devoted to 
it at an established university.’ (Krishnan, 2009:11)  
 
Pierce notes:  
 
Although most studies fail to define the term [discipline] explicitly, they typically assume 
that boundaries of disciplines closely follows those of academic departments…[their] 
importance in creating and maintaining disciplinary communities makes the academic 
department the building block from which disciplines are created. (1991:22-23)  
 
The history of the discipline of philosophy can be traced using this institutionalised focus, starting with 
the founding of a new chair and charting its subsequent development. One of the first ‘philosophy’ 
chairs was the Knightbridge Professor founded in 1683 at the University of Cambridge, originally 
called the Chair of Moral Theology or Casuistical Divinity, and often known as the Professor of 
Casuistry. In Cambridge before the early-19th century the only degree – or tripos – that could be 
studied was mathematics. A classics tripos was introduced in 1822 but was only available to 
graduates of the mathematics tripos. Philosophy began as part of an area of study called moral 
sciences (which included moral philosophy, political economy, modern history, general jurisprudence 
and the laws of England), which was introduced in 1848 and became a tripos in 1851 and honours in 
1861. Around the middle of the 19th century subjects began to become more defined and specialised. 
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Law created its own tripos in 1858 with history and these split in 1870. Economics became a separate 
degree subject in 1903. What was left of the original moral sciences tripos continued till it was 
renamed ‘philosophy’ in 1970. In 1881 the Chair of Logic, Mental & Moral Philosophy, and Political 
Economy at University College Liverpool was founded and became the Chair of Philosophy in 1891. 
Hence, philosophy in its current institutional form has only existed for slightly over 100 years. In the 
nineteenth century psychology and philosophy were not seen as separate disciplines. Theorists who 
are now seen as philosophers, Hume, Hobbes and Locke, produced elaborated accounts of 
psychology; for Mill, logic was part, or a branch, of psychology; William James is seen both as an 
ancestor of psychologists and philosophers. The journal Mind, when it was founded in 1878, 
published articles that nowadays would be considered to be psychology. What we now know as 
economics had a similar relationship with philosophy. Adam Smith is an important theorist for both 
modern disciplines and economics was part of the original moral science tripos in Cambridge until 
1903 when, as a discipline, it moved away from moral aspects (Alvery,1999) and became a discipline 
in its own right. Now, University departments are moving away from ‘traditional’ (20th century) 
disciplinary boundaries to being organised around areas of study to reflect the aspiration for a greater 
inter-disciplinary focus (such as departments of health and well-being).  
 
Societal concerns, funding, teaching requirements, location of academics (i.e. philosophers in medical 
schools) all combine to change the profile of academic disciplines. Disciplines can be seen as specific 
practices, with rules that determine which kind of statements are accepted as true or false within that 
particular discourse (Lyotard, 1984). Academic disciplines are socially contingent bodies with specific 
discursive strategies to address an area of shared concern. They are essentially ‘communities of 
practice.’ defined as: ‘groups of people who share a concern or a passion for something they do and 
learn how to do it better as they interact regularly’ (Wenger, 2006).  Disciplines are not fixed or 
discrete entities, but continually change and evolve. It is against this historical background that we 
can begin to answer the question of whether bioethics is an academic discipline in its own right, 
recognising that bioethics, and now empirical ethics, are part of the changing evolution of academic 
subjects and disciplines. 
 
Bioethics – discipline or not? 
 
Bioethics arose out of philosophy.  ‘Bioethics’ is characterised as the “investigation of ethical issues 
arising in the life sciences…by applying the principles of moral philosophy to these issues” (Bennett & 
Cribb, 2003:10).  At the ‘birth of bioethics’ philosophy and theology shaped the discipline with their 
methods and structures of abstract universal foundationalist theorising (Jonsen, 1998). Although 
bioethics is informed by other disciplines – its central methodology is philosophical.   As Green 
observes,  
 
(w)hile ethics and moral philosophy may sometimes represent a relatively small part of 
the actual work of bioethics … the methods of ethics and philosophy remain 
indispensable to this domain of enquiry (1990:182).   
 
Arguably bioethics has changed and evolved since its beginnings in the middle of the 20th Century. It 
now encompasses a more divergent view of ethics, drawing on a wider theoretical cannon (such as 
care ethics, feminist perspectives, post-modernism) and using different approaches to solve moral 
problems (such as empirical methodologies) (Herrera, 2008). Under our definition we would argue 
that bioethics is a discipline in its own right, it is a community of scholars, with its own journals, 
conferences, networks and ways of approaching and debating moral problems and issues in the area 
of the life sciences. This community includes others from disciplines such as medical law, medicine 
and sociology who contribute to this specific community of practice.78  
  
Considering the development of empirical ethics through the lens of our conception of academic 
disciplines, we argue it is another step in the evolution of bioethics that should not be ruled out on 
predetermined theoretical commitments to ‘pure’ philosophical method. There is not space in this 
chapter to revisit why bioethics in its philosophical form might use empirical data, how this relates to 
moral theory and the is/ought debate, nor why we need a particular discipline or sub-set of bioethics 
called ‘empirical ethics’. These questions have been debated extensively elsewhere79 (Molewijk & 
                                                     
78 It is more institutionalised in the US, with departments of bioethics, but there are centres for bioethics in the UK. 
79 Including in this volume. 
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Frith, 2009), but for our purposes we will take empirical ethics to be one of the methods of inquiry 
used by bioethicists to approach and explore moral issues. 
 
Empirical ethics moves away from what might be seen as the safe and established shores of 
philosophical method. As we have noted, bioethicists are often accused of not being proper 
philosophers, but with the advent of empirical ethics we now might be subject to the charge of not 
being proper sociologists as well. To address, what ultimately comes down to, the issue of who is 
given the privilege of having their research recognised and valued within the academic community of 
bioethics and outside, we will first consider the debate over what constitutes ‘expertise’, first in relation 
to bioethics, and then to how one qualifies as an expert in empirical ethics. 
 
Expertise 
 
There has been extensive debate about what constitutes moral expertise and how this relates to the 
role bioethicists occupy on public bodies or when offering ethical advice (for example in a clinical 
setting).80  There is a close link between how we define moral expertise and how moral judgments are 
justified (Gesang, 2010), but moral expertise can also focus on the process of decision-making rather 
than an ability to make ‘correct’ moral judgments. When considering whether bioethicists in their role 
qua bioethicists are experts, it is important to define exactly which role of the bioethicist we are talking 
about. As Archard notes, with reference to ‘ethics experts’ on public bodies, “[t]he fact that moral 
philosophers sit on the bodies in question is not tantamount to the exercise of the moral expertise” 
(2011:119-120).  The nature of committees, he argues, is such that no one person is making the 
decision and usually such bodies make general policies recommendations rather than dictating 
specific actions. Thus, bioethicists on committees cannot be said to be making moral decisions in the 
way one might in one’s personal life. Nor can medical ethics consultants, certainly in the UK, who 
might be called in to advise on more pressing decisions, be said to be making decisions; their role is 
advisory and it is the health care professionals concerned who are the ones actually making the 
decision. Driver’s distinction between ‘three distinct forms of moral expertise’ is useful here:  
 
the expert judger, who does a better job of arriving at true moral judgments, the expert 
practitioner, who acts morally well more than others, and the expert in moral analysis 
who has greater than normal insight into the nature of morality (in some respect). 
(2013:280)  
 
The final definition seems best to capture the moral expertise of bioethicists; they are experts in moral 
analysis, which enables them to identify moral issues, moral distinctions, non-sequiturs in moral 
reasoning, and to locate issues within the context of ethical theory. 
 
For Caplan, those trained in ethics have a set of traditions and theories that enable them to deliberate 
about and judge moral issues: 
 
A fully developed applied ethic would afford the moral philosopher an opportunity to 
examine the delicate interplay that occurs among fact, social roles and prescriptive 
principles in reaching moral decisions. (1982:16)  
 
An ethicist has expertise in both normative theories and concepts and a good understanding of the 
area they are considering.  An important aspect of this role is not just accepting the moral problems 
as presented by, say, doctors, because: 
 
[a] knowledge of ethical theories, traditions and concepts allows the moral philosopher to 
see the normative aspects of ordinary events in ways that those more directly involved 
do not and sometimes will not. (Caplan, 1982:14)  
 
Thus, the ethicist has the role of identifying and defining moral problems rather than simply offering 
solutions. Using ethical theory can highlight and clarify the areas of disagreement and discern 
underlying ethical problems and tensions. Theories and principles can be a tool for elucidating and 
analysing the data (Frith, 2012), just as, for example, sociologists use theories of social interaction to 
approach their data (Maxwell, 1996).   
                                                     
80 See also Edwards & Deans (2016), in this volume. 
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This view, as Singer notes, takes expertise as a skill: 
 
… the moral philosopher does have some important advantages over the ordinary man. 
First his general training…should make him more than ordinarily competent in argument 
and in the detection of invalid inferences…his specific experience in moral philosophy 
gives him an understanding of moral concepts and of the logic of moral argument. The 
possibility of serious confusion arising if one engages in moral argument without a clear 
understanding of the concepts employed has been sufficiently emphasised…Clarity is 
not an end in itself, but is an aid to sound argument. Finally there is the simple fact that 
the moral philosopher can, if he wants, think full-time about moral issues, whilst most 
other people have some occupation to pursue which interferes with such reflection. 
(1972:117) 
 
Lillehammer talks about the advantage of being able to devote sufficient time to this type of 
deliberation: 
 
the role of bioethicists is vindicated by their possession of a critical and systematic 
mastery of ethical concepts and positions, of the presuppositions of such positions, and 
the relations and distinctions between them. It is in the application of this knowledge that 
philosophical expertise comes into its own right by encouraging a more informed level of 
debate in bioethics. It is not that bioethicists offer expertise that scientists, doctors, or 
politicians are in principle barred from acquiring on their own. It is rather that the division 
of intellectual labour provides the benefit of input from persons devoted to the systematic 
study of the theoretical complexities embodied in ethical concepts applied in practical 
bioethical debate. (2004:133) 
 
At the heart of these skills-based accounts is that a good bioethicist is not more likely to make better 
moral judgments, but they are likely to help others to make better moral judgments by aiding the 
process of decision-making.  
 
This suggests a process account that could be constructed along the lines of the importance of 
employing procedural justice, akin to Daniels’ (2008) accountability for reasonableness approach. 
This approach privileges process because there is unlikely to be agreement on substantive decisions.  
Richard Ashcroft (2008) has expressed concerns that process accounts abrogate bioethicists’ 
responsibilities and ultimately makes them redundant. Instead, he argues, bioethicists should be 
producing and defending substantive moral arguments, and this is the unique contribution of the 
bioethicist in policy forums. There are two rejoinders to this view. First, in a committee neither the 
bioethicist, nor any other individual, is asked to make a moral decision. Rather, it is the job of the 
committee to come to some collective decision. Second, as Frith has argued elsewhere (2009), good 
process can lead to good substantive moral decisions – the process and end are not separate 
entities. 
 
In conclusions what determines a bioethicist’s skill and usefulness is essentially the skill of 
argumentation, the ability to pick out key moral issues and determine ways of thinking about moral 
problems that might not be immediately available to the non-bioethicist. This raises the question of 
how does empirical ethics fit into bioethics expertise as we have conceptualised it?  
  
Empirical ethics and expertise 
 
The answer to this question depends on one’s conception of empirical ethics and, as argued above, 
our conception of empirical ethics keeps at its heart a broad conception of philosophical method and 
corresponding skills. There are different forms of empirical ethics and different ways in which the 
relationship between empirical data and ethical theory can be conceptualised (as demonstrated in this 
volume). Does empirical data leave ethical theory unaltered? Or does empirical data have some 
influence on the actual content and structure of ethical theory itself? To consider the different 
conceptions of empirical ethics and what contribution bioethicists might make to empirical work, we 
want briefly to give an overview of the empirical work conducted in bioethics to illuminate different 
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forms of empirical ethics. Draper and Ives (2007) categorise81 different ways sociological research 
has been employed in ethical reasoning, and thereby provide an example of how two different 
disciplines might come together under the ‘empirical ethics umbrella.’ The three broad categories are: 
i) sociology of bioethics; ii) sociology for bioethics; and iii) sociology in bioethics.82  It is possible that 
some studies could fall into more than one category – the categories are not mutually exclusive. 
 
Sociology of bioethics  
 
This incorporates two aspects: (1) seeing bioethics and bioethicists as objects of study and (2) 
examining the social context of bioethical issues or problems. Ethical issues may be studied by the 
methods of social science. The papers in de Vires et al’s edition of Sociology of Health & Illness 
(2006), for example, are largely an attempt to put bioethical issues (such as the ethics of research 
and social policy) into a social context.83 A sociology of bioethics can engage with ethical theory to 
varying degrees. Bosk’s (1992) study of genetic counselling in a paediatric hospital, for example, 
although looking at an area of great ethical concern, does not explicitly employ or consider ethical 
theory in its analysis. Other studies and authors critically engage with ethical theory and use their 
studies to demonstrate what they see as failings in the traditional bioethics.  Anspach (1993), for 
example, in her study of decision-making in an intensive care nursery, explicitly engages with the 
bioethical debate over life and death decisions in intensive care. Alderson (1990) used her empirical 
findings to advance a form of the ‘social science critique’ of bioethics. 
 
Sociology for bioethics  
 
This type uses empirical research to produce data for bioethics.  In practice, says Weisz, social 
scientists, “can provide ethicists with data, ranging from descriptions of the historical origins of current 
ethical debates to information about how people in different cultures and at different social levels 
actually behave in ethically problematic situations” (1990:5). Empirical research could be used to 
identify moral issues that need to be studied. Baruch Brody argues for this sort of role for empirical 
research in bioethics:  
 
‘It can identify issues that actually arise and processes actually used for dealing with 
them, thereby suggesting where normative analysis is most needed.’ (1993:218)  
 
The models of sociology of and for bioethics largely keep the disciplinary boundaries between ethics 
and sociology separate. There is ethical theory on the one hand and there is sociologically gathered 
evidence on the other.  
 
Sociology in bioethics 
 
This attempts to break down the boundaries between empirical evidence and ethical theory. It uses 
empirical data to directly alter and shape ethical theory:  
 
For example, one might wish to modify the theory of patient autonomy towards the social 
practice of surgical decision-making in elderly men on the basis of empirical data. 
(Stigglebout et al.,  2004:269)  
 
Thus, “bioethical theorising…is not removed from lived experience – it is based upon it.” (Draper & 
Ives, 2007:325)  
 
 
There are many forms of empirical ethics, each with a different emphasis depending on the 
disciplinary background and concerns of the research team. There is no single right way of doing 
empirical ethics; it depends on what the aims of the study are (Ives & Draper, 2009). It is now 
accepted, in the general research community, that neither qualitative nor quantitative methods are 
                                                     
81 There are obvious limitations with constructing any typology of this nature. The intention is to broadly group approaches that 
share certain characteristics for clarification purposes. 
82 These categories are similar to those often used in medical sociology (White, 2002).  
83 See also Haimes’ work on genetic databases, discussed in Haimes & Williams (2007). 
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intrinsically ‘better’ than the other.84  Rather, which paradigm you draw on depends on the research 
question and the key aspects of the world that one wants to investigate. We consider the same is true 
of empirical ethics.  
 
Role of the bioethicist in empirical ethics 
 
To return to the question of what the philosophically orientated bioethicists can contribute to empirical 
ethics work, we take our favoured definition of empirical ethics as one that incorporates some form of 
normative, and hence philosophical, method, and integrates this with empirical data; a form of 
sociology in ethics. It could be argued that ethicists, trained in philosophy, are not the best people to 
carry out the research from which these data are derived. Levitt (2004), for example, argues that 
bioethics and sociology should remain complementary rather than seeking to become more 
integrated. Appiah, who despite being very sympathetic to the use of empirical findings in the 
discussion of moral deliberation says: ‘Philosophy should be open to what it can learn from 
experiments; it doesn’t need to set up its own laboratories.’ (2008:3)  
 
There are two reasons we argue that bioethicists should be involved in the actual conduct of empirical 
studies and thereby involved in forming a distinctive type of empirical ethics inquiry based on 
bioethical expertise rather than just leaving it to sociologists. First, a study designed by an ethicist and 
therefore driven by predominately ‘ethical’ concerns will have a different emphasis and focus from 
those conducted by sociologists. This is not the only way to approach ethical issues or areas, but 
there is room for studies of this type alongside more conventionally conceived sociological ones. 
Second, ethicists might (and this is a more controversial claim) be better able to design studies that 
produce the kind of data that are of use in conducting an ethical analysis. For example, if interview 
data is collected by an ethicist there will be a difference in how the conversations are focussed, the 
prompts used and the ideas explored that will focus more on the normative aspects of the 
encounter.85 Even if the claim that ethicists might be better at collecting their own data for their own 
purposes is disputed, our central claim is that there is room for a distinctive type of empirical ethics 
study: a study that uses ethical theory and principles in the collection and analysis of the data and  
seeks to say something about the theories and principles themselves as well as the phenomena 
under study (Frith, 2012). Hence, it is valuable for ethicists to carry out their own empirical studies, 
and in doing so they can make a distinctive contribution to the literature and create a ‘community of 
practice’ that integrates empirical evidence and moral theorising. 
 
 
Quality and reporting 
 
We have described a particular form of empirical ethics that integrates moral theorising and empirical 
research and therefore creates, arguably, a ‘new’ form of academic inquiry.   There have, however, 
been concerns expressed about the quality of this kind of empirical ethics, claiming it is bad 
philosophy, bad sociology or a combination of both. In this section we will address these issues as 
they relate to our conception of empirical ethics, sociology in ethics. Other forms of empirical ethics 
that do not integrate the normative and the empirical may not face such reporting challenges as they 
are able to report along more conventional disciplinary lines. 
 
The debate over the quality of empirical ethics mirrors the one that has taken place over quality in 
qualitative research.  This debate is particularly relevant here, as empirical ethics has drawn heavily 
on the insights provided from qualitative research. Like empirical ethics, qualitative research has had 
to spend a considerable amount of time justifying why it is a suitable alternative approach to 
quantitative techniques (Murphy et al, 1998).  Hurst (2010) argues that empirical ethics has focussed 
for too long on more meta-ethical issues such as how to bridge or accommodate the fact/value 
distinction. This has ‘clouded’ the more practical methodological concerns by having the debate at a 
level of abstraction that is removed from quality concerns over the actual presentation and analysis of 
data. The concern with meta-ethical issues is understandable and appropriate for a new 
discipline/area of inquiry/or community of practice where the rationale and foundations of why we are 
doing something need to be articulated and defended. However, it is now appropriate to move on to 
                                                     
84 Although the recent decision of the BMJ not to publish qualitative research may suggest the value of such research is still 
being questioned (Greenhalgh, 2016). 
85  Farsides and William’s work is a good example of this, and they elaborate on this approach in this volume. 
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think about how research in this area is designed, conducted and reported and how we distinguish 
‘good’ research in this area from ‘bad’ or ‘less good’.86 
 
Hurst argues that,  
 
‘[i]deally, empirical research in bioethics should meet standards for empirical and 
normative validity similar to those used in the source disciplines for these methods, 
engaging when needed with colleagues within these disciplines, and articulate empirical 
and normative aspects explicitly and appropriately.’ (2010:444)  
 
This is one approach, but as empirical ethics integrates elements from these source disciplines (for 
example, but not exclusively, sociology and philosophy 87) there needs to be some account of how the 
two are integrated in a robust way.  The ‘Empirical Ethics Working Group’ from Germany (Mertz et al, 
2014; Salloch et al, 2012) see this element as important; and Salloch et al (2012) argue that good 
quality empirical ethics research has to be based on an account of the conceptual relationship 
between the normative and empirical. It could, therefore, be argued that good quality research in 
empirical ethics has to incorporate rigour in both components of empirical ethics (i.e. bioethics and 
sociology) and then explain how the two aspects are integrated or inform each other.88 This seems a 
sensible requirement.  
 
 
Reporting empirical ethics 
 
Questions of quality are closely connected to issues of how to report results and publish empirical 
ethics research. Often, what may appear to be flaw in a study is a consequence of poor reporting and, 
similarly, good, polished reporting of a study can hide a multitude of sins.  Reporting can be a 
particular challenge for interdisciplinary research, as conventions for disciplines differ.  There are a 
few journals that explicitly welcome89 or are dedicated to empirical research in bioethics. The 
American Journal of Bioethics: Empirical Ethics journal, for example, recognises that there are 
different reporting conventions and in its guideline for authors says:  
 
‘Many disciplines are welcome; flexibility with respect to methodological approach; 
structure of manuscript can fit the methodology; less strict about word/page limits; focus 
on integrity of methods’ (Miller, 2013).  
 
The main issue for reporting empirical ethics is that this type of research does not have its own 
established reporting norms and has to fit in with either the norms of bioethics and philosophical style 
papers or the requirements for empirical papers (such as those that require papers to be structured 
with background, methods, results and discussion). Adopting either approach will involve 
compromises in the reporting of the data. 
 
As it was argued above, if empirical ethics papers are expected to give an account of the empirical 
data, the ethical reasoning and how the two are integrated, this can present difficulties both in the 
format required by some journals and in the restrictions on the length of journal articles. This presents 
a challenge for researchers to navigate and makes it hard to include all the key elements in one 
paper. The tight word limits imposed by some journals, for instance, may force authors to choose 
between elaborating on the method and discussing the distinctly ethical implications of the data 
reported in detail. Concentrating on the latter may obfuscate reviewers’ attempts to consider the 
quality of the study design, whilst neglecting this aspect in favour of the former may result in other 
reviewers being unconvinced that the normative conclusions have been properly justified.  Word limits 
in journals, particularly medical journals, are a problem for all healthcare researchers using non-
quantitative methods. The increasing use of online supplementary material by journals has meant that 
space issues could, potentially, be overcome. But even here deciding what is ‘supplementary’ can be 
an issue.  
                                                     
86 See also Singh’s (2016) chapter in this volume. 
87 Empirical ethics draws on other disciplines i.e. psychology, but in this chapter philosophy (specifically ethics) and sociology 
will be used as examples of the disciplinary tension between abstract and empirical theorising. 
88 For examples of an explanation of the method of combining the empirical and the normative see Frith (2012), Ives (2014), 
Molewijk et al. (2004), as well as the above chapters in section 2 of this volume. 
89 For instance Clinical Ethics based in the UK has a section dedicated to empirical ethics 
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So, how might these difficulties of reporting everything in one paper be addressed? We might set out 
two possible responses; but they are a far from ideal, and illustrate the difficulties of having to work 
within reporting structures designed for other disciplines.  
 
First, the results could be divided up, reporting empirical findings according to qualitative norms in a 
journal friendly to qualitative methods and the normative dimensions and reflections in bioethics 
journal, making reference to the findings published elsewhere. What is then lost is the element of 
integration that justified the choice of methodology for the original study design. And, perhaps worse, 
appears to lend weight to the ‘jack of all trades, master of none’ characterisation of empirical ethics 
researchers (Dunn et al, 2008).  
 
Second, the scope of the findings reported could be curtailed, perhaps even reporting and discussing 
only a single finding in an attempt to do justice to both reporting norms and simultaneously 
demonstrate the value of integration. There are several dangers here too. One is that it appears to be 
making much of little, as the richness of the entire data set is somewhat hidden. Another is that it 
opens researchers either to the charge of unethical research practices as data is collected that is not 
reported, or it creates an appearance of salami publication as the process has to be repeated over 
several papers so that the full richness of the data can emerge. It is far from obvious which of these 
pragmatic responses is best, and neither represents how an empirical ethics project should ideally be 
reported. 
 
These disciplinary specific reporting norms are also reflected in the reviewer pool operated by 
journals. Bioethics journal reviewers might not want or feel able to judge the methods sections of an 
empirical ethics paper and may be critical of the normative analysis arguing that insufficient attention 
has been paid to that aspect. Sociology journal reviewers may want more on the methods and be 
critical of the theoretical underpinnings of the paper, as they are unfamiliar with ethical theory and 
forms of argument. 
 
As inter-disciplinary research becomes more established, and alongside this empirical ethics, then 
hopefully journals will be amenable to more varied reporting norms that can encompass different 
forms of research and provide better forums for this kind of research. 90 
 
Assessing quality 
 
In practice how might the quality of empirical research be assessed? It is our view that these quality 
issues will increasingly be addressed as the area grows and a body of good practice builds up. To 
draw on the debates over quality of qualitative research again, there has been growing consideration 
of how to assess the quality of qualitative research (see Murphy et al, 1998; Spencer et al, 2003). 
This has culminated in the formulation of some broad checklists for quality assessment. A similar type 
of checklist could be produced for empirical ethics and Mertz et al (2014) have begun to develop this 
for empirical ethics. They formulate what they call a ‘road map’ with four criteria: 
 
1. Reflection on the relationship between empirical research and normative research questions 
– this addresses how the two elements are integrated and what theoretical frameworks 
underpin the study. 
2. Relevance – this relates to the relevance of the study both for advancing scientific and ethical 
understanding and relevance to society (‘impact’ in UK parlance). 
3. Inter-disciplinary research practice – this has some overlap with the first criteria, and is 
focussed on how different disciplines interact (i.e. how decisions are made on a project with 
sociologists and philosophers), how data is gathered and analysed and the conclusions 
reached. 
4. Research ethics and scientific ethos – such as informed consent, competing interests, 
reporting and consequences for the future. 
 
                                                     
90 Arguably more established researchers in this area could channel efforts into attempting to change the reporting cultural and 
norms of traditional journals – something that may be helped by exploiting the impact advantages of interdisciplinary findings – 
and by themselves being willing to support newer and specialist journals, not just by taking up seats on editorial boards and 
committees but also by using them as an outlet for their own papers and thereby contributing to the virtuous cycle that will 
increase the citation rates for these journals.  
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There are certain generic criteria that any piece of research can be judged against (relevance of data 
to answering the research question, robust of data analysis, how well has the research process been 
documented) although it would not solve debates over quality it could provide a steer in the right 
direction. These criteria are a useful starting point for debate amongst the empirical ethics community 
and could be helpful for thinking about what to include in a journal article and how to report results. 
They provide a set of questions or areas to think about and although they do not provide answers, this 
is not the job of quality guidelines. Therefore, checklists may only take us so far and there is still room 
for judgement, and hence disagreement, over what constitutes good quality research in empirical 
ethics. This is not in itself a bad thing, as all areas and disciplines debate scholarship, critique papers 
and aim to advance knowledge by improving on what has gone before. This is a sign, in fact, of 
healthy academic debate. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have argued that academic disciplines are not static, but ever changing, evolving 
forms of communities of practice. Bioethics is a relative newcomer on the scene that has grown out of 
philosophy to become a different kind of community of practice with different ends, goals, publishing 
forums and norms and, arguably, can be seen as an academic discipline in its own right. Empirical 
ethics is a further development and, under our formulation, draws on normative analysis and 
integrates it with empirical research to produce a distinctive analysis of ethical questions or situations. 
To be an expert in bioethics is to have a set of skills to draw on to help analyse ethical issues; 
determine and define the key areas of contention. Empirical ethics draws on this kind of expertise and 
uses this in empirical research that, under our analysis, has a distinctive set of concerns and priorities 
and makes it a different endeavour (community of practice) from, for example, medical sociology.91  
 
It is too early to say whether empirical ethics can be said to be a discipline in its own right or a 
methodological tool within bio- and applied ethics. As we have framed the concept of ‘discipline’, there 
is nothing that would prevent it from becoming a discipline if a sufficiently well developed community 
of practice grew up and it became institutionally situated. The concerns over quality of this new type 
of enterprise are not surprising and such concerns are raised about all new forms of inquiry. As 
empirical ethics develops, quality and reporting issues will be increasingly debated and standards and 
processes developed and it is unrealistic to expect this to happen overnight. A major hurdle 
continues, however, to be the RAEs in UK (or local equivalents) used to rank Universities and their 
different departments. These forms of assessment tend to be conservatively played by academic 
institutions concerned about league tables. Greater consideration must be given to how to incorporate 
new forms of research endeavours, such as inter-disciplinary research, in RAEs. These exercises are 
very important, and shape how Universities focus their endeavours.  Therefore, how the quality and 
utility of empirical ethics is assessed is a crucial issue for this emerging area of academic inquiry.    
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